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ABSTRACT 
Police routinely give eyewitnesses multiple opportunities to identify the same suspect, 
and numerous exoneration cases demonstrate that this practice can contribute to wrongful 
convictions. Empirical research addressing this practice shows it can lead to the repeated-suspect 
effect, which is a significant increase in suspect identifications after the same suspect has been 
presented in a previous showup or lineup (Steblay & Dysart, 2016). Procedures that tend to 
increase the chance of innocent suspect identifications are considered suggestive and produce 
unreliable eyewitness decisions. Thus, the use of multiple identification opportunities is 
considered suggestive and are discouraged by researchers (Wells et al., 2020). Despite this, 
eyewitness testimony obtained using suggestive procedures is frequently used at trial anyway 
because it is still admissible in court if other criteria are met indicating the identification was 
“nevertheless reliable” (Manson v. Brathwaite, 1977; Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). This 
dissertation builds on past research in this area by examining the effect of more the one 
intervening lineup and biased intervening lineups containing the same innocent suspect in two 
experiments, and how these different intervening lineup manipulations impact identification 
outcomes, confidence, and mechanism-related questions. 
Participants in both experiments watched a crime video, completed an intervening task 
phase, then evaluated a final, fair lineup. For Experiment 1, the intervening tasks were a fair 
lineup, a biased lineup, or a reading comprehension control task, and the final lineup contained 
either an innocent suspect, repeated from the intervening lineup, or the true culprit embedded 
among five fillers. For both studies, a repeated-suspect effect occurred such that a fair 
intervening lineup containing the innocent suspect resulted in more misidentifications of that 
same innocent suspect in the final lineup, consistent with past research. Furthermore, when 
x 
participants received an intervening lineup that was biased towards the repeated innocent 
suspect, the repeated-suspect effect was more pronounced with significantly more innocent 
suspect picks from the final lineup when compared with participants who received a fair 
intervening lineup. Similarly, in Experiment 2, presenting participants with two intervening 
lineups exacerbated repeated-suspect effects relative to only one intervening lineup, particularly 
when one of those intervening lineups was biased. In Experiment 1, participants who received a 
final lineup containing the culprit were equally able to identify the culprit regardless of the 
intervening task condition, indicating that the memory for the true culprit was maintained despite 
exposure to misleading intervening lineups.  
Overall, these studies confirm that multiple identification attempts that each contain the 
same innocent suspect decreases the reliability of eyewitness decisions and increases the risk of 
misidentification for the innocent suspect. Moreover, these effects become stronger when the 
intervening lineups are biased or when more intervening lineups are introduced. Post-
identification questions were also used to determine how the repetition manipulation and lineup 
bias manipulation might influence the relative contribution of two cognitive (dual-process 
recognition and source misattribution) and two social (commitment and demand characteristics) 
mechanisms for repeated-suspect effects. These self-report measures were used to speculate 
about how these processes are involved in creating repeated-suspect effects and to encourage 
future research addressing non-memory mechanisms in eyewitness identification research. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
Most errors in eyewitness identification occur as a result of relatively common, everyday 
failures in decision-making and memory. In the context of everyday life, these types of errors are 
inconvenient, but ultimately relatively inconsequential (Neth & Gigerenzer, 2015). Consider a 
situation where a person comes across someone that they know and, after some thought, decides 
that they recognize them from a yoga class. If the recognizer is mistaken and this person is 
actually a barista who works regularly at the local café, the consequences are unlikely to be 
severe for any of the individuals involved. The “victim” of the memory failure might correct the 
person and may even be mildly offended, but any lasting penalties are unlikely. Yet, if an 
eyewitness to a crime makes an error like this and is mistaken about the reason that they 
remember someone during a criminal investigation, this type of ordinary mistake can lead to 
serious consequences. In fact, using the database of forensic DNA-based exonerations, 
eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of proven wrongful convictions in the US legal 
system (Innocence Project, 2020). 
Consider a case in which decision making and memory errors resulted in the wrongful 
conviction of John Jerome White. White was convicted of sexual assault and burglary in 1979 in 
Atlanta, Georgia, and the victim in this case identified White as her attacker in two different 
lineups. After 22 years in prison, however, White was exonerated using DNA evidence 
(Innocence Project, 2020). In this case, the DNA evidence also revealed the identity of the actual 
perpetrator, a man named James Parham. At first glance, the White case does not seem unique 
when considered among the more than 200 cases of DNA-based exonerations of innocent people 
who were mistakenly identified by eyewitnesses. Here, though, the victim identified White 
twice—initially from a photo-lineup and subsequently identified him again from a live lineup. 
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Importantly, the only person in common between the two lineups was White. That is, the fillers 
in the first (photo) lineup and the second (live) lineup were different people. Presenting an 
eyewitness with multiple lineups is not unusual in the DNA exoneration cases of mistaken 
identification as it is distressingly common in police practice (Steblay & Dysart, 2016). But the 
second (live) lineup in the White case had a bizarre fluke in it. Unbeknownst to anyone at the 
time, one of the people chosen to be a filler in the live lineup was the actual perpetrator, James 
Parham. Despite the fact that the actual perpetrator was now fully visible in person to the victim, 
she made no hesitation in re-identifying White. The live lineup in this case is shown in Figure 1. 
The actual perpetrator is on the far right, and White is in the middle.  
 
 
Figure 1. Lineup containing John Jerome White (third from the left) and the real culprit, James 
Parham (fifth from the left), along with three known-innocent fillers. 
 
There are few details available regarding the initial photo lineup, so no one can say for 
sure why the eyewitness picked White the first time. In hindsight, it is surprising that she picked  
White initially as he does not look very similar to the true culprit at all, with the exception of also 
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being a black male with a moustache. Perhaps the fillers in the first photo lineup were even less 
similar in appearance to Parham than was White. Or perhaps the lineup administrator, who was 
the case detective rather than a blind administrator, cued the witness to pick White from that 
initial photo-lineup in some way. We will never know what exactly transpired, but it is certainly 
possible that the eyewitness was either nudged by the administrator or biased by the lineups.  
However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the most interesting part of this case is that 
the second lineup afforded the eyewitness a good, close, live view of the actual culprit, Parham. 
Why did the eyewitness not pick Parham, the actual culprit, now that he was in the lineup? When 
she identified White in the previous lineup, did she then feel committed to that decision and felt 
she had to pick White in order to stay consistent? Is it because White felt very familiar to her, but 
she misremembered the situation in which she had seen White before? Had exposure to White 
somehow displaced or altered her memory of Parham? These are some of the potential processes 
that were investigated in this dissertation. 
Inspired by instances such as the White case, the current project addressed the effect on 
eyewitness identification decisions and associated confidence levels when the eyewitness is 
repeatedly exposed to a particular suspect across multiple identification procedures (referred to 
here as repeated-suspect effects). A body of literature already exists demonstrating that 
misidentifications of a suspect increase when people see that innocent suspect multiple times, 
whether the prior presentation was in a mugshot (e.g., Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 
2006), an initial showup (e.g., Haw, Dickinson, & Meissner, 2007), or a previous lineup (e.g., 
Steblay & Dysart, 2013). 
The current work draws inspiration from prior repeated-suspect studies but is also unique 
in several ways. First, the current studies extend the repeated-suspect literature by including both 
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biased and fair intervening lineups. To be clear, though the presentation of multiple identification 
procedures containing the same innocent suspect is not a “fair” eyewitness identification 
procedure when considered as a whole. But the individual procedures can be constructed in ways 
that are fair or biased. In other words, a final identification attempt may be constructed in a way 
that ensures the innocent suspect does not stand out (a fair lineup), but a previous lineup may 
make the lineup unfair if the innocent suspect was also in a previous lineup. Investigating the 
role of biased lineups in repeated-suspect effects is an important contribution for a couple of key 
reasons. A biased lineup changes how people perceive, process, and remember the faces in that 
lineup—namely, by drawing attention away from the fillers and towards the suspect in the 
lineup. Thus, there are theoretical reasons to believe that a repeated innocent suspect who 
appears in a previous biased lineup will receive significantly more misidentifications in another, 
fair lineup at a later time compared with if that same innocent suspect was previously seen in a 
fair lineup.  
The use of biased lineups in a repeated-suspect effect paradigm also directly tested the 
suggestion made by the dissenting judges in the Supreme Court decision of Manson v. 
Braithwaite (1977)—that a subsequent fair lineup can “correct” any suggestive influence caused 
by a previous, suggestive identification procedure (such as a biased lineup). Under the current 
law in Manson v. Braithwaite, suggestive identification procedures and any associated 
eyewitness testimony can be admissible in court if the eyewitness meets a set of criteria. That is, 
eyewitness testimony is admissible if the eyewitness was, in general, confident in the 
identification, had a good view of the culprit during the crime, was attentive during the crime, 
the accused matches their initial description of the culprit, and the time that passed between the 
crime and identification procedure was reasonable. But the dissenting judges in this case 
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proposed a different solution. Specifically, they proposed that if a prosecutor learns that an 
identification procedure was unfairly suggestive, the prosecution can “easily arrange another 
lineup conducted under scrupulously fair conditions” (Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977, p.g. 11) to 
ensure their eyewitness can appear in court. The current studies test this idea for the first time. 
These experiments were expected to show that the dissenting judges were misguided and, once 
an eyewitness has been given an opportunity to identify a suspect (in a suggestive or fair 
procedure), any subsequent decisions made by that eyewitness about that same suspect are 
contaminated and should not be admissible in court. 
Second, post-identification questions about participants’ subjective memory experience 
were administered to investigate the nature of any memory processes associated with repeated-
suspect effects. Although assessing memory processes is not unique to this work (see Haw, 
Dickinson, & Meissner, 2007), these experiments are the first to measure a combination of 
memory and non-memory mechanisms in a repeated-suspect paradigm and how the relative 
contribution of these mechanisms might shift as a result of the various repetition manipulations. 
That is, the relative contribution of these memory processes was expected to change according to 
which intervening task a participant received (i.e., fair versus biased initial lineup, the number of 
intervening lineups, and whether the true culprit or the repeated innocent suspect is present in the 
final lineup). For example, determining the source of any feeling of recognition is predicted to be 
influenced by the fairness of the intervening lineup (source monitoring). Specifically, because an 
innocent suspect is more salient in a biased lineup than in a fair lineup, it was predicted that 
participants will be more likely to report that the previous lineup was a source of recognition 
when the lineup is biased rather than fair.  
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The experimental conditions should also change participants’ reports about their 
recognition experience (dual-process recognition). Sometimes eyewitnesses feel like a lineup 
member is familiar, but no particular reason for that familiarity comes to mind. This situation 
may arise when an eyewitness has seen an innocent suspect before in a context where the 
innocent suspect was not particularly salient or memorable, such as a previous, fair lineup in 
which the innocent suspect was embedded among other, similar looking individuals. Other times 
(e.g., after a biased intervening lineup), participants may recall both the face and the context in 
which they have seen that face before. Variations in participants’ reports of recognition 
experiences and source judgments across the current experimental conditions have yet to be 
examined in repeated-suspect effect research. 
Another of the more unique features of the current studies is the use of post-identification 
questions to assess participants’ motivations for misidentifying the innocent suspect more than 
once. Do participants report that they identified the same person again because they wanted to 
appear consistent (commitment processes; Foote, 1951; Kielser, Pallack, & Kanouse, 1968)? Past 
research suggests that choosing a person from an earlier lineup is associated with choosing the 
same person again later if that they appear in a subsequent lineup (Steblay & Dysart, 2016). 
However, calling this a commitment effect involves implicit assumptions about the reasons for 
these choosing patterns without an actual investigation into the underlying mechanisms. 
Specifically, the label “commitment” presumes a motive on the part of the eyewitness—that they 
wish to remain consistent with their earlier decisions (Brigham & Cairns, 1988; Swann & 
Bosson, 2010). Alternatively, though, it may be that these participants simply have a stable 
preference for that individual across identification procedures. That is, those eyewitnesses who 
thought that the innocent suspect looked most like the culprit in the first lineup are also likely to 
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think that person looks like the culprit again even when presented with different fillers. The 
current studies are the first to look for evidence that participants who choose the innocent suspect 
multiple times do so as a result of a particular motive to appear consistent. 
The aspects of the experiments discussed so far appear in both experiments. There were 
also three additional manipulations that only appear in one of the experiments. In Experiment 1, 
half of the people saw the true culprit in their final lineup so that I could measure participants’ 
abilities to maintain the memory for the true culprit’s face despite having viewed an intervening 
culprit-absent lineup and even having picked an innocent person in the intervening lineup. Does 
a biased or fair intervening lineup containing an innocent suspect prevent participants from 
identifying the true culprit in a later lineup, compared with when someone receives no 
intervening lineups? The fate of the memory for the true culprit has not been a focus in past 
research, but knowing the impact of a repeated-suspect on the true memory for the culprit is 
crucial for assessing the risk associated with target-absent, intervening lineups.  
Another possible process that might lead to a repeated-suspect effect is demand 
characteristics. In a real case, for example, the fact that a detective has chosen to include a person 
seen in a previous identification procedure in a new lineup could lead the eyewitness to make an 
inference about what the detective is trying to achieve by repeating that individual. In this 
context, the repetition heavily suggests that the detective believes this person is the culprit and 
expects the eyewitness to pick that person. Experiment 2 explores the possibility of this type of 
social influence by asking some questions of the participants at the conclusion of the study. To 
better simulate a real-world situation, the experimenter remained in the room with the participant 
for the duration of the procedure in Experiment 2 to help create the appearance that the 
experimenter knew how the participant had responded to the previous lineup and had control 
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over what lineup came next. Non-memory factors, such as demand characteristics, have not 
received attention in past studies (the focus has been almost exclusively on memory processes). 
However, as will be discussed later, social influence can have powerful effects on eyewitness 
decision-making independent from, and in conjunction with, memory effects. 
Finally, Experiment 2 introduced an additional intervening lineup phase and increased the 
potential for social influence factors to affect participants. So, Experiment 2 participants might 
have received zero, one, or two target-absent intervening lineups. Moreover, as in Experiment 1, 
the first intervening lineup could be biased or fair lineup containing the innocent suspect, but if 
participants received a second target-absent, intervening lineup, this was always a fair lineup. 
The additional lineup phase was expected to increase the strength of the repeated-suspect 
effect—people should be more likely to misidentify an innocent suspect after seeing them in two 
previous lineups, rather than one or none--but also alter the nature of the associated source 
monitoring, recognition, and social influence processes.  
This paper begins with a review of the relevant literature, starting with a summary of 
eyewitness identification procedures. Specifically, I focus on what the recommendations are for 
administering fair lineups that reduce the risk to innocent suspects, while maintaining the rate of 
true culprit identifications as much as possible. The suggestive eyewitness procedures that are 
relevant to the current dissertation are also discussed with an emphasis on how these procedures 
alter choosing and increase the risk of innocent suspect misidentifications. The next section of 
this dissertation explores the research relevant to investigations of multiple lineup procedures 
and the repeated-suspect effect, before addressing any current research about the repeated-
suspect effect specifically. The introductory section of this dissertation finishes with a 
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comprehensive discussion of the five potential memory and non-memory factors measured here. 
Each is described more broadly and in the specific context of repeated-suspect effects.  
Next, the predictions relevant to Experiment 1 are outlined and the associated 
experimental methods are described, followed by an explanation of the results that were found. 
Results are organized based on the predictions that each set of analyses is designed to address. 
The results of Experiment 1 are summarized before Experiment 2 hypotheses are introduced 
along with the associated experimental design. After the methods for Experiment 2, the results 
are presented, again organized by the hypotheses that each section addresses. Experiment 2 
results are discussed in brief before moving into a General Discussion of these studies. 
Eyewitness Identification Procedures 
An identification procedure is a protocol used by criminal investigators to present a 
person to someone who witnessed a crime with the goal determining whether that person is the 
perpetrator that the witness saw. The person being presented to the witness is called a suspect 
and has been singled out by the police as someone who might have committed the crime. A 
suspect, therefore, might or might not be guilty, but something has made the police think that 
there is a reason present this person the eyewitness. The suspicion could be based on something 
as simple as a hunch, or as strong as physical evidence placing the suspect at the scene of the 
crime (Wells & Quigley-McBride, 2016). Identification procedures are a type of system 
variable—a variable that the criminal justice system has control over and can influence 
eyewitnesses when they provide evidence about the crime or make identification decisions 
(Wells, 1978). Repeated-suspect effects occur when an eyewitness is presented with multiple 
identification procedures containing the same suspect, which is a specific type of eyewitness 
identification context.  
 10 
It is well-established that aspects of an identification procedure can increase suspect 
identifications whether or not the suspect is guilty. Procedures that result in the types of errors 
that put innocent suspects at risk are part of a larger class of suggestive eyewitness identification 
procedures—decision-making protocols that can influence an eyewitness’s memory for the 
crime event or encourage an eyewitness to use information other than their memory for the 
culprit to make an identification decision. There are a variety of identifications procedures that 
can be considered “suggestive,” but this dissertation will focus on those that are most relevant to 
the current studies: showup procedures, biased lineup procedures, and multiple identification 
procedures with the same eyewitness. To begin, though, I will discuss what research 
recommends regarding best practices for identification procedures. 
Research-Based Recommendations for Conducting Eyewitness Identification Procedures 
Eyewitnesses are vulnerable to influence from many different sources, regardless of the 
quality of their memory for the true culprit. Even an eyewitness who originally had a high-
quality memory for the culprit’s face can be influenced to identify an innocent person, or feel 
more or less confident in their decision, based on information encountered before, during and 
after a lineup procedure (Wells & Quigley-McBride, 2016). There are many ways that an 
eyewitness’s ability to identify the culprit may be hindered, and many cannot be controlled by 
law enforcement. Eyewitnesses cannot be prevented from engaging with news media or talking 
to others about the event. Plus, their memory for the culprit’s face may have been limited from 
the outset due to features of the crime, such as the presence of a weapon or a poor view of the 
culprit (estimator variables, Wells, 1978). Law enforcement can control the procedures that they 
use when interacting with eyewitnesses and gathering evidence from eyewitnesses, though, and 
there is a wealth of literature demonstrating best-practices for gathering eyewitness evidence.  
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Ideally, an identification procedure will maximize the number of times eyewitnesses 
make correct identifications of true culprits and minimize the number of misidentifications of 
innocent suspects. There is already a wealth of research concerning the types of procedures that 
are most likely to achieve these outcomes (see Wells et al., 2020 for a recent summary of the 
research-based recommendations). In general, the best-practice recommendation is to have an 
eyewitness take part in a single identification procedure (Steblay & Dysart, 2016) that makes use 
of a fair lineup (Luus & Wells, 1991), accompanied by unbiased instructions informing them 
that the culprit may not be one of the people in the lineup (Clark, 2005). The lineup should be 
administered by a person who does not know who the investigators expect the eyewitness to pick 
from the lineup (double-blind administration; Kovera & Evelo, 2017), and the lineup should 
contain only one person that the police think committed the crime as a result of other 
investigative work (Wells & Turtle, 1986). This suspect should be surrounded by up to five other 
individuals that are known to be innocent—called fillers—that match the general description of 
the suspect and culprit, but are not so similar that even someone who got a good look at the 
culprit would be confused (Fitzgerald, Price, Oriet, & Charman, 2013). There are other 
recommendations detailed by Wells and et al. (2020), but generally speaking if the identification 
procedure follows these guidelines, the procedure will encourage accurate decisions and 
discourage incorrect identifications. 
Many of these research-based recommendations have been used to create law 
enforcement policies, but policies are not always indicative of true police behavior in practice. 
Results from self-report surveys suggest that there are many instances in which policies are not 
followed in the field (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Wells, et al., 2000). For example, police 
frequently conduct showups initially, followed by a lineup containing the same suspect at a later 
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time to ensure the eyewitness evidence will be admissible in court. Similarly, police might 
construct a second, “better” lineup to secure a conviction (Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). Both 
showups and multiple identification attempts with the same suspect have been defined as 
“suggestive” by empirical work, but are regularly used in practice. 
Suggestive Identification Procedure: A Showup Procedure  
A “showup” is an identification procedure in which the eyewitness is simply asked to 
decide if one individual, presented alone, is the perpetrator of the crime (Haw, Dickinson, & 
Meissner, 2007; Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2003). Showups typically occur in a 
specific context—immediately after a crime event. The police called to the scene will often scour 
the surrounding area to see if anyone nearby matches the eyewitness description of the culprit. If 
someone is found during this search, the police might conduct a showup to determine if this is 
the culprit the eyewitness saw (Smith, Wells, Lindsay, & Myerson, 2018). However, an 
identification made using a showup procedure might not be admissible in court—showups are 
suggestive procedures and evidence obtained from suggestive procedures can only be presented 
in court if the judge finds that the identifications was “nevertheless reliable” (two-step test 
outlined in Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977 and Neil v. Biggers, 1972). To do this, the judge will 
assess the eyewitness’s experience during the crime and identification procedure using five 
criteria: the quality of their view, how attentive they were during the crime, how accurate their 
description of the culprit was, how much time passed between the crime and the identification 
procedures, and their certainty in their identification decision. So, a showup could pass these 
criteria and be admissible, but police can also circumvent addressing these criteria by conducting 
a subsequent, fair lineup procedure, which will be admissible as evidence in court under the first 
step of the test. As a result, showups are frequently followed by a lineup procedure at a later time 
with the same suspect and eyewitness to ensure that the eyewitness’s testimony can be used in 
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court (Haw et al., 2007). Therefore, an intervening showup is likely to be one of the most 
common examples of a repeated-suspect effect in the real world. 
Though there are instructions that can be used to reduce the likelihood of a 
misidentification during a showup procedure, such as informing the eyewitness that there will be 
other opportunities to make an identification if they do recognize this person (Eisen, Smith, 
Olaguez, & Skerritt-Perta, 2017; Smith et al., 2018), this procedure is not recommended in 
practice (Wells et al., 2020). A showup procedure cannot be conducted double-blind as it is 
obvious to both the administrator and the eyewitness who the suspect is, so any suggestive 
information will increase identifications of that suspect regardless of their guilt. For instance, the 
knowledge that this person was found nearby is likely to bias eyewitness decisions in favor of 
“guilt” (Smith et al., 2018). Thus, showups put innocent suspects at a higher risk for 
misidentification because every mistaken identification will fall on the innocent suspect. Meta-
analyses confirm that showups result in significantly more misidentifications of innocent 
suspects than fair lineups (Neuschatz, et al., 2016; Steblay et al., 2003). Showups often result in 
more correct identifications too, but this favorable outcome relies on the same mechanism that 
leads to increases in incorrect identifications—the suggestive nature of the procedure rather than 
an actual improvement in eyewitness performance (Smith, et al., 2018).  
Suggestive Identification Procedure: A Biased Lineup 
A lineup is a procedure where an array of photos, or a line of live individuals, is 
presented to an eyewitness. The person suspected of the crime is one of the people in the lineup 
(the guilty or innocent suspect), embedded among similar-looking people that are known to be 
innocent. The known-innocent lineup members are called fillers and can be selected for the 
lineup in various ways, such as matching them to the eyewitness’s description of the culprit, or to 
the suspect. Regardless of how the fillers are selected, a fair lineup must ensure that the suspect 
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does not stand out from the fillers in the lineup and can protect innocent suspects from being 
misidentified by eyewitnesses (Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Wells, Leippe, & Ostrom, 1979).  
A fair lineup is effective in this way because, if an eyewitness views a fair lineup 
containing an innocent suspect (a target-absent lineup), the fillers and the innocent suspect 
should appear to be equally plausible choices to the eyewitness. The lineup is essentially an array 
of innocent people that the eyewitness has never seen before so, provided the lineup is actually 
fair and well-constructed, the eyewitnesses should reject the lineup (culprit is “not present”) or 
identify one of the lineup members at random (Smith, Wells, Lindsay, & Penrod, 2017).  
Well-selected fillers are critical to an effective lineup procedure because they are 
definitely innocent (with the exception of the case described at the start of this dissertation, 
which was an anomaly). For this reason, fillers will never be prosecuted. So, if an eyewitness 
identifies a filler from a fair lineup rather than the suspect, this is relatively inconsequential for 
that filler. However, it does provide the police investigator with useful information about the 
reliability of the eyewitness and the probable guilt of the suspect (Smalarz, Kornell, Vaugh, & 
Palmer, 2019). In other words, the eyewitness felt that someone who is definitely not the culprit 
looked most like the culprit out of these individuals in the lineup, which may mean they did not 
get a good look at the culprit during the crime. If the eyewitness did get a good look at the culprit 
during the crime, their identification of a filler may also mean that the police suspect is not the 
culprit and the eyewitness was willing to select someone from the lineup even if they were a 
poor match to their memory of the perpetrator (Smith, Wells, Smalarz, & Lampinen, 2018). 
For a truly fair lineup, when the suspect is not the culprit, there should be an equal chance 
that the eyewitness will identify one of the fillers or the innocent suspect—a one in six chance 
for a standard six-person lineup. Thus, five out of six decisions about a fair lineup in which an 
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eyewitness is guessing or makes a mistake will land on fillers (filler siphoning; Smith et al., 
2017). However, if the real culprit is in the lineup (a target-present lineup), the eyewitness should 
find that they stand out from the fillers, because the culprit is familiar and the fillers are not. 
Fillers should, therefore, draw fewer choices away from the culprit than they do from an 
innocent suspect when a reliable eyewitness is presented with a fair lineup containing the true 
perpetrator. In this way, fair lineups do not change the decisions of relatively confident 
eyewitnesses with a good memory for the crime, but will redirect the decisions of uncertain 
eyewitnesses and those with weak memories away from the suspect to the fillers (Smith et al., 
2017). A fair lineup procedure is the format recommended for presenting a suspect to an 
eyewitness (Wells et al., 2020). 
Although a lineup is by far the best procedure for obtaining accurate eyewitness 
identification evidence, a lineup can still be administered ineffectively or in a suggestive manner. 
For instance, a biased lineup makes it obvious to the eyewitness, or sometimes anyone who 
views the lineup, which lineup member is the police suspect (Wells, et al., 1979). A lineup can 
be considered biased for many reasons. Lineup instructions that imply that the guilty person is 
definitely present in the lineup increase the rate at which eyewitnesses decide to make an 
identification (Clark, 2005; Malpass & Devine, 1981). When the suspect is the only person 
wearing clothes similar to those worn by the culprit during the crime, this will increase the rate at 
which participants select the suspect from the lineup (Lindsay, Wallbridge, & Drennan, 1987). 
However, the focus in this proposal is on filler-biased lineups.  
Filler-biased lineups are constructed in a way that makes the suspect stand out from the 
other lineup members because the fillers do not match the suspect’s general appearance or 
description. For instance, take a situation where an eyewitness reports that the culprit has a scar. 
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If a lineup is created where the suspect is the only person in the lineup with that type of scar, 
then the lineup is biased. As a result, the same number of people will choose from the lineup as 
would from a fair lineup containing the same suspect, but these choices will accumulate mainly 
on the suspect (Smith et al., 2017). Therefore, although a biased lineup presents multiple people, 
only one of them is a truly plausible identification option. This means that, because the fillers are 
not sufficiently similar to the suspect or the description of the culprit, a biased lineup offers no 
protection to an innocent suspect because no filler siphoning occurs (Smith et al., 2017).  
Bias can be subtle, such as in the White case (see Figure 1), where White is the only 
person in the lineup posing differently. Bias could also be extreme, such as a single, African 
American suspect surrounded by Caucasian fillers, but this is comparatively rare. Whatever the 
source of the bias, a biased lineup draws the decision-maker’s attention to the suspect and 
increases the chance that the suspect will be identified, regardless of their guilt. Sometimes a 
lineup is biased in such an obvious way that any person could look at the lineup and pick out the 
police suspect, such as a lineup in which only the suspect is wearing prison orange. The effect of 
a biased lineup is very similar to a showup, as there is only one plausible option and it is obvious 
who the suspect is. In fact, sometimes a biased lineup can be even more suggestive than a 
showup because lineups tend to increase choosing compared to showups, even when they are 
biased. Thus, the lineup procedure encourages more choosing but directs that choosing towards 
the suspect (Smith et al., 2017).  
Suggestive Procedure: Multiple Identification Attempts with the Same Eyewitness 
There are many reasons why police may present an eyewitness with a suggestive 
identification procedure—the police might be motivated to hold someone responsible for the 
crime, might seek retribution for a distressed witness, or might simply not understand that a 
procedure is suggestive. An eyewitness might also be uncertain the first time they identify 
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someone from a lineup, particularly in situations where there is no other evidence obtained 
during the investigation to suggest that this is the suspect (Wells et al., 2020). A suggestive 
procedure or a procedure in which the eyewitness was hesitant do not make a strong case, so the 
police investigator might feel a need to obtain some other eyewitness evidence to support a 
prosecution. The admissibility criteria for evidence at trial do not prevent police from conducting 
another, fair lineup procedure with the same suspect and eyewitness to ensure that the eyewitness 
evidence is compelling and can be presented in court (Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977). In fact, in 
the dissenting opinion of Manson, the judges specifically suggested that simply administering a 
new, fair lineup procedure with that same suspect was a way to correct for the previous, biased 
identification procedure. However, another identification procedure containing only a single, 
repeated person from a previous lineup is not a research-based solution to a previous, suggestive 
procedure. In fact, repetitive presentation of the same suspect to the same eyewitness is just 
another way to suggest to the eyewitness which lineup member is the suspect. 
Actually, multiple identification procedures are problematic even when no one is 
repeated across identification procedures, though the repeated-suspect case is the focus of the 
current dissertation. When an eyewitness sees many different faces of individuals during the 
course of the criminal investigation, this can harm their ability to identify the true culprit later. 
Why? Each new face is a new piece of information relevant to the case and research shows that a 
plethora of new information can hinder a person’s ability to remember older, similar information 
(e.g., retroactive interference; Windschitl, 1996). That is, eyewitnesses are exposed to so many 
faces during the criminal investigation that this may interfere with their memory for the face 
associated with the actual crime event. In addition, if an eyewitness selects someone from a 
previous lineup (Smalarz et al., 2019) and receives feedback of any kind about a previous 
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identification (Smalarz & Wells, 2014), this will alter the identification decisions they make in 
later lineups even when no one is repeated across procedures. When the same person does appear 
in multiple lineups, the suggestive influence is more obvious and targeted towards a particularly 
lineup member, particularly when the initial presentation of the suspect is also inherently 
suggestive, such as a showup (Haw et al., 2007). 
Research Relevant to Repeated-Suspect Effects 
The research relevant to the repeated-suspect effect falls into four categories: bystander-
culprit confusion effects, mugshot-exposure effects, “blank” lineup procedures, and repeated-
suspect effects. Though not all of these paradigms involve two formal identification attempts, 
they all involve repeated exposure to an innocent person and examine the influence of that 
exposure on eyewitness accuracy in a final identification attempt. Hence, all of these areas are 
relevant to the potential underlying mechanisms that are responsible for repeated-suspect effects, 
and the relevant research in each area will be discussed in turn. 
Bystander-Culprit Confusion Effect 
One reason that a lineup may contain a person that an eyewitness recognizes is when 
multiple individuals are present at the crime scene or seen soon after the crime. Importantly, not 
all of the people present at a crime scene will be culprits—some are bystanders (e.g., Buckhout, 
1974). The eyewitness might become familiar with the faces of any innocent bystanders and any 
culprits and, thus, might experience a similar level of familiarity for culprits and bystanders if 
these individuals are presented in a later identification procedure. Experiments investigating this 
type of scenario refer to this as unconscious transference (Loftus, 1976), but I will refer to this 
type of scenario as the bystander-culprit confusion effect because this label more clearly 
describes this type of identification error. 
 19 
In one of the first empirical studies in this area, Loftus (1976) presented participants with 
photos of a guilty person and faces of other, innocent men. Three days later, the participants 
were asked to view a lineup containing either the person that they were told was the real culprit 
(target-present) or one of the innocent men (target-absent). When presented with the culprit-
absent lineup, participants often misidentified the familiar, innocent face and found it very 
difficult to determine which familiar faces were innocent or guilty (Loftus, 1976). Similar results 
have been found with videotaped events containing a culprit and an accomplice (Geiselman, 
MacArthur, & Meerovitch, 1993). However, other studies have failed to find bystander-culprit 
confusion effects under similar conditions (Geiselman, Haghighi, & Stown, 1996). 
Why do people find it difficult to determine whether a familiar face is the culprit or not? 
Some researchers suggest that people are better able to tell when a person’s face is familiar than 
they are at determining the source of that familiarity. Typically, when unsure, people will draw 
on contextual information or attempt to analyze the quality of their own memory (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the case of a lineup, the context 
itself strongly suggests that anyone who is familiar must be familiar because the person is the 
culprit. If this is the process underlying bystander-culprit confusion, participants will find it easy 
to determine whether a particular face is familiar, but struggle to attribute this feeling of 
familiarity to something other than this person being the culprit. Thus, the eyewitness 
misidentifies a familiar, innocent bystander as the culprit.  
Some research suggests that warning people about the possibility of this confusion 
reduces bystander-culprit confusion effects (Ross, Ceci, Dunning & Toglia, 1994). Bystander-
culprit confusion effects are also sensitive to the timing or features of the encoding scenario, with 
attenuated effects in weaker encoding conditions (Read, Tollestrup, Hammersley, McFazden, & 
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Christensen, 1990). Age and in-group biases can also exacerbate confusion between bystanders 
and culprits. For instance, older adults show different patterns of results when viewing older and 
younger bystanders or culprits (Perfect & Harris, 2003). If the culprit and bystanders belong to a 
different social group than the eyewitness, this increases misidentifications of innocent 
bystanders. However, in general, the literature in this area is mixed. A meta-analysis was 
conducted and the overall effect size associated with bystander-culprit confusion was small, with 
a reported Cohen’s d of approximately 0.19 (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006). Thus, 
bystander-culprit confusion effects do not appear to be as robust as other eyewitness 
identification effects (Geiselman et al., 1996). 
Mugshot-Exposure Effect 
When an eyewitness is exposed to mugshots prior to any formal identification procedure, 
this situation can also create feelings of familiarity for an innocent person. The mugshot-
exposure effect refers to the increase in misidentifications seen after eyewitnesses view many 
mugshots, one of which appears again in subsequent lineup—a mugshot is repeated in a later 
lineup. In contrast to bystander-culprit confusion, mugshot exposure appears to have a larger 
overall effect, with a Cohen’s d of approximately 0.44 (Deffenbacher et al., 2006).  
In some jurisdictions, such as New York City (Goldstein, 2019), it is common for police 
to ask eyewitnesses to look through a large number of mugshots when they do not have a suspect 
yet. Unfortunately, this procedure increases the likelihood of misidentification of an innocent 
person for two reasons. First, the sheer number of people presented in a mugshot set means that 
there is a high chance there will be at least one person that resembles the culprit enough for the 
eyewitness to pick them out. Second, unlike a situation with one culprit and a number of 
innocent bystanders, someone in a mugshot book can very easily become a suspect—even if the 
eyewitness is not sure, the person in the mugshot clearly has a history of criminal behavior, and 
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the police will be willing to believe they may be guilty (Wells, 1988). Even if the witness does 
not identify someone from the mugshots, the potential for misidentification remains—if one of 
the mugshots is repeated in a later identification procedure (e.g., lineup), an innocent person 
might stand out as familiar simply because the face was viewed earlier (Brown, Deffenbacher, & 
Sturgill, 1977; Perfect & Harris, 2003). As mentioned already, an eyewitness might easily be 
confused by a feeling that they have seen a face before, believing the face was present at the 
crime rather than seen in the mugshots (for a review, see Deffenbacher, et al., 2006).  
Mugshot-exposure effects have been demonstrated to occur in various experimental 
conditions. Misidentifications occur when participants view just a few or many mugshots. For 
instance, participants viewed only 18 mugshots in an early study (Brigham & Cairns, 1988), but, 
in a later study, participants viewed 600 mugshots (Dysart, Lindsay, Hammond & Dupuis, 2001). 
These effects are found when the to-be-remembered face appears in live events (e.g., Brown et 
al., 1977 in Experiments 2 and 3, and Lindsay et al., 1994), a crime video (Memon, Hope, 
Bartlett, & Bull, 2002), or photographs (Brown et al., 1977 in Experiment 1; Loftus 1976). 
Mugshot-exposure effects also occur even when they are not the focus of an investigation, such 
as when it is just one of many variables manipulated systematically to influence encoding and 
retrieval in eyewitness identification tasks (Cutler, Penrod, O’Rourke, & Martens, 1986; Cutler, 
Penrod, & Martens, 1987).  
There are conditions that can exacerbate these effects too, such as including biased 
instructions, drawing attention to mugshots with clothing biases, or changing the order of the 
mugshots according to the eyewitness description of the culprit (Lindsay, Nosworthy, Martin, & 
Martynuck, 1994). In contrast, there is little evidence that the effect of viewing mugshots can be 
reversed once an eyewitness has seen the photos. For instance, mugshot viewing still results in 
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many false alarms even when participants are encouraged to use techniques known to improve 
memory performance, such as context reinstatement (Memon, et al., 2002). Mugshot-exposure 
paradigms have been important for determining some of the processes responsible for increased 
false alarms after seeing a set of mugshots.  
Consider one of the first examples of mugshot-exposure effects, where participants 
learned a large number of faces in two different rooms (Experiment 1; Brown, et al., 1977). 
Although people were proficient at distinguishing between faces seen before versus new faces, 
they were less capable at reporting the room in which they viewed a particular face. Furthermore, 
when people witnessed an event and then half of the participants viewed mugshots (Experiments 
2 and 3), the people who viewed the mugshots made significantly more misidentifications in a 
later lineup that includes people who were in the mugshots. These experiments show that people 
easily determine when someone’s face is familiar, but cannot easily determine the reason for the 
familiarity.  
The mechanisms that have been used to explain these effects are discussed in detail later 
in this paper. In brief, though, researchers typically conclude that a witness is using other 
available information to provide clues about where the feeling of familiarity came from (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974), concluding that someone must be the culprit if their face does not feel new 
(Yonelinas, 2002), or failing to accurately determine the sources of memory (Johnson et al., 
1993). These are the same processes that are typically used to explain bystander-culprit 
confusion—people seek other information, analyze the memory, or look to the context to explain 
why a face is familiar (Johnson et al., 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Finally, in situations 
where an eyewitness actually chooses one of the mugshots, research shows that people are more 
likely to choose that face again if it appears in a final lineup compared with a face seen the 
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mugshot phase but not selected (e.g., in Brigham & Cairns, 1988 and Dysart et al., 2001). This 
associated between choosing during an earlier mugshot phase or intervening identification 
procedure phase has been referred to as a commitment effect in the literature. 
Blank Lineup Paradigms 
The concept of “blank” lineups was originally introduced to separate reliable 
eyewitnesses from eyewitnesses who are highly likely to make an identification error (Wells, 
1984; Smalarz et al., 2019). For this procedure, eyewitnesses are shown an initial lineup and, 
unbeknownst to the eyewitness, this lineup is always target-absent and contains only known 
innocent fillers. Thus, there is no culprit nor any designated innocent suspect, only people who 
are known to be innocent. The initial lineup serves as a test that eyewitnesses could pass by 
rejecting the lineup and saying that the culprit is “not present” (Wells, 1984; Wells & Turtle, 
1986). However, because eyewitnesses will often adopt a relative decision-making strategy when 
viewing a lineup, some eyewitness will misidentify a person in the initial lineup that they believe 
looks most like the person they remember from the crime (Palmer, Brewer, & Weber, 2012; 
Wells, 1984). Including a blank lineup first helps to distinguish between eyewitnesses who will 
identify someone even when they have a weak memory, are uncertain, or are guessing (a low 
criterion for identification) and eyewitnesses who will wait until they see someone that is a 
sufficiently high match to their memory (higher criteria for an identification decision). There is 
an important distinction between blank-lineup and repeated-suspect paradigms, though—there is 
no risk of wrongful conviction for anyone in the initial lineup and no one appears in both lineups. 
 Although they cannot speak to the influence of a repeated individual on decisions, blank 
lineups can speak to the decision-making patterns that occur when someone is presented with 
multiple lineup procedures and can make an identification in each instance. For instance, Palmer 
et al. (2012) investigated the impact of a blank lineup on a subsequent lineup decision. In Studies 
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1a and 1b, people who chose from the initial, blank lineup were less likely to identify someone 
from the subsequent lineup compared with those who did not choose from the blank lineup or 
who never received an initial lineup. The blank lineup also reduced the number of culprit 
identifications, particularly when the participant chose from the blank lineup, but did not affect 
the number of filler identifications. Thus, the blank lineup actually impaired performance. Study 
2, however, showed that choosing from the initial, blank lineup was also associated with reports 
of a weaker memory of the culprit. Thus, the blank lineup highlighted those individuals who 
were more likely to make memory errors. 
One reason for conducting a blank lineup is that, theoretically, it should allow police to 
quickly determine the reliability of an eyewitness before showing them the lineup containing 
their suspect. This means that, if people became reluctant to choose or less accurate after an 
initial, blank lineup, then blank lineups are not useful for their intended applied purpose. In light 
of the studies already discussed here, blank lineups do not seem to help researchers sort between 
reliable and unreliable eyewitnesses, rather blank lineups have a negative impact on eyewitness 
accuracy in a later procedure. Even when feedback was provided to eyewitnesses after the blank 
lineup, there was no improvement in outcomes (Palmer, Brewer, & Weber, 2010a). When 
participants were told that they made an incorrect identification, their performance was worse on 
the subsequent lineup containing the culprit than people who did not receive an initial, blank 
lineup. A correct rejection of the blank lineup made no significant difference when participants 
received feedback and impaired performance when no feedback was given. Thus, these results 
suggest that multiple identification procedures can only impair eyewitness outcomes, with no 
evidence that blank lineups could improve performance (Palmer et al., 2010a). 
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In two recent experiments, researchers investigated the validity of the practice of 
“burning” witnesses (i.e., no longer considering that witness to be a reliable source of 
information) who demonstrate poor recall or a willingness to identify someone even when 
uncertain (Smalarz et al., 2019). For both experiments, a video was presented and then some 
participants saw an initial, target-absent lineup, and others did not (control condition). 
Experiment 1 included only target-present final lineups, whereas Experiment 2 manipulated 
whether the culprit was present in the final lineup or not. As in Palmer et al. (2012), “blank 
lineup” participants were split into two categories for analyses: 1) those that chose someone from 
the blank lineup, and; 2) those that rejected the blank lineup. The results support the practice 
where police discontinue using eyewitnesses that choose from blank lineups, believing this to be 
a sign of unreliability. In these studies, participants who rejected the initial lineup showed similar 
final lineup performance to the control condition, but participants who chose from the blank 
lineup made decisions with little diagnostic value in subsequent lineups (Smalarz et al., 2019).  
Blank lineups as a formal procedure are not popular in practice and are not recommended 
by researchers (Wells et al., 1998; 2020). However, police will sometimes disregard the fact that 
an eyewitness picked a filler from a prior lineup, or bury evidence that the eyewitness took part 
in a previous lineup at all (Smalarz, et al., 2019). Thus, even though the research shows that 
eyewitnesses who make an identification of a filler in a first lineup are not reliable for a second 
lineup, police practices sometimes fail to properly reflect this fact. With respect to the current 
project, the blank lineup studies demonstrate that, even when none of the lineup members are 
repeated, making decisions about multiple lineups can hinder eyewitness decisions. 
Direct Studies of the Repeated-Suspect Effect 
The repeated-suspect effect concerns situations where the same suspect is presented to 
the same eyewitness in multiple, formal identification procedures presented serially. This is 
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different from the paradigms used to investigate bystander-culprit confusion, mugshot exposure, 
and blank lineups, though the mechanisms involved in all of these effects are similar. For 
instance, the cognitive and social processes that contribute to the mugshot-exposure effect and 
repeated-suspect effect are similar, but the relative contribution of the processes may differ 
because the mugshot-exposure effect involves a slightly different paradigm. The type of situation 
that results in a single person appearing in multiple, formal identification attempts is qualitatively 
different to a situation where a lineup is created after an eyewitness views many mugshots. When 
an eyewitness is asked to inspect mugshots (images of people who have come into contact with 
the criminal justice system before), the police usually do not have a suspect and this is one 
method used to find a suspect. When a formal, identification procedure is conducted, the police 
already have a hypothesis about who the culprit is as a result of other investigative work, and 
they test that hypothesis by showing their suspect to the eyewitness. The police investigator 
might do this by placing their specific suspect in a showup, where suspect is presented alone, or 
in a lineup, where the suspect is embedded among known-innocent fillers (Wells & Luus, 1990). 
Regardless of the exact nature of the identification procedure, the goal of the identification 
procedure is to see if the eyewitness recognizes a specific suspect from the crime event. 
If this identification test is done “wrong” though, any information obtained is potentially 
unreliable. For instance, if anyone is presented to the same eyewitness in multiple lineups, such 
as a filler, identification data can be influenced by the repeated procedure itself. In particular, if 
the police suspect appears in more than one lineup, it is potentially impossible to determine 
whether the eyewitness identified them due to their memory of the crime, the previous lineup, or 
both (Steblay & Dysart, 2016). Consider again the White case described earlier. We know that 
White appeared in both the intervening, photo lineup and the final, live lineup. In addition, we 
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now know that the final lineup was, in fact, target-present because Parham was later discovered 
to be the true culprit rather than a mere filler. At the time, though, police did not know ground 
truth—that is why they completed the identification procedures. Although, the second 
identification of White could have been because the eyewitness was certain that White was the 
culprit or because White appeared in the previous lineup, the police interpreted her identification 
as incriminating evidence against White. 
The literature addressing repeated-suspect effects is not large and there is variation in the 
experimental methods used. Overall, however, the studies tend to show some consistencies in 
methods and results. First, participants are exposed to the culprit, either using a photo (Haw et 
al., 2007), a video (Steblay, Tix, & Benson, 2013), or a live encounter (Gorenstein & Ellsworth, 
1980). Then, usually after some time has passed, participants are presented with the first 
identification procedure (the intervening lineup or showup) which contains someone who is not 
the culprit but will appear again in the final lineup. A control condition is used during the 
intervening lineup phase so that some participants make judgments about a final lineup after an 
intervening lineup that does not include a repeated individual. The retention interval between 
phases varies a lot between experiments (from a few minutes in Haw et al., 2007 to two weeks in 
Steblay et al., 2013), but participants will see a final lineup some time later for which 
identification decisions will be analyzed to look for repeated-suspect effects. Sometimes, the 
final lineup contains the culprit that was repeated in a previous lineup. In other conditions, the 
designated innocent suspect appears in the final lineup and the intervening lineup (e.g., Steblay 
et al., 2013). Other times, the final lineup will contain the culprit, the repeated innocent person, 
or both the culprit and the person from the previous lineup (e.g., Haw et al., 2007). Despite 
variation within each phase described here, there is a typical paradigm used for examining 
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increased innocent suspect identifications when that innocent suspect appears in both the initial 
and final lineup. 
The earliest example of repeated-suspect effect research involved a staged event during a 
large psychology class, where the “culprit” interrupted the class (Gorenstein & Ellsworth, 1980). 
Immediately after this class, half of the students were dismissed and the other half remained 
behind to complete a 12-person lineup. Between four and six days later, everyone from the class 
was presented with a six-person lineup, which always contained the culprit. In addition, though, 
for some of the participants, the final lineup also contained one of the individuals from the initial, 
12-person lineup (the repeated innocent suspect). The results showed that the students who 
viewed the initial lineup often selected the repeated innocent face rather than the true culprit’s 
face, suggesting that the intervening lineup both impaired people’s ability to accurately identify 
the culprit and increased their chance of misidentifying an innocent person. 
Although mugshot exposure and other lineup effects were studied extensively during this 
time, repeated-suspect effects received little attention for the next 20 years. Two publications 
then emerged from a research team that emphasized the effect of encoding quality and amount of 
time between identification procedures in the repeated-suspect effect. Participants in the first of 
these projects saw a photo of a face for 60 seconds in the initial session, which served as the 
“culprit” in this experiment (Hinz & Pezdek, 2001). The following week, participants viewed a 
six-person, target-absent lineup that sometimes contained an innocent person who would appear 
in the final lineup too. The six-person, final lineup took place two days later and could contain 
the true culprit, the innocent person from the intervening lineup, or both of these individuals 
embedded among new fillers. As anticipated, when the innocent suspect was repeated, that 
person was misidentified more frequently in the final lineup, with the highest misidentification 
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rates occurring when the true culprit was not also present in the lineup. That is, when the culprit 
and the repeated innocent person appeared in the final lineup, participants identified the true 
culprit less frequently compared with when the true culprit appeared with a set of five new 
fillers. Finally, when the true culprit appeared alone in the final lineup, the correct identification 
rate was fairly consistent across the experimental and control conditions, both before and after 
“non-choosers” were forced to identify someone. These results suggest that the memory for the 
culprit survives intervening lineups. 
The set of experiments manipulated other variables known to impair an eyewitness’s 
ability to accurately identify the true culprit in an identification procedure (Pezdek & Blandon-
Gitlin, 2005). In the first experiment, the paradigm was similar to the earlier study (Hinz & 
Pezdek, 2001), but the race of the culprit was manipulated such that some participants saw a 
culprit that was a different race to them and others saw a same-race culprit. Identification of 
individuals from a different race is known to be more difficult and impair eyewitness 
identification performance (cross-race effect, Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Because cross-race 
identification of a culprit is already more difficult, misidentifications of a repeated innocent 
suspect were significantly more common for those in the cross-race condition than those in the 
same race condition. In addition, accurate identifications were much lower for those in the cross-
race condition. Thus, it appears that when the identification task more difficult, the effect of a 
repeated innocent person is stronger. 
In the second experiment (Pezdek & Blandon-Gitlin, 2005), the strength of encoding was 
manipulated by presenting the culprit’s face to participants for 10 or 60 seconds in the initial 
session. The second manipulation involved shifting when the intervening lineup took place 
during the procedure—the intervening lineup was either presented closer in time to the initial 
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experimental session or closer in time to the final lineup. Again, when participant’s identification 
task was more difficult (shorter encoding time), there were significantly more misidentifications 
of the repeated innocent person and significantly fewer correction identifications. In addition, 
when the intervening lineup took place closer in time to the final lineup, this also resulted in a 
stronger repeated-suspect effect (more misidentifications of the repeated innocent person and 
fewer correct identifications). 
So far, the studies described have followed a fairly uniform design using classic 
eyewitness identification paradigms and lineup identification procedures. A study by Haw et al. 
(2007) introduced a within-subjects design so as have more power to investigate the processes 
responsible for these effects (which they called eyewitness carryover effects in Haw et al., 2007). 
In addition, they used a showup procedure for the intervening identification procedure rather 
than a lineup. Showups are suggestive, so this design decision might have also increased the 
magnitude of the repeated-suspect effect. The final, unique aspect of this study was that the 
researchers collected self-report measures on the details of participants’ memory experiences. 
Thus, for each final lineup decision, there was an associated “remember”, “know”, or “guess” 
judgment. Dual-process recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2002) will be discussed in more detail 
in the next section of this paper, but this was the first study to address the role of dual-processing 
(familiarity and recollection processes) hypothesis in the repeated-suspect effect. 
Participants in the Haw et al. (2007) study completed a single session. First, they studied 
eight faces that served as “culprits” in this study. After a three-minute filler task, participants 
made decisions about six different, intervening showups. This was followed by another three-
minute task before participants were presented with sixteen different, final lineups that they 
made identification decisions about. Half of these lineups contained a culprit from the study 
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phase and half did not include any of the culprit faces. Some of these final lineups also included 
a repeated, designated innocent suspect who had appeared in one of the intervening showups.  
Haw et al. (2007) found that repeated innocent suspects were identified at a significantly 
higher rate than photos that were not repeated (a repeated-suspect effect). In addition, correct 
identifications were less common when both a target (culprit) faces and a repeated (innocent 
person) face were present in a final lineup, as participants often misidentified the innocent person 
that had appeared in the showups. When a culprit was not in the lineup, though, and the lineup 
only contained the repeated innocent person and five new fillers, the repeated-suspect effect was 
strongest. Identifying the innocent suspect during the showup phase was also related to 
identifying the innocent suspect in the final lineup phase. This means that participants who chose 
the innocent suspect during the intervening showup phase had a higher innocent suspect 
misidentification rate in the final lineup than those who did not identify the innocent suspect 
during the showup phase (referred to by the authors as a commitment effect).  
Misidentifying the innocent suspect in two different identification procedures was also 
associated with significantly more “remember” reports. Haw et al. (2007) interpreted this as an 
increase in false recognition when participants identified the innocent suspect twice. That is, they 
posited that act of identifying the culprit during the intervening showups may make recognizing 
that person again later feel like a stronger memory experience than if that person had only been 
passively viewed. This difference in subjective memory experience led to an increase in the 
number “remember” judgments for individuals who misidentified the innocent suspect twice 
compared with individuals who made a single misidentification during the final lineup. 
A more recent study followed a classic eyewitness identification approach with one set of 
lineup data per participant, a videoed crime event, and two well-constructed lineups (Steblay et 
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al. 2013). Participants completed two experimental sessions, which were 14 to 18 days apart. In 
the first session, participants watched a 30-second video of a perpetrator snatching someone’s 
purse, received pre-lineup instructions, and then made an identification decision about a six-
person lineup (intervening lineup). For the second session, participants received lineup 
instructions again and made decisions about a new lineup (final lineup). For both lineups, the 
experimenter presented either a target-present or target-absent lineup, which was randomly 
assigned to be in a simultaneous (all photos at once) or sequential format (one at a time). Thus, 
the final lineup either contained the culprit from the video (target-present) or the designated 
innocent suspect that appeared in the intervening lineup (target-absent). Thus, in this study, none 
of the lineups pitted the guilty person and the innocent suspect against one another. 
The results were consistent with previous studies. Participants were able to identify the 
culprit if the guilty suspect appeared in one of the lineups, though accuracy did not improve and 
confidence was inflated when the culprit was repeated. When the innocent suspect was repeated, 
in contrast, misidentification of this lineup member increased significantly between the 
intervening and final lineup. Thus, seeing the guilty person in multiple lineups did not change 
accurate decisions very much, but significantly increased incorrect identifications of the innocent 
suspect for the final lineup. Steblay et al. (2013) also found evidence that, participants who chose 
the innocent or guilty suspect in the intervening lineup were more likely to choose that person 
again if they appeared in the final lineup than participants who did not choose one of the 
repeated individuals in the first session (which they described as a commitment effect). Finally, 
lineup format altered identification decisions such that sequential lineups reduced the repeated-
suspect effect—reduced misidentifications of a repeated innocent suspect—as compared to a 
simultaneous procedure. Thus, it was already well-known that sequential procedures are slightly 
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better than simultaneous procedures at reducing the risk of misidentification for innocent 
suspects, but these results demonstrate that sequential lineup presentation better protects innocent 
suspects even when they are repeated across identification procedures. 
Overall, there is fairly strong support for the idea that participating in multiple 
identification procedures is detrimental to eyewitness identification outcomes, regardless of 
whether someone is repeated across the procedures. It is also clear from the literature reviewed 
here that including the same person in multiple identification procedures is particularly 
detrimental as it can increase misidentifications of a particular person who was not involved in 
the original crime event (repeated-suspect effects, see Steblay & Dysart, 2016 for a review). The 
evidence suggests that when an eyewitness views a showup or a lineup containing any suspect, 
this contaminates any subsequent identification procedures, especially those that contain the 
same suspect, shown to the same eyewitness (Smalarz et al., 2019; Steblay & Dysart, 2016; 
Wells et al., 2020). Thus, relying on eyewitness evidence in any situation involving a multiple 
identification procedure is ill-advised, and more than one identification procedure presented to 
an eyewitness in which only one person is repeated is highly questionable. Despite this, multiple 
identification procedures in which the police suspect appears multiple times are often still 
admitted in court using the two-step legal test from Manson (Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977), 
providing law enforcement with little motivation to change their methods. 
Processes and Mechanisms Contributing to the Repeated-Suspect Effect 
The processes and mechanisms relevant to eyewitness misidentification tend to fall into 
two main categories (Steblay et al., 2013): 1) memory factors (e.g., dual-process recognition, 
source monitoring, and memory for the culprit), and; 2) non-memory factors (e.g., commitment 
effects and social influence). Each of these are relevant to the current dissertation and will be 
considered below in the context of repeated-suspect effects. 
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Memory Factors 
Memory is almost always an important component when considering eyewitness 
identification errors. Did the eyewitness identify this person because the face is clearly the same 
as the face they remember seeing during the crime event? Or is the eyewitness just inferring that 
this must be the criminal because this face stands out as more familiar than the other faces? By 
answering questions like this, researchers can make conclusions about some of the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying specific eyewitness errors. 
Dual-process models of recognition memory 
As the name suggests, the dual-process model of recognition memory posits that a 
person’s memory experience is created by two different processes that some researchers have 
called recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). The contribution of each process when 
retrieving specific episodes from the past will alter the subjective experience for the person 
attempting to recognize something or someone. As a result, both processes will influence any 
judgments that people make about their memory for a person or other item. Some researchers 
refer to recollection and familiarity as “remembering” and “knowing,” respectively (Tulving, 
1985). Remembering and knowing are the labels typically used when asking participants to 
report their subjective experience during recognition memory experiments (e.g., Meissner, 
Tredoux, Parker, & MacLin, 2005). Dual-process approaches theorize that 
recollectionl/remembering and familiarity/knowing are distinct, categorical descriptors of 
different processes through which recognition can occur.  
In the past, there has been some disagreement about the nature of the distinction between 
remember, know, and guess processes (Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2002). Some 
researchers theorized that the distinction is purely quantitative in nature and can be measured by 
determining the strength of the memory trace and how confident the recognizer is (e.g., 
 35 
Donaldson, 1996). Thus, a very strong memory trace will result in a “remember” judgment and 
high confidence. The weaker the memory trace, the more common judgments like “know” or 
“guess” become, with each of these levels of recognition associated with a distinct decision 
criterion (Gardiner et al., 2002). Other researchers (e.g., Jacoby, 1991 and Rajaram, 1996) posit 
that decision criteria and memory strength alone cannot explain the distinction between 
“remember” and “know” experiences. A “remember” judgment represents a qualitatively 
different memory trace than would be associated with a “know” judgment about the same 
information. Moreover, “knowing” describes an automatic process that is affected by processing 
fluency, whereas “remembering” is consciously controlled. Though diverging opinions still exist, 
most researchers now describe familiarity and recollection as qualitatively different, subjective 
memory experiences (for a meta-analysis, see Gardiner et al., 2002). 
Familiarity refers to situations in which someone simply has a sense that an item or 
person has been seen before, or that a piece of information is not new. This “sense” arises 
without any accompanying information about the encoding experience or reasons for the feeling 
of familiarity (Jacoby, 1991). The phenomenological experience of familiarity feels similar to 
experiencing other heuristic-type processes (System 1 processes; Kahneman, 2011), and will 
arise quickly and automatically in response to a stimulus, without effort on the part of the 
perceiver. That is, when people encounter a stimulus that has been seen before, such as a face, it 
is easier to process than a novel face would be. The feeling associated with ease of processing 
signals to the perceiver that the face belongs to someone they have encountered previously, but 
lacks details about why the face is familiar such as how or when the original encounter occurred 
(Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Rajaram, 1996; Steblay et al., 2013). Therefore, other information 
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or strategies might be used to infer something about why this person is familiar (Mandler, 1980; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Familiarity is thought of as a continuous variable, so a feeling of familiarity can be very 
strong, very weak, or anything in between (MacPherson, 2015). However, only a few researchers 
measure “know” judgments in a graded manner (e.g., Palmer, Brewer, McKinnon, & Weber, 
2010b). To help explain how familiarity is a matter of degree, take a situation where a person has 
met someone else only once before, in passing. They recognize the other person, but know 
nothing about the person or the circumstances in which they have met. In addition, because they 
have only encountered this other person once before, the feeling of familiarity is weak. They 
may have even taken some time to realize that this person was familiar. In contrast, if the 
familiar person was someone who regularly attended the same events, they might find this 
person’s face extremely familiar. They might even feel quite frustrated at the absence of other 
information to accompany this feeling—what is their name? Where have we met before? These 
examples are one way to portray different extremes on the familiarity continuum. Despite this, 
familiarity is usually measured by asked people to make a forced-choice, categorical judgment 
between “remember”, “know”, or “guess” (Meissner et al., 2005; Palmer et al., 2010b). 
Dual-process models posit that recollection processes occur independently of familiarity. 
Recollection is a controlled process that provides rich information about previous encounters 
with the subject of the recognition experience—a qualitatively different experience to familiarity 
(Gardiner et al., 2002; Rajaram, 1996). In other words, someone is having a recollection 
experience when they recognize an item or person and can recall details about the relevant 
encoding experience (Yonelinas, 2002). To illustrate, consider the example in the previous 
paragraph. A recollection experience in the same context would mean that, when that person was 
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recognized, the feeling associated with that recognition was not merely a sense that their face has 
been encountered before. Rather, the specific instance(s) in which they have been encountered 
before will also come to mind. Maybe they met this person last year at the same event. Because 
they are experiencing episodic recall, they will also remember contextual details about the 
encoding episode, such as their name, as well as specific details about their conversation and the 
event itself.  
Unlike familiarity, recollection is not treated as continuous in dual-process models. 
Rather, recognition experiences must cross a threshold or meet particular criteria to be 
categorized as recollection (MacPherson, 2015; Wixted, 2007). According to this way of 
thinking, recollection is binary—something is recalled or not—but the way dual-process 
recognition is typically measured does not reflect this distinction. Participants are usually asked 
to choose the category (“remember”, “know”, or “guess”) that best describes their memory 
experience, and each category is defined in detail (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). This 
means, though, that a memory experience with some features of recollection, but not enough to 
cross the “recollection threshold”, falls within familiarity. Thus, a familiarity judgment could be 
made in a situation where a person does actually know something about the encoding event 
(Palmer et al., 2010b). A recollection judgment could also encompass a variety of recognition 
experiences. It could be used to label a strong recognition experience associated with a very 
detailed and clear memory trace, or a single coding experience remembered with minimal level 
of detail. But recollection is not measured in this way, despite research suggesting that 
recollection functions as a continuous variable (Mickes, Wais, & Wixted, 2009). 
Because recollection provides more detail regarding the encoding episode, researchers 
will often state that recollection experiences tend to be more accurate than familiarity (e.g., Wais 
 38 
et al., 2006), and that eyewitness misidentification is often the result of relying on familiarity. In 
particular, if the same suspect is presented to an eyewitness in multiple lineups, that suspect’s 
face will seem familiar for reasons that are not relevant to whether that is the face of the culprit 
or not (Haw et al., 2007; Steblay & Dysart, 2016). In this way, mere familiarity can contribute to 
repeated-suspect effects. To clarify, I will revisit the case of White and Parham. White’s face 
would have looked familiar to the eyewitness because she had seen White in the first, photo 
lineup. She was not wrong that his face was familiar. Her mistake was that she inferred that his 
face was familiar because he was the culprit.  
But unless an eyewitness experiences recollection and, therefore, recalls the context of 
encoding too, they must interpret their feelings of familiarity based on clues from the recognition 
context (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Why would a person in a police lineup look familiar? The 
context strongly suggests what a familiar face should mean—this must be the perpetrator. But 
why, then, did the eyewitness in the White case not recognize the true culprit (Parham)? Because 
familiarity is graded, if two faces in the lineup were familiar, White’s face could have seemed 
more familiar than Parham’s. The eyewitness had a good view and plenty of time to study 
White’s face during the lineup, which also occurred more recently than the crime. Crime events 
are typically not conducive to encoding. In fact, the victim reported being stressed and scared 
during the crime, and was not wearing her prescription glasses. Thus, the encoding event for 
White’s face was likely more favorable for forming a memory than was the crime event and 
reliance on familiarity could have contributed to White’s wrongful conviction. 
However, even if familiarity can often contribute to eyewitness errors, it does not 
necessarily follow that recollection, a process independent of familiarity, would be 
comparatively more accurate. Certainly, by definition, recollection requires someone to 
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remember the specific event that produced the recollection experience. Would details about the 
encoding experience only be available if the recognizer was remembering the person or 
information correctly? In eyewitness identification situations, remembering the specific reason 
that a face is familiar might well be essential to making a correct decision (Meissner et al., 2005). 
Yet, people will make recollection judgments when they are incorrect, so self-reports about 
memory processes like recollection cannot guarantee accuracy (Lindsay, 2008). For example, in 
Haw et al. (2007), individuals who chose the same innocent suspect from an initial showup and 
subsequent lineup often reported experiencing recollection about these incorrect recognition 
decisions (called false recollection). Studies like this suggest that an incorrect recognition 
experience can feel like a detailed recollection of a specific encoding event in repeated-suspect 
effect paradigms. 
Source monitoring in recognition memory 
Source misattribution is another potential mechanism underlying repeated-suspect 
effects, and in many ways is extremely similar to dual-process recognition. There are some 
important distinctions, though, that I will clarify here. In the Source-Monitoring Framework 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), “source” refers to the circumstances under which a 
person, item, or piece of information was encoded as a memory, allowing it to be recognized and 
tied to this specific encoding event later. Information that contributes to accurate source 
monitoring includes the place where encoding occurred, the time encoding occurred, the context 
surrounding the encoding event, and the modality through which the relevant item was 
experienced (Lindsay & Johnson, 1991). People often have a very clear memory for a piece of 
information, an item, or a person, but have trouble determining the source of that memory. The 
Brown et al.’ (1977) mugshot-exposure study (Experiment 1) is a particularly compelling 
example of how source-monitoring can contribute to eyewitness misidentification. Participants 
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made very accurate judgments about whether a face was old or new, but had great difficulty 
remembering in which of two rooms each face was studied—their ability to recognize faces was 
superior to their ability to accurately determine the source of the recognition. 
Source monitoring often involves inferring the correct source from aspects of the memory 
that can provide clues about when the learning occurred (e.g., does the memory feel vivid and 
clear, indicating the event was recent?). People will also assess how plausible the potential 
sources of the memory are along with other heuristic-type reasoning strategies, as well as the 
context in which the recognition occurs (Johnson et al., 1993). Take, for example, an eyewitness 
who recognizes an innocent person presented in a lineup procedure. If the eyewitness was also 
able to attribute that recognition to the proper source, they might avoid a misidentification—they 
might realize that this person was a bystander at the crime scene (bystander-culprit confusion; 
Deffenbacher, et al., 2006), in one of the mugshots that they saw earlier in the investigation 
(mugshot-exposure effect; Deffenbacher et al., 2006), or in a previous showup or lineup 
(repeated-suspect effect; Steblay & Dysart, 2016). Inaccurate source monitoring can also 
contribute to misidentification rates and wrongful conviction, though. For instance, if nothing 
specific about the encoding event springs to mind, but a lineup member feels very familiar to 
them, they may make a source misattribution error by relying on the most plausible explanation 
in that context. When any person is recognized in a lineup presented during a police 
investigation, the assumption is that this must be true culprit.  
The primary cause of source-monitoring errors is a high degree of similarity between the 
true source of a memory and other potential sources of a memory (Johnson et al., 1993). That is, 
when an item, person, or piece of information was presented in a different modality, context, or 
in the company of different people, source judgments will be easier. Conversely, a high level of 
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correspondence between the features of various potential sources and the correct source will 
make it more difficult to make an accurate source judgment (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). Brown 
et al.’ (1977) study is another good example here. Faces were learned in two different rooms that 
likely had a lot in common and were in the same general location on a campus. Thus, though it 
was easy to determine which faces were new or old, the setting in which the faces were learned 
was easily confused. In a similar way, a face appearing in an eyewitness lineup and a face seen at 
a crime event are hard to distinguish—both involve a stressful situation where the visual memory 
for a face is very important and both situations are related to a specific crime. 
How people engage in the source-monitoring reasoning process will also influence 
accuracy. In some situations, the source judgment is easy and will not require a lot of time nor a 
lot of thought to come to an accurate conclusion. However, other times there will be more 
uncertainty about the source of a feeling of recognition—maybe there are many possible sources 
given the information available, or there are few clues to help determine the source. The success 
of the source-monitoring process in this type of situation will depend on how carefully the 
person evaluates the possible sources. People might make a quick, low-quality judgment, but the 
resulting source judgment is more likely to be incorrect than if they had taken their time 
(Johnson et al., 1993). Moreover, people will change their criteria for making source attributions 
based on the context they are in—the amount of evidence people require before they are willing 
to make a definitive source judgment is malleable. People will shift the threshold for a source 
judgment around based on the importance of the task, what others expect of them, what they 
want to achieve, and based on feedback (Dodson & Johnson, 1993; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). 
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Comparing and contrasting source monitoring and dual-process recognition  
In most cases, the outcomes of a source-monitoring focused approach and a dual-process 
recognition approach will be extremely similar, so it can be difficult to explain the features 
unique to each approach. In addition, proponents of both approaches generally agree that both 
familiarity and recollection are used when people evaluate their memory and make memory 
judgments, and explain qualitatively different recognition phenomena (Johnson et al., 1993; 
Mickes et al., 2009; Wixted, 2007). For example, recollection is defined by whether source 
information can be recalled alongside the memory itself—this is key to distinguishing recall and 
familiarity. Successful source monitoring results in the same outcome—the correct source of the 
recognition experience is determined from information the person already has, or information 
they deduce from the memory itself (Macpherson, 2015). So, what are the differences between 
these two functionally similar approaches in an experimental or applied context? 
In the past, researchers have differentiated these approaches by classifying source 
monitoring as a separate reasoning process that occurs during recall. Accordingly, source 
information is not recalled automatically and it must be deduced by the recognizer after the fact, 
using source monitoring strategies (Johnson et al., 1993). Furthermore, some researchers argue 
that a source monitoring approach leads to more accurate memory judgments. Rather than 
obtaining a single categorical judgment, participants are asked whether an item, person, or piece 
of information has been encountered before on a graded scale and only afterwards that are they 
asked about source information. This avoids confusing the recognition experience with the 
ability to recall the source of the memory (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). Source monitoring has 
also been differentiated from dual-process approaches on the basis that it can occur regardless of 
whether an original memory exists. People might use the features of the memory experience only 
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(e.g., vividness) or the surrounding context (e.g., where the recognition took place) to determine 
reason for recognition even if they cannot remember anything about the encoding event or the 
recognition itself is weak (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). 
More recently, research in this area has started to view source monitoring and dual-
process recognition as supplemental to each other—dual-process recognition interacts with 
source monitoring to influence memory judgments (Wixted, 2007; Wais et al., 2006). One 
important distinction that remains, though, is that source-monitoring conceives of recollection 
and familiarity as subjective experiences that are continuous, rather than separate, independent 
processes (MacPherson, 2015). Thus, both familiarity and recollection can be associated with 
memory judgments that are strong—made with high confidence and high levels of accuracy—or 
weak—made with low confidence and low levels of accuracy (Mickes et al., 2009). Source 
monitoring researchers consider source information as separate to recollection and familiarity 
judgments, and source information can be linked to memories with low levels of subjective 
familiarity and recall. There is evidence that the frequency of accurate source judgments tends to 
be similar for both familiarity and recollection judgments, consistent with this conception of 
source monitoring and recognition processes (Macpherson, 2015).  
The White case can be used to demonstrate how source monitoring and dual-process 
recognition might differ in their explanation of eyewitness errors. As already explained, dual-
process recognition models would hypothesize that her error occurred because she relied on 
familiarity recognition and did not carefully consider the reason for the feeling of familiarity. A 
source-monitoring researcher might approach this problem slightly differently, beginning with 
the idea that her memory was actually accurate—the eyewitness indicated that she had seen 
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White before, and she was correct. The misidentification happened because she made an 
incorrect judgment about the source of the memory.  
The eyewitness may have struggled to distinguish between the initial photo lineup and 
the crime event itself given the shared characteristics of the events. Moreover, her decision-
making process would have contributed to the source misattribution. As mentioned when 
discussing familiarity processes, a lineup context strongly suggests that any familiar face is likely 
to be the culprit, so an eyewitness might require relatively little evidence to conclude that the 
source of familiarity was the original witnessed event. 
Maintaining the memory of the culprit 
Conditions relevant to assessing whether participants can accurately remember the culprit 
after multiple identification attempts have been included in repeated-suspect effect studies, but 
have not been explored in detail or with appropriate control groups (e.g., Hinz & Pezdek, 2001). 
This is surprising given that this is a situation where preserving the original memory is very 
important—someone has witnessed criminal activity and their memory is often crucial for 
discovering what really happened and who committed the crime. Decades of research shows, for 
instance, that eyewitnesses frequently incorporate misinformation into their memory for the 
crime (Loftus, 2005). Although people tend to perceive their own memory as fixed, memory is 
actually constantly updated as new knowledge is encoded (Newman & Garry, 2013). Repeated 
identification paradigms introduce an eyewitness to new information over time, and so there is 
potential for this type of memory task to impact a person’s ability to maintain an accurate, 
original memory in a similar way to misinformation paradigms.  
Misinformation effects occur after exposure to misleading post-event information, which 
is any incorrect information encountered after an event that was not part of the original memory. 
Misinformation can be communicated to an eyewitness in many ways: news, social media, other 
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eyewitnesses, leading questions, or discussing the event with others (see Newman & Garry, 2013 
for a review). It is very difficult to know if misinformation has been incorporated into an 
eyewitness’s memory once time has passed after the crime event. The leading solution to this is 
to obtain detailed information from eyewitnesses immediately after the crime, before they have 
talked with other eyewitnesses, been interviewed by police, had time to read the news, or 
recounted their experience to others (e.g., the Self-Administered Interview; Gabbert, Hope, 
Fisher, & Jamieson, 2012). However, recalling crime-relevant information can also increase an 
eyewitness’s vulnerability to subsequent suggestive information, so even obtaining a record of an 
eyewitness’s memory soon after the event may not guarantee maintenance of an accurate 
memory for the crime (Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009). 
Importantly, intervening identification procedures can be characterized as post-event 
information (Windschitl, 1996), which makes the misinformation effect literature relevant to the 
current project. If an eyewitness picks someone from a lineup and then is shown a totally 
different lineup soon after, the eyewitness might conclude that their first identification was 
wrong. If an eyewitness rejects an initial lineup, and is given another lineup with only one person 
in common with the previous lineup, this is particularly informative and suggestive—the 
eyewitness might then assume that repeated person is the police suspect. The White case can, 
again, be used as a demonstration. Presenting White to the eyewitness in a photo lineup 
procedure before the second live lineup is a type of misinformation, as White’s face was new 
information and not part of the original memory for the crime event. When she saw White in the 
first lineup and chose to identify him, White’s face was encoded and associated with the crime 
event and would be recalled alongside other information about the crime. 
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Early studies addressing the misinformation effect posited that the original memory may 
be replaced by the newly encountered information (Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978; Loftus, 2005). 
So, in the context of the White case, the memory of Parham’s face could have been replaced by 
White’s face after the eyewitness selected White from the initial lineup. If this was true, the 
eyewitness would never be able to identify Parham in a later lineup, even if White was not 
present, as the original memory no longer existed. In this situation, when the eyewitness thought 
of her attacker, she would have thought of Parham’s face before the intervening lineup, and 
White’s face after the intervening lineup. However, the consensus in the field is that memory 
replacement does not play a central role in the vast majority of misinformation paradigms, as 
people demonstrate an ability to remember the misinformation and the original information when 
given the opportunity (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). 
Other researchers conceptualize the effect of new information on memory as a graded 
outcome, so the new information may become incorporated into the original memory at various 
levels to form a blended memory (Loftus, 1977; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). Under this view, 
the eyewitness’s misidentification of White might have occurred due to parts of White’s face and 
parts of Parham’s face becoming combined in her memory to form an entirely new, blended face. 
If the victim’s earlier identification of White resulted in a new, blended memory, Parham might 
still appear familiar to her, and the eyewitness might still have been able to identify Parham if he 
was presented in a lineup without White. She would be, however, less likely to identify Parham 
after blending the memories than if she had never identified White in the first lineup and her 
confidence in the identification of Parham would be lower. Although there is some evidence that 
memories can become blended, particularly for information exchanged in social settings 
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(Skagerberg & Wright, 2008) this is not the leading view on what happens when an eyewitness 
encounters post-event information. 
A final possibility, and the one with the most support in the literature, is that the first 
misidentification of White may have created a second memory trace that existed alongside the 
memory for Parham (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). As a result, two memories of crime-related 
faces would co-exist after the first photo lineup—one of Parham and one of White—and 
associated with the crime event. Under these circumstances, the memory for Parham’s face 
remains intact, so the eyewitness would have been able to recognize and identify Parham in a 
lineup that did not contain White. In addition, the eyewitness’s recognition experience would 
have been similar to what she would have experienced had the initial identification of White not 
happened—the memory for Parham remains as it was after the crime event. 
Competing memory traces would complicate future retrieval attempts in a situation where 
a subsequent identification procedure contains both individuals (the traditional misinformation 
paradigm created by Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), as was the case for White. There are several 
theories to explain this phenomenon in the literature. One possibility is that the original memory 
is inhibited by the misinformation because, once accepted, the misleading information from the 
intervening lineup blocks access to the original crime information (Ayers & Reder, 1998). 
Alternatively, because two faces relevant to identification are now available in memory, which 
one informs the final lineup decision depends on which face is more accessible at retrieval and 
whether the witness was able to accurately determine the source of each memory trace (Lindsay 
& Johnson, 1989). White was seen more recently than Parham, so his face might have been more 
readily accessible. This fact alone might have led to the misidentification of White. However, 
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research on modified tests and the effect of a second memory trace suggests that, had the final 
lineup not included White, only Parham, the victim might have managed to identify Parham. 
The first study that was conducted in the current dissertation addressed the nature of the 
original memory for the true culprit after intervening lineups. To do so, the experimental design 
borrows a method from post-event information and misinformation effect experiments. 
Typically, the post-event information effect is demonstrated by showing participants an event 
(live, photo, or otherwise) and afterward providing participants with incorrect information, 
correct information, or no extra information. To determine whether a participant shows evidence 
of the misinformation effect, participants are tested by including both the original information 
and the misinformation in a forced-choice test.  
Essentially, this test pits the two pieces of information against each other to see which 
one the participants choose (Loftus, 2003). This is analogous to many of the repeated-suspect 
effect experiments described in this dissertation. Participants are shown the culprits face initially, 
in some form (typically a video or photo), and then they view an identification procedure that 
contains an innocent suspect—the misinformation. This misinformation might be particularly 
strong if the intervening identification procedure is suggestive, as the relevant misinformation—
the repeated person—will stand out more (e.g., in Haw et al. (2007) a showup was used for the 
intervening identification procedure, although their study did not include a less suggestive 
procedure for comparison). Then, for the final test, many experiments include both the innocent 
suspect and the culprit in a final lineup. Importantly, though, researchers have speculated that the 
original memory for the culprit has been impaired or changed in repeated-suspect paradigms, but 
the classic misinformation effect paradigm cannot actually speak to this point. In fact, it can only 
reveal whether the misinformation is more accessible or salient than the original information, not 
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the state of the original memory. Demand characteristics might also be a underlying reason for 
participant’s choices in a classic misinformation paradigm—the information from the post-event 
information is what participant believe they are supposed to pick. Regardless, when this design is 
used, researchers can show whether an innocent suspect from an intervening lineup is more 
accessible than the culprit, but not how the culprit’s face is represented in their memory, if at all. 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) modified the traditional test of the misinformation 
effect to answer the question regarding the fate of the memory for the original information. 
Instead of pitting misinformation against the original information, the modification pitted the 
original information against novel information (not previously viewed in the experiment) in a 
forced-choice recognition task. The key aspect of this modified task is that the test does not 
include the misinformation as an option. To use a concrete example from the White case, this 
would be analogous to a situation where Parham had been presented surrounded by new fillers 
for the second, live lineup, without White. Using the traditional test where both the original 
information and misinformation are options, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) demonstrated the 
usual effect—more people chose the misinformation item even when the original information 
was present. When their modified version of the test was used, though, they found no evidence 
that exposure to misleading post-event information had altered or otherwise impaired the original 
memory. To be specific, the memory was not replaced, or even diminished, by the 
misinformation as evidenced by participants’ ability to identify the correct information when it 
was tested without the misinformation as an alternative. 
The McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) test is usually referred to as simply the “modified 
test”. The first proposed experiment, therefore, examined whether the memory for the true 
culprit’s face survived exposure to the intervening lineups using a design inspired by the 
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“modified test”. Specifically, the final lineup test includes either the true culprit from the crime 
video and five new fillers or the innocent suspect from the intervening lineups and five new 
fillers. In addition to the final test not including the misinformation alternative, there is another 
critical feature of the McCloskey and Zaragoza final test that is required to properly test whether 
the misinformation affected the original memory—the final test must be a forced-choice test. 
Hence, for a final lineup test, the culprit must be present and not the innocent suspect, and 
everyone must make an identification from that lineup eventually (the equivalent of a six-
alternative forced-choice test). Forcing people to select a lineup member after they say “not 
present” for the final lineup has been done in some previous repeated-suspect effect work (e.g., 
Pezdek & Hinz, 2001; Pezdek & Blandon-Gitlin, 2005) and is necessary to ensure any 
differences in accurate identifications on the final test are due to change in memory not changes 
in decision criterion (an eyewitness’s willingness to choose from the lineup). 
Previous research has examined final lineups containing the true culprit (e.g., Haw et al., 
2007; Hinz & Pezdek, 2001, and Steblay et al., 2013), and some have also used forced-choice 
tests (e.g., Hinz & Pezdek, 2001; Pezdek & Blandon-Gitlin, 2005). Though the results suggested 
that memory is not impaired by lineup misinformation, the design of previous studies precluded 
a clean investigation of the participants’ ability to remember the culprit after intervening, target-
absent lineups. These studies always preceded the final target-present lineups with a target-
absent, fair lineup (e.g, Hinz & Pezdek, 2001), or repeated the culprit in the intervening lineups 
(e.g., Steblay et al., 2013). The current study improves the typical repeated-suspect paradigm for 
the purpose of examining an eyewitness’s ability to identify the culprit by using the “modified 
test” (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985), a forced-choice final task (Hinz & Pezdek, 2001; Pezdek 
& Blandon-Gitlin, 2005), fair and suggestive intervening lineups, an ecologically-valid design, 
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and, importantly, a no-misinformation control group to provide base levels of accurate culprit 
identifications for comparison.  
Although I was not able to determine exactly how memories were altered or stored as a 
result of my experimental manipulations, I was able to see whether the memory for the original 
culprit remained intact. If a second memory was created by intervening identification procedures, 
and this second memory did not hinder access to the first memory, there should be no difference 
in participants’ abilities to correctly identify the true culprit when they see a final, target-present 
lineup and are forced to choose someone. If replacement or memory blends occurred, there 
would have been differences in correct identification across conditions, particularly when the 
intervening lineup was biased. This was a novel characteristic of the current dissertation, as no 
previous repeated-suspect effect studies have addressed the fate of the memory for the true 
culprit after exposure to a repeated, innocent suspect. 
Non-Memory Factors 
Memory mechanisms do not operate in isolation to produce repeated-suspect effects. Past 
research suggests that choosing from a previous identification procedure or rejecting a previous 
lineup is associated with different identification decisions in a later lineup (e.g., Haw et al., 2007, 
Palmer et al., 2010a, and Smalarz et al., 2019). Some researchers have suggested that the mere 
act of identifying a lineup member in an earlier lineup makes the eyewitness more likely to select 
that person again in a later identification procedure (called commitment effects; Steblay & 
Dysart, 2016). In addition, identification procedures in the real world have an administrator—
usually a police officer—who may have an agenda or expect a particular decision (called social 
influence; Steblay, 1997). Both of these non-memory factors will be discussed here with 
reference to how they might influence eyewitness decisions in situations with multiple 
identification procedures containing a repeated individual. 
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Commitment effects 
Commitment effects describe situations where people resist changing their prior 
decisions, even when presented with new circumstances or contrary evidence. The processes 
involved in psychological commitment have a rich history in social psychology and such effects 
are relevant to the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and belief perseverance 
(Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980). Essentially, if people are given the opportunity to make a 
second, similar judgment, people tend to align with whatever decision they made previously.  
Psychological commitment is a motivational construct. The idea is that people stick with 
earlier decisions out of a need or a drive to appear consistent to oneself or to others (Kiesler, 
Pallack & Kanouse, 1968). Commitment effects are frequently strongest when the decisions are 
made in public so that others could easily notice whether they are consistent or not, or when 
being inconsistent might threaten one’s self-concept or identity (e.g., Brigham & Cairns, 1988, 
public versus private mugshot decisions; also see Cialdini, 2009; Swann & Bosson, 2010).  
If a psychological commitment effect occurs then we should observe that people make 
later decisions that are consistent with their prior decisions. But observing consistency in 
decisions does not mean that psychological commitment occurred. There are many possible 
reasons for consistency that have no relation to the motive of psychological commitment. If you 
have people choose which of two shirts they like best, one blue and the other green, it is very 
likely that someone who chooses blue will repeat choose that same blue shirt at a later time if 
you have them choose between that same blue shirt and a new green shirt. But their consistency 
is not because they felt committed to the blue shirt but instead because their preference has not 
changed – blue remains their preference. For most problems of this type, simple consistency of  
preference has to be ruled out in order to invoke a motive like psychological commitment.  
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Researchers have cited that commitment processes are responsible for some of the 
patterns seen in repeated-suspect effect experiments. Specifically, witnesses who picked an 
individual from an intervening showup or lineup tend to be more likely to pick that same person 
again from a later lineup than those who viewed the intervening showup or lineup but did not 
pick them. This consistency in choosing has been referred to as a commitment effect in mugshot-
exposure effect and repeated-suspect effect studies. However, this term has been adopted without 
much reference to the meaning behind them. If the name is interpreted according to social 
psychological theory, this means that researchers believe that witnesses tend to pick the same 
person from the second lineup because they identified that person in an earlier identification 
procedure and are motivated to be consistent (Brigham & Cairns, 1988; Dysart et al., 2001; Haw 
et al., 2007). Invoking the construct of commitment assumes a causal claim (these people made 
the second decisions because they made the first) and a motivational mechanism. 
Does an eyewitness who chooses consistently across identification procedures do so as a 
result of a commitment process, with prior choosing causing the eyewitness to choose the same 
person again later? Researchers describe the commitment effect as additive in the literature. This 
means that choosing in a previous identification procedure affects later misidentification rates 
over and above what can be explained by the eyewitness tending to merely prefer the same 
person in a second lineup as they did in an initial lineup (Deffenbacher et al., 2006; Haw et al., 
2007; Steblay & Dysart, 2016). The White case, again, provides an ideal scenario to explain this 
concept. A commitment effect interpretation of the White case would hypothesize that the 
eyewitness misidentified White in the second, live lineup out of a desire to remain consistent 
with her earlier decision to select White in the first, photo lineup. Thus, whoever had been 
chosen in the previous lineup—whether it was White, the true culprit (Parham), or another 
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innocent suspect—if they appeared again in the second lineup, the eyewitness would have 
identified them again in order to be consistent. In other words, this account suggests that the 
eyewitness is motivated by a sense of commitment to the choice they made previously. 
To date, though, the studies reporting commitment effects have not demonstrated a causal 
relationship between choosing in an initial identification procedure, and choosing the same 
person again later. Neither have they established that this association has anything to do with 
commitment processes. Rather, what they show is mere correspondence between choosing in an 
earlier procedure and choosing that person again in a later procedure. There is a much simpler 
alternative interpretation for this pattern: an eyewitness who finds a particular person to be the 
most similar to the culprit in an initial procedure is also more likely to think that lineup member 
looks most like the culprit in the later procedure. Whether this is due to familiarity or the person 
closely resembling the culprit by chance, it is not due to their earlier choice. These choosing 
patterns simply show that the eyewitness has a preference for a particular lineup member, and 
that preference led the eyewitness to select the same person in two different lineups.  
Consistent preferences could occur for many different reasons, none of which require a 
commitment process. Let’s consider an extreme example—imagine that, in the first lineup, 
White was the only African American individual included in the lineup. Thus, he was the 
preferred choice because the lineup was biased. In the second lineup (Figure 1), White is in the 
middle of the lineup, standing differently and dressed differently to the other lineup members, 
and he was in the previous lineup. Thus, the eyewitness’s attention was likely drawn to White, 
leading to her choice. Or maybe he simply matched the description she gave to the police better 
than the other lineup members. All of these circumstances do not suggest a commitment effect. 
Rather, these are demonstrations of a consistent preference. It is not really surprising that 
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someone who made an identification from an intervening lineup because, in their opinion, that 
person looks a lot like the culprit, might be likely to pick that same person later because, even in 
the new lineup, they still look most like the culprit to them. 
Given that there is no existing evidence of a commitment process, a simpler explanation 
might be preference. That is, the eyewitness’s choice in the initial identification procedure 
revealed the preference that would display again later, rather than causing the later preference. 
Another way to conceptualize consistency in preference is to view choosing as a predictor rather 
than a process or an effect. That is, rather than being the cause of increased choosing later, if an 
eyewitness identifies a mugshot, suspect, or lineup member, this predicts higher rates of that 
eyewitness choosing that the same person in a later lineup (e.g., Deffenbacher et al., 2006; 
Steblay & Dysart, 2016; Zajonc, 1968). The current research cannot definitively speak to 
causation, as people will still self-select into “initial choice” conditions based on their 
intervening lineup choice. However, post-identification questions will be used that might help to 
address whether participants who identify the same person in two identification procedures felt 
that any sense of commitment to their earlier decision played a role in their final lineup decision. 
Social influence 
The final process of interest in the current project is social influence. The impact of social 
influence can be substantial in eyewitness identification situations, especially in the actual cases 
with real eyewitnesses. For instance, there is a large literature addressing the effect of an 
administrator that knows who the suspect is in the lineup (e.g., see non-blind administration 
review Kovera & Evelo, 2017). Social influence refers to the ways in which a person’s thoughts, 
feelings, or behaviors are influenced by the actual or implied presence, words, or actions of other 
people (Allport, 1985). There are three main routes through which another person might change 
the way another thinks or behaves: obedience, compliance, and conformity. Interestingly, the 
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influencer can impact another person in this way even if the influencer is unaware of the effect 
they have on the other person, or if there is no pre-existing relationship between the influencer 
and the person influenced (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). These features 
of social influence mean that people are typically surprised to learn they have been subjected to 
social influence, or have influenced another. These aspects of social influence also mean that 
social influence is extremely difficult to manage in real-world situations.  
In an eyewitness identification context, the lineup administrator or police creating the 
lineup can intentionally or unintentionally influence an eyewitness’s thoughts or behavior 
through the normal procedures they use to obtain identifications. This idea is not new—it has 
been referred to in numerous eyewitness identification publications (e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2011; 
Gabbert, Memon, & Allen, 2003; Steblay, 1997; Wells et al., 1998). But social influence is rarely 
given the spotlight in discussions of processes in eyewitness identification experiments. Let us 
return to the White case one final time to illustrate the importance of social influence. It has 
already been discussed extensively in this dissertation how the repeated presentation of White 
could have influenced the eyewitness’s memory. However, the repetition of White in these 
lineups was also potentially a form of informational social influence—social influence resulting 
from using others as a source of information about correct behavior or decisions, driven by the 
desire to behave appropriately or make accurate decisions (Cialdini, 2009). Under the right set of 
conditions, eyewitnesses could be making inferences about what decision the police expect (or 
want) the eyewitness to make. As alluded to in other sections of this dissertation, the eyewitness 
in the White case may have interpreted the repetition of White in the lineups as an indication of 
their what the police knew or wanted. Hence, demand characteristics might be another causal 
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path that the repeated-suspect effect might follow, manipulated in the current work with 
repetition of the innocent suspect.  
There are related social influence processes that could be contributing to the repeated-
suspect effect that I will not address in detail and are not the focus of the current project. 
Obedience to authority, a classic social influence process (Milgram, 1967), is relevant because 
police are authority figures. People have a pervasive tendency to obey authority figures, even 
when people are extremely uncomfortable with what the authority figure has asked them to do. 
Expectation effects (Rosenthal, 2002) could also impact eyewitness choices. As mentioned 
earlier, a lineup is like an experiment (Wells & Luus, 1990) and therefore lineup procedures are 
susceptible to the same kinds of biases and influences that impact experimental science 
procedures. If the administrator of a procedure has expectations about how the participant will 
behave, this might become apparent to participants and alter their behavior. 
In fact, people can feel the pressure of social influence even if the administrator performs 
no explicit suggestive behaviors—even subtle changes in a lineup administrator’s behavior can 
have large effects on eyewitnesses. For example, post-identification feedback from the 
administrator of the lineup about the accuracy of an identification attempt can have alarming 
effects on eyewitness confidence, with even small suggestions resulting in large distortions in 
eyewitnesses’ retrospective confidence and recollections of their witnessing conditions (Wells & 
Bradfield, 1998). After confirmatory feedback, misidentifications can start to look like correct 
identifications because people will assume a confident eyewitness is an accurate eyewitness 
(Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002). Eyewitnesses can be very uncertain about their decision 
about a fair lineup and will be looking for any evidence that they selected the person the police 
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wanted them to identify. Hence, a nod, a smile, or a gesture might be enough to influence an 
eyewitness’s confidence (Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 2014).  
In the case of the repeated-suspect effect, the most obvious possible social influence is 
embedded within the paradigm itself—the repeating of the suspect. Repeating the same suspect 
in a second lineup with all new fillers creates a situation in which the eyewitness might infer that 
the lineup administrator is telling the eyewitness which person to pick or has other evidence to 
suggest this person is guilty. Social influence does not require any form of direct request or 
suggestion. To the extent that the eyewitness is aware that the second lineup repeats only one 
person, a reasonable inference is that the lineup administrator is sending a message about which 
person they believe is the culprit or whom the lineup administrator wants the eyewitness to pick. 
In order to explore the idea that the repeated-suspect effect might include a social 
influence component, post-identification questions were included that ask participants about 
whether they felt the experimenter was trying to influence them. Evidence for social influence 
would be indicated by participants reported more attempted influence in the repeated-suspect 
conditions than in the conditions where the suspect was not repeated. In particularly, conditions 
with biased intervening lineups may show particularly high levels of perceived attempts to 
influence as the suspect is made to stand out initially and then also repeated. 
Final Remarks on Processes Contributing to the Repeated-Suspect Effect 
In sum, as is typical in psychology, the answer to the question “How do repeated-suspect 
effects come about?” is not straightforward. To describe these effects as resulting from a single 
process would be to ignore the plethora of other, interesting explanations and how people behave 
during real lineup procedures. I identified five processes that I thought would contribute to 
repeated-suspect effects and used them to form predictions about the two studies proposed for 
this dissertation. Of course, the contribution of these mechanisms will vary based on the features 
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of the situation, the behavioral tendencies of the eyewitness, and quality of the original memory, 
and not all of these conditions could be captured here. It was not my goal to conclude what 
processes are operating and when, but these studies can speak to some of the strategies and 
processes that people are using, and start to clarify which processes play a more significant role 
in each experimental condition. 
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CHAPTER 2.    EXPERIMENT ONE  
Overview 
There were three main goals of this dissertation study. First, Experiment 1 was designed 
to demonstrate the repeated-suspect effect in a controlled laboratory setting. Second, the post-
identification questionnaires created to examine the psychological mechanisms that contribute to 
the repeated-suspect effect, particularly when the answers were compared across experimental 
conditions. Experiment 1 had three experimental phases, separated by ten-minute filler tasks to 
promote some forgetting and maintain ecological validity. First, participants watched a crime 
event containing a single perpetrator. After a filler task, participants completed the intervening 
lineup phase. Third, after another filler task, participants completed the final lineup phase 
followed by process-related post-identification questions.  
Finally, there were two key manipulations that were incorporated to influence the relative 
involvement of each psychological process being investigated in this dissertation. Specifically, 
the intervening lineup phase either included a biased lineup, a fair lineup, or no lineup. If 
participants received a lineup for their intervening task, it was always target-absent (containing 
an innocent suspect not in the video). Biased lineups were used here because they draw attention 
to the suspect, whether or not they are guilty, allowing an investigation into the mechanisms 
involved when errors and process-related responses in this condition are compared to those in the 
fair lineup and control conditions. The final lineup was either a target-present lineup (containing 
the suspect from the video) or a target-absent lineup (containing the innocent suspect). This 
manipulation was intended to provide insight into the fate of the memory for the true culprit. 
Does the memory for the true culprit survive the intervening lineup phase? Or does a fair or 
 61 
biased, intervening lineup (target-absent) change the memory for the culprit in some way that 
hinders participants’ abilities to make a correct identification in the final lineup?  
Predictions 
Hypotheses Set 1A: The Repeated-Suspect Effect  
Participants who received an intervening lineup containing an innocent suspect were 
hypothesized to be more likely to select that innocent suspect again later when compared with 
the control condition (an intervening reading task). For decisions made by participants who 
receive a fair, target-absent, intervening lineup, significantly more innocent suspect 
identifications were anticipated when assessing their final, target-absent identification decisions 
compared with the control condition. This effect was expected to be strongest when using overall 
choosing data. Initially, participants were allowed to make a final, “not present” judgment, but 
were then forced to choose the lineup member they would have picked if they had to. Overall 
choosing data includes identifications made after participants were forced to choose.  
However, for the participants who saw an intervening, target-absent, biased lineup, the 
innocent suspect was expected to stand out in the intervening lineup, drawing participants’ 
attention to the innocent suspect and increasing misidentifications of the innocent suspect at this 
stage of the experiment. As a result, participants who saw a biased intervening lineup were 
hypothesized to demonstrate an even larger repeated-suspect effect than the participants who 
received a fair intervening lineup. That is, I predicted significantly more false alarms in the final, 
fair, target-absent lineup when participants received a biased intervening lineup compared with 
when participants received a fair intervening lineup or an intervening reading task. This effect 
was expected to be strongest when comparing the biased lineup condition to the control 
condition, and when overall decisions from the final lineup were examined. 
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Hypotheses Set 2A: Remember-Know-Guess and Source-Monitoring Processes 
The intervening lineup manipulations were predicted to affect the number of participants 
in each condition reporting recollection, familiarity, or guess (Remember-Know-Guess 
judgment; RKG) to describe their recognition experience during their final identification 
decision. To recap, familiarity (know) is associated with a feeling that a face was seen before, but 
lacks information about the source of the memory. When someone remembers a face, they 
believe they have seen that person before and recall the specific circumstances in which that face 
was encountered. Guessing is a decision made without using memory—identifying someone 
with no evidence to support the choice. Results from the source measures should parallel the R-
K-G results, as source judgments are expected to correlate with “remembering.”  
The predictions for innocent suspect identifications are more complex. Participants in the 
fair intervening lineup condition were expected to notice the innocent suspect less often than 
participants in the biased intervening lineup condition because a fair lineup does not draw 
attention to the innocent suspect. Thus, for the participants in the fair intervening lineup 
condition, the source of recognition when choosing the innocent suspect should not be as easily 
accessible compared to participants in the biased intervening lineup condition. Innocent suspect 
identifications for fair intervening lineup participants were expected to report “knowing” the 
innocent suspect more often than “remembering” compared with other conditions. Fair 
intervening lineups were not expected to bring a particular source of recognition coming to mind 
so the scores for the sources of recognition should indicate a minimal role in their identification. 
However, it was possible that the participants in the fair lineup condition would report the video 
as a source of recognition, but not because they actually remember seeing the person they 
identified in the video. Rather, the feeling of familiarity was misattributed to the most probable 
source—the memory that they were asked to use (the video). 
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People who received a biased intervening lineup were hypothesized to be more likely to 
notice the innocent suspect in the intervening lineup, as biased lineups narrow attention towards 
the innocent suspect. Because the innocent suspect is so salient in a biased intervening lineup, 
these participants were expected to report the lineups as a prominent source of recognition. With 
a particular source in mind and a strong recognition experience, the participants who received a 
biased intervening lineup are also hypothesized to report more “remember” experiences than 
“know” experiences when identifying the innocent suspect from the final lineup (compared with 
a fair intervening lineup or no intervening lineup). The video is likely to be scored as a stronger 
source of recognition compared with other conditions too, because that is the probable source for 
a stronger recognition experience. 
True culprit identifications were expected to be associated with higher rates of 
“remember” judgments regardless of intervening task condition. When participants identified the 
innocent suspect, they should attribute that recognition to the video more than innocent suspect 
and filler identifications, primarily in the no intervening lineups condition. Very little association 
was expected between reports that the lineup was a source when the culprit was identified in the 
final lineup, regardless of the type of intervening lineup. Finally, Haw et al. (2007) suggested 
that more incorrect “remember” judgments were a marker of commitment effects. If this is true, 
participants who chose the innocent suspect twice were expected to report “remember” more 
often than those who only identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup. 
Hypotheses Set 3A: Commitment Effects 
The literature review also gave rise to hypotheses regarding the potential for 
psychological commitment processes to influence participants. I expected to replicate prior 
research showing that people are more likely to select the innocent suspect from the final lineup 
when they also identified the innocent suspect from an intervening lineup, when compared to 
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participants who rejected or selected a filler from the intervening lineup. Though this pattern 
appears fairly robust in past literature, the question of why this effect occurs has not been 
addressed. Do people select the innocent suspect twice in a row in order to appear consistent and 
commit to the choice that they made earlier, as previous research has suggested? Or do people 
simply select the same face from two lineups because they think that person looks most like the 
culprit in both lineups?  
To address the role of commitment, participants’ answers to post-identification questions 
were used. Participants self-reported how important they felt it was to make consistent choices 
across lineups (Commitment 1), pick the same person again (Commitment 2), and appear 
consistent (Commitment 4). Another question asked if participants identified the same person 
twice simply because they were correct (Commitment 3). If commitment processes play a role in 
participants’ identification decisions, participants who chose the innocent suspect twice were 
anticipated to show a higher mean score on each of these commitment questions than participants 
who only identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup. 
Hypotheses Set 4: Memory for the Culprit 
The final set of predictions related to participant’s decisions when they received a final, 
target-present, fair lineup from which all participants were eventually forced to choose. People in 
this condition were the only people with the opportunity to make a correct identification—in all 
other conditions, the only correct answer was “not present”. So, the key question that this 
manipulation was designed to address was whether or not our participants could remember the 
true culprit who appeared in the video they saw, and under what conditions participants were 
better or worse at identifying the true culprit. The comparison group here, again, was the group 
that received no intervening lineup. Thus, there was no chance for other faces or identification 
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procedures to influence their memory. This group, therefore, provided a base rate for correct 
identifications of the true culprit in this paradigm.  
When participants received a biased intervening lineup, the innocent suspect would have 
stood out from the fillers in the lineup because these lineups were designed so that the innocent 
suspect was the only plausible choice. A biased lineup is a suggestive procedure—its structure 
points the decision-maker towards the suspect in the case, increasing the likelihood that they will 
be identified whether or not they are guilty. Thus, it is possible that the innocent suspect stood 
out enough that the innocent suspect’s face became the face that the participant remembered 
rather than the culprit’s face from the video. If this was the case, participants who saw a biased 
lineup would be less likely to correctly identify the culprit in the final lineup. However, an 
alternative possibility is that the intervening lineups create a new memory trace that is separate 
from the memory for the culprit, particularly when the innocent suspect stands out (i.e., the 
participant identified them and/or the lineup was biased). In this scenario, participants would be 
equally likely to identify the true culprit regardless of which intervening task condition they 
received. That is, whether they received an intervening biased or fair lineup, or a non-lineup task, 
their memory for the true culprit remains unchanged and intact. Participants’ abilities to identify 
the culprit after seeing additional faces should remain unhindered in this case so long as there are 
no other faces in the lineup providing a competing memory trace. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants in this study were undergraduate students from Iowa State University 
recruited via an online website in which researchers could post advertisements for studies. 
Studies are completed in return for partial course credit. When I pilot tested this study with my 
research assistants, this study took approximately 40 minutes, so student-participants received 
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two SONA credits for up to one hour of participation. A total of 362 students were run in person, 
but some exclusions were made as a result of computer problems and randomization errors for 
one type of counterbalancing. In addition, any participants with incomplete data were excluded 
because data were required from all phases of the experiment. After exclusions, the sample size 
was 316 (refer to Table 1. for a summary of the sample sizes in each condition). No demographic 
information was collected but all participants were undergraduates from Iowa State University. 
This study was approved by the IRB Board at Iowa State University (ID: 19-322, see Appendix 
I). The final sample size is larger than the original goal of 250 participants because data 
collection was more efficient than anticipated. Thus, the research assistant ran Experiment 1 until 
the programming for Experiment 2 was complete. In addition, once I reviewed the data, a 
programming error was found in one type of counterbalancing. Some participants had seen three 
intervening lineups rather than one intervening lineup and their data were unusable. Thus, more 
data were collected to even out the sample sizes and correct for the programming error. 
Design 
This is an experimental study with a 3 (intervening task phase: biased lineup, fair lineup, 
vs. reading task) x 2 (final lineup phase: target-present vs. target-absent fair lineup) between-
subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of the intervening tasks and 
either a target present versus absent fair lineup for the final lineup phase (refer to Table 1. for a 
summary of the number of participants in each condition for the final sample). Figure 1 contains 
a diagram of the design and procedures. 
Materials 
New eyewitness research materials were created and pilot tested online for this study. 
The materials were created in a way that allowed for the dual-video counterbalancing design 
outlined in Oriet and Fitzgerald (2018). This design was fully counterbalanced so that there were 
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two crimes filmed, each with two possible targets (two young Caucasian men with small builds) 
and two complete sets of lineups with similar choosing patterns regardless of which of the two 
targets was present as the suspect (discussed in Quigley-McBride & Wells, 2020). Thus, there 
are two possible targets for the same crime, which was randomly assigned to participants, and 
each of the targets could serve as the designated innocent suspect for the other target in any 
target-absent lineups. Refer to Figure 2 for a visual representation of how this method can be 
used to create materials for eyewitness identification experiments. Full details of the pilot testing 
data and how the crime videos and suspect images were created and filler images selected can be 
found in Appendix A, but are also discussed here in brief.  
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Figure 2. A vis al representation of how the materials will be counterbalanced, inspired 
by Oriet and Fitzgerald’s (2018) novel eyewitness lineup methodology. 
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Table 1. A summary of the sample sizes in each condition for Experiment 1. 
 Final Lineup Condition  
Intervening Lineup 
Condition 
 
Target Present 
 
Target Absent 
TOTAL 
Biased Lineup* 50 50 100 
Fair Lineup* 56 62 118 
Reading Task 49 49 98 
TOTAL 155 161 316 
Notes. * The intervening lineups were always target absent, containing the innocent suspect’s 
photo and five photos of individuals who are fillers. 
 
Suspect photos  
Two individuals that matched a similar description were used. They were both young, 
Caucasian men with a slender build, short hair, and no facial hair. For the photographs, the 
suspects were posed and dressed in a similar way to fillers (obtained from the Florida Inmate 
Database (www.dc.state.fl.us). Multiple photos were taken to achieve a variation across photos 
of the same individual. Thus, even though multiple lineups contained the same individual, the 
same photo did not appear twice. 
Filming the crime event  
Two different crime events were filmed for use in these experiments, each lasting 20 
seconds—a theft in an office and a staged drug deal. The event was filmed multiple times, and 
from three different angles. The videos were edited so that most of the crime was seen from far 
away, with approximately three seconds of a close up of the suspect’s face. The quality of the 
video was degraded slightly for the current experiment. 
Filler photos  
The Florida Inmate Database (www.dc.state.fl.us) was searched for young, Caucasian 
men who matched the description of our suspects. Some fillers were also found for the biased 
lineups (also Caucasian but either heavier set, with glasses, or a lot of facial hair). The same 
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fillers never appeared in more than one lineup presented to a participant. A Mechanical Turk 
sample was obtained to get similarity ratings between the filler and suspect photos. So, each 
filler photo has a mean similarity rating for each of our two suspects. 
Creating the lineups  
The similarity data were used to create five fair lineups with fillers that had the same 
average similarity regardless of which suspect was used. Two biased lineups were also created in 
which the suspects stood out. All lineups can be found in Appendix A. To ensure that the fair 
lineups were achieving adequate filler siphoning and to confirm that the biased lineups were 
biased, the lineups were pilot tested on Mechanical Turk. These data are included in Appendix 
A. Three of the fair lineups demonstrated appropriate levels of filler siphoning and hits for both 
suspects. 
Questionnaires  
The questionnaires used in this experiment were created for the purpose of addressing the 
research questions in this dissertation. Many of these are Likert-type scales and some are open 
response to allow from content analyses later to determine whether participants were suspicious 
or noticed the manipulations. The exact wording of these questions can be found in Appendix B. 
One exception, however, were the instructions and judgement associated with participants’ initial 
“Remember-Know-Guess” judgments. A comprehensive set of instructions defining the different 
recognition concepts and the associated response options from Meissner et al. (2005) and Haw et 
al. (2007) were used here so that this judgment could be directly compared to the relevant, 
previous literature. 
Creating the experiment  
The experiment itself was created on Qualtrics. To make data set up and cleaning easier 
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at a later time, the manipulations and counterbalancing of materials was split up so that there 
were six different Qualtrics surveys in total. There were three different surveys created for each 
suspect: 1) biased intervening lineup, 2) fair intervening lineup, or 3) intervening reading task. 
Qualtrics was used to randomly assign participants to receive either the office theft video or the 
drug deal video with one of the suspects, and then randomly assign them to one of the possible 
lineups (or reading task, if relevant) for each lineup phase. In addition, participants were 
randomly assigned within each survey to receive a target-present or target-absent final lineup. 
Procedure 
Participants signed up for a one hour, in-lab session of their choosing using an online 
system. They were met at the door to the laboratory by an experimenter and brought through to 
one of the rooms in the laboratory. They were asked to leave their belongings in the main area, in 
particular their cell phones, so that they would not have any distractions during the experiment. 
The experimenter asked them to sit at the computer and then presented them with the consent 
document. Participants were told that the document explained what the experiment would 
involve, how their privacy would be protected, and what these data are used for. Importantly, 
although participants were told about the nature of the tasks they would be completing, 
information relevant to our hypotheses were not provided until the end of the study (e.g., how 
many lineups they would receive or that a lineup member may be repeated). Participants read the 
consent form at their own pace and asked questions before signing and dating the document, and 
checking the boxes indicating that they were over 18 years of age and had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision (as stipulated in the online study advertisement). 
Next, participants were told that they would be left in the room to complete the 
experiment on the computer. They were told that “a number of different kinds of tasks” would be 
completed in the session, and the computer would provide them with all of the instructions for 
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each task and guide them through the experiment. The experimenter informed them that, at the 
end, there would be a screen stating that the experiment is over and that was their cue to come 
out and let the experimenter know that they were finished. In addition, if they had any questions 
throughout, they were encouraged to come and find the experimenter. If there were no remaining 
questions, the participant was told to start the experiment. 
The Qualtrics survey began by instructing participants that their first take was to watch a 
video. They were told that the video was “not very long, but it is relevant to your next task, so 
please do your best to pay close attention” to encourage them to watch the video carefully 
without revealing what they would be asked about later. On the next page, one of the four crime 
videos would play (each 20 seconds in length), after which the screen automatically advanced to 
the next page. On this page they were told that the next task involved completing a simple task 
for the next ten minutes. The first filler task was to “count the number of syllables in a series of 
words.” When participants clicked to move to the next page, the timer began and participants 
worked through a list of random words with a textbox next to each word to enter the number of 
syllables. Their accuracy did not matter—participants just needed to work on the task for the full 
10 minutes. After 10 minutes, the page automatically advanced to the next set of instructions. 
The next phase of the experiment was the intervening task. Participants in the control 
condition read an article about different types of cyclones or Tyrannosaurus Rex genetics and 
answered two multiple-choice questions designed to test their comprehension. Individuals 
assigned to receive a biased lineup were presented with a target-absent, biased lineup at this 
point and asked to make an identification decision and rate their confidence in that decision. 
Participants assigned to receive a fair intervening lineup made an identification decision and 
confidence judgment about a target-absent, fair lineup. All lineups in this phase are target absent, 
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which means the lineups contain the suspect that was not in the video at the start of the session 
(e.g., if suspect 1 was in the video the participant saw, these lineups would contain suspect 2).  
Participants in the biased and fair intervening lineup conditions received instructions 
before viewing the lineups. They were told that they would see six photographs of different 
people, which is “called a lineup, which is a procedure used by police to gather evidence when 
they find a person that they think committed a crime.” Participants were told that this individual 
is called a “suspect” and is placed in a lineup with similar-looking people before being presented 
to an eyewitness of the relevant crime. If an eyewitness can pick the police suspect out of the 
lineup, this is considered incriminating evidence against the suspect. However, they are also 
informed that “the police are sometimes incorrect in their suspicions and the suspect is not the 
culprit.” So, a lineup will not always contain the person that the eyewitness saw committing the 
crime.” Participants were asked to decide if one of the people in the lineup is the person they 
saw in the video at the start of the session, and keeping in mind that the person in the video may 
not be in the lineup. 
The biased or fair lineup was displayed on a new page and three questions were presented 
below. First, they were asked to select which photograph they though was the person from the 
video (“Photo 1” to “Photo 6”) or select “Not Present.” There was a textbox where they were 
asked to write about why they made that decision. Finally, they were asked to indicate how 
confident they were in their decision from 0% (“not at all confident”) to 100% (“completely 
confident”) in 10% increments. For the reading task, participants read the article and responded 
two multiple-choice questions at the bottom that they needed to get correct before they could 
move to the next part of the experiment (details can be found in Appendix D.).  
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The next task was another 10-minute filler task where participants were asked to count 
the number of vowels in a fairytale story. There was a textbox under each paragraph for them to 
enter the number of vowels. As for the previous filler task, their accuracy for this task was 
irrelevant—they just needed to be occupied for the full 10 minutes. The page automatically 
advanced after 10 minutes elapsed. The next task for participants in all conditions involved 
making an identification decision about a fair lineup. Participants were randomly assigned to 
view a target-present lineup (contains the suspect that the participant saw in the video) or a 
target-absent lineup (contains the suspect that was not in the video). Initially, participants were 
given the same response options as the intervening lineup (called “final lineup decision” in the 
results). However, if a participant selected “Not Present” for this final lineup, the next screen 
instructed them to indicate the lineup member they would have identified if they had to choose 
(called “forced-choice task/decision” in the results). Participants also provided an explanation of 
why they made that decision and how confident they were in that forced identification decision. 
The experimental session finished with a series of post-identification questionnaires 
designed to examine the mechanisms underlying participants’ decisions about the final lineup. 
These questions concerned participants’ memory experience when making decisions about the 
lineups, their ability to determine the source of any familiarity or recollection of a person, as well 
as questions about commitment effects and social influence. The full details of the instructions, 
questions, and questionnaires that participants worked through in this study can be found in 
Appendix B. Once these post-identification questionnaires were completed, participants reached 
the “end” screen of the survey where they were instructed to go get their experimenter. They 
were then debriefed about the purpose of the study and dismissed. 
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Results 
Materials Check 
Were there any differences in repeated-suspect effect outcomes based on which 
suspect served as the culprit and which served as the innocent suspect?  
To determine whether the two suspects that were used in the current materials produced 
different hit or false alarm rates in the current study, I ran two logistic regression models. False 
alarms on the innocent suspect were the outcome variable for the first model (1 = innocent 
suspect identification, 0 = did not identify the innocent suspect), which tested for an interaction 
between which suspect served as the culprit and Intervening Task Condition on innocent suspect 
misidentification rates for target-absent final lineups. There were no significant interactions 
(biased lineup vs. no lineup X suspect 1 vs. suspect 2: B < 0.01, p = 0.999, ! = 1.00, 95% CI 
[0.80, 10.38]; fair lineup vs. no lineup X suspect 1 vs. suspect 2: B = 0.86, p = 0.443, ! = 2.36, 
95% CI [0.26, 25.53]), nor a main effect of which suspect served as the culprit (B = -0.49, p = 
0.608, ! = 0.61, 95% CI [0.075, 4.01]). Thus, which person served as the culprit and innocent 
suspect did not affect repeated-suspect effect outcomes, and it was not necessary to include 
“suspect” as a control variable in these analyses.  
An identical analysis was run on the target-present final lineups to see whether correct 
identifications were influenced by which suspect acted as the culprits. Again, there were no 
significant interactions between Intervening Task Condition and suspect for predicting correct 
identification rates (biased lineup vs. no lineup X suspect 1 vs. suspect 2: B = -0.61, p = 0.459, ! 
= 0.54, 95% CI [0.11, 2.70]; fair lineup vs. no lineup X suspect 1 vs. suspect 2: B = -0.75, p = 
0.344, ! = 0.47, 95% CI [0.10, 2.23]), nor a main effect of suspect on hits (B = -0.09, p = 0.879, 
! = 0.91, 95% CI [0.30, 2.83]). Again, these results suggested that which person served as the 
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culprit made no significant difference for predicting hits for Experiment 1, so “suspect” was not 
included as a control variable in any analyses of hits. 
Manipulation Checks 
Did the biased intervening lineup bias participants identification decisions?  
During the intervening lineup phase, participants who received a biased intervening 
lineup identified the innocent suspect significantly more frequently (38%) than participants who 
received a fair intervening lineup (9%, B = -1.78, p <.001, ! = 0.17, 95% CI [0.42, 0.06]). Thus, 
participants presented with a fair intervening lineup misidentified the innocent suspect 29% 
fewer times than participants who saw a biased intervening lineup, indicating that the biased 
lineup made participants significantly more likely to identify the innocent suspect. 
Hypotheses Set 1A: Repeated-Suspect Effect 
Identification decisions  
Identification decisions are binary variables, with each decision type coded as present or 
not for each lineup decision that each participant made. For instance, if a participant selected the 
innocent suspect from a lineup, that decision would receive a score of “1” in the column 
indicating the number of false alarms, and a score of “0” in each of the columns for hits, misses, 
correct rejections, and filler picks. Refer to Table 2 for definitions of what these signal-detection 
theory labels mean in the context of this experiment and Table 3 for a summary of identification 
decisions in each condition for this experiment. 
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Table 3. A summary of how signal-detection theory language relates to Experiments 1 and 2, and 
how this maps on to the various lineup conditions, identification decisions, and accuracy. 
Lineup type Decision Label Accuracy 
Target-Present Identify Suspect Hit Correct Decision 
 Identify Filler False Alarm (Filler) Incorrect Decision 
 Reject lineup Miss Incorrect Decision 
Target-Absent Identify Suspect False Alarm* Incorrect Decision 
 Identify Filler False Alarm (Filler) Incorrect Decision 
 Reject lineup Correct Rejection Correct Decision 
Notes. * When a false alarm is referred to in the current document, assume that this is a false 
alarm on the innocent suspect unless the author specifies that it is a false alarm on a filler. 
 
Analytic plan  
Participants who received an intervening lineup containing an innocent suspect should be 
more likely to select that innocent suspect later compared with the control condition where the 
intervening task was not a lineup and did not expose them to the innocent suspect’s face. This 
effect was expected to be strongest when an intervening lineup was biased versus fair, and when 
the decisions that participants made after they were forced to choose were included in the 
analysis. The key outcome in this case is the number of incorrect identifications (false alarms). 
The outcome variable was, therefore, the number of false alarms on the innocent suspect in each 
condition of interest, with “1” coded to indicate a false alarm and “0” to represent any other 
lineup decision. Logistic regression analyses were run with the number of false alarms as the 
outcome variable and the intervening task condition (biased lineup, fair lineup, and reading task) 
as a categorical predictor, with the reading task as the reference group (a control condition). 
Analyses only include participants who received a target absent lineup during their final lineup 
phase, as these were the only participants for whom these hypotheses were relevant.  
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Biased intervening lineups  
A biased intervening lineup significantly increased participants’ likelihood of picking the 
innocent suspect out of the final, fair lineup when compared to the control participants who saw 
no lineup (34% versus 2%; B = 3.25, p = 0.002, ! = 25.76, 95% CI [4.90, 473.43]). A similar 
effect was found when the forced-choice decisions were included in these data (52% versus 10%; 
B = 2.30, p <.001, ! = 9.97, 95% CI [3.63, 32.46]). These are large effects, as was expected 
when participants saw the innocent suspect in a biased intervening lineup. Even before 
participants were forced to choose from the lineup, participants who had previously seen the 
innocent suspect in a biased lineup were much more likely to select the innocent suspect from the 
final lineup compared with participants who had never seen the innocent suspect before. When 
identification decisions from the forced-choice task were included, participants were more likely 
to select the innocent suspect if they had seen them before in a biased lineup (compared to 
control participants), but the effect was smaller than when the forced-choice decisions were not 
included. Figure 4 contains a graph of these results. 
Fair intervening lineups  
When compared to the control condition, participants who received a fair intervening 
lineup containing the innocent suspect were more likely to misidentify the innocent suspect in 
the final lineup. Although this was marginally significant for final lineup decisions (12% versus 
2%; B = 1.89, p = 0.082,	! = 6.61, 95% CI [1.12, 125.21), the effect was significant when the 
identification decisions for the forced-choice task were included (28% versus 10%; B = 1.29, p = 
0.019,	! = 3.63, 95% CI [1.31, 11.82]). The final lineup decision results suggest that an incorrect 
identification of the innocent suspect in the final lineup were more likely when a fair intervening 
lineup was seen compared to no intervening lineup. Similarly, when the forced-choice data were 
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included too, participants were also more likely to selected the innocent suspect when they had a 
fair intervening lineup rather than no lineup. Note, though, these effects were smaller than those 
seen in the biased intervening lineup conditions, as was hypothesized (biased versus fair 
intervening lineup, final lineup decisions: B = 1.36, p = 0.007, ! = 3.90, 95% CI [1.51, 11.02]; 
and forced-choice decisions: B = 1.01, p = 0.012, ! = 2.75, 95% CI [1.26, 6.11]). Refer to Figure 
4 for a visual representation of these data. 
Conclusion  
Analyses of the identification decisions across the different intervening tasks support the 
hypothesis that seeing an innocent suspect in an intervening lineup will increase the likelihood 
that the same innocent suspect will be identified in a subsequent lineup. Thus, this experiment 
shows a clear repeated-suspect effect. In addition, these data show that a biased intervening 
lineup produces the largest repeated-suspect effect, particularly when participants are forced to 
choose from the final, target-absent lineup. Although the effect was strongest for people in the 
biased intervening lineup condition and for the data including forced-choice decisions, both the 
fair and biased intervening lineups increased misidentifications of the innocent suspect in the 
final lineup, when the forced-choice data were included and when they were not. It seems that, 
whenever an intervening lineup containing the innocent suspect was presented, the innocent 
suspect was more familiar to the participants than any of the new fillers in the final lineup. 
Figure 5 contains a summary of final lineup identification decisions. 
Confidence in identifications 
There were two different confidence measures that were analyzed here. One was the 
participants’ reported confidence in their final lineup decisions, which will be referred to as 
confidence. A second confidence measure was collected for those who said “not present” for the 
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final lineup and went one to complete the forced-choice identification decision. The confidence 
data that includes the data from the forced-choice task will be called forced-choice confidence. 
Standardized beta values are reported. 
Analytic plan  
Linear multiple regressions were run to assess the effect of lineup decision and 
intervening task condition on confidence levels. Again, these results only include those 
participants who received a final lineup that was target absent. Initially, models were run looking 
for an interaction between the intervening task condition and whether a participant selected the 
innocent suspect. There were no significant interactions, though, so these were removed.  
Confidence  
When the responses from the participants’ final lineup decisions were analyzed (prior to 
being forced to choose from the lineup), there was no significant effect of intervening task 
condition (biased intervening lineup vs. control condition: B = 0.07, p = 0.458; fair intervening 
lineup vs. control condition: B = 0.04, p = 0.668) or identification decision on confidence levels 
(false alarm vs. other identification decision: B = 0.05, p = 0.548). Although all patterns were 
non-significant, participants were generally more confident in their final lineup decision for 
conditions where an intervening lineup was presented (biased: M = 59%, SD = 22%; fair: M = 
57%, SD = 22%) compared with the control condition where the intervening task was not a 
lineup (control: M = 54%, SD = 23%). 
Forced-choice confidence  
When identification decisions from the forced-choice question were analyzed with 
confidence was the outcome variable, there was a marginally significant main effect of forced-
choice identifications on confidence (B = 0.15, p = 0.085). That is, participants who did not 
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select the innocent suspect (i.e., identified a filler), even after being forced to choose, reported 
lower confidence levels on average (M = 47%, SD = 24%) than participants who selected the 
innocent suspect from the final lineup (M = 56%, SD = 19%). However, there was no significant 
effect of intervening task on forced-choice confidence levels (biased vs. control: B = 0.07, p = 
0.455; fair vs. control: B = 0.06, p = 0.520). Forced-choice task confidence levels were lower 
than final lineup decision confidence levels (all forced-choice confidence responses: M = 50%, 
SD = 24%). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A graph showing the proportion of people in each condition, at each phase of the 
experiment, who selected the innocent suspect. Error bars represent 95% CIs. 
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Figure 5. A stacked bar graph showing the proportion of people selecting the innocent suspect in 
the final, target-absent lineups. Light grey sections represent additional participants who chose 
the innocent suspect after being forced to choose. Error bars represent 95% CIs. 
 
Hypotheses Set 2A: Remember-Know-Guess and Source-Monitoring Processes 
Categorical Remember-Know-Guess judgment  
Did participants in different conditions report using recollection or familiarity to a greater 
extent when making lineup decisions? This was examined using participants responses to the 
post-identification Remember-Know-Guess (R-K-G) question (Appendix B contains the 
instructions and question prompt). 
Analytic plan  
The proportion of R-K-G judgments in each intervening task condition were compiled in 
Table 4, separated also by whether participants received a target-present or target-absent final 
lineup. This permitted a comparison of how “remember”, “know”, and “guess” were distributed 
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across conditions when participants made culprit identifications or innocent suspect 
identifications. 
Chi-Square analyses were used to determine whether the distribution of R-K-G 
judgments was different for culprit identifications and innocent suspect identifications within the 
biased and fair intervening lineup conditions. There was a very low rate of innocent suspect 
identifications in the control condition, so an inferential analysis of those data was not 
appropriate. Supporting multinomial analyses can be found in Appendix H, but note that these 
are underpowered. Finally, the number of “remember” and “know” judgments associated with 
false alarms for the intervening and final lineup versus a false alarm only in the final lineup was 
analyzed to see if the “false recall” findings from Haw et al. (2007) replicated here. 
When participants identified a suspect, did the distribution of “remember” and “know” 
judgments vary based on intervening task condition and target presence in the final lineup? 
 First, the distribution of remember, know, and guess judgments was examined for 
participants who received biased intervening lineups and then selected the culprit or innocent 
suspect from the final lineup. Table 4 contains a complete summary of these data. The first 
comparison of interest was between reports of subjective recognition experience for culprit and 
innocent suspect identifications. For participants who selected the true culprit from the final 
lineup after a biased, intervening lineup, there were 20.7% judgments of “know” and 37.9% 
“remember” judgments. For innocent suspect identifications after a biased intervening lineup, 
38.5% reported “know” and 30.8% reported “remember.” A Chi-Square analysis indicated that 
there was no association between these categorical variables (#$ [1, N = 35] = 1.45, p = 0.229). 
The percentages suggest that “remember” judgments tend to be more common than “know” 
judgments for culprit identifications, and “know” judgments more common for innocent suspect 
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identifications than “remember” judgments, which was hypothesized. However, the statistical 
test was not significant due to low samples sizes, so interpret these patterns with caution. 
Table 4. R-K-G judgments for suspect identifications separated by intervening task condition and 
final lineup condition. 
Intervening 
Task Condition 
Final Lineup & 
Decision 
N who 
identified 
the suspect* 
Distribution of Judgments 
Remember Know Guess/ Not Present 
No Lineup Target Present (Hits) 26 35.0% 15.0% 50.0% 
Target Absent (FAs) 5 20.0% 0.0% 80.0% 
Biased Lineup Target Present (Hits) 29 37.9% 20.7% 41.4% 
Target Absent (FAs) 26 30.8% 38.4% 30.8% 
Fair Lineup Target Present (Hits) 25 40.0% 24.0% 36.0% 
Target Absent (FAs) 17 41.2% 23.5% 35.3% 
Notes. FAs = False Alarms. *Target present suspect identification means that the participant 
chose the true culprit from the lineup. Target absent suspect identification means that the 
participant chose the innocent suspect from the lineup. Rows total to 100%. All percentages 
rounded to 1dp. 
 
Next, the R-K-G judgments were evaluated for culprit and innocent suspect 
identifications after fair, intervening lineups. Again, Table 4 contains a complete summary of the 
data relevant to these analyses. For the target-present final lineups, 24% of participants who 
identified the culprit reported “know” and 40% reported “remember” after receiving a fair 
intervening lineup. Similarly, 23.5% of participants who selected the innocent suspect in the 
target-absent final lineup condition reported “know” and 41.2% reported “remember” after 
seeing a fair intervening lineup. Again, there was no significant association between these 
categories (#$ [N = 27] = 0.004, p = 0.95). The percentages show that, regardless of whether the 
final lineup was target-present or -absent, participants tended to judge their memory experience 
as “remembering” more frequently than “knowing” after a fair intervening lineup. 
Finally, Chi-Square analyses were performed on “remember” and “know” judgments hits 
and false alarms from the final lineup. There was no evidence that the type of lineup (biased or 
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fair) was associated with frequency of “remember” and “know” judgments among those who 
identified the true culprit from the final lineup (#$ [1, N = 21] = 0.02, p = 0.818). That is, 
“remember” judgments were associated with culprit identifications after fair and biased 
intervening lineups to a similar degree (fair: 40.0%; biased: 37.9%), and “know” judgments 
made about culprit identifications were equally common in the fair and biased intervening lineup 
conditions (fair: 24%; biased: 20.7%). There was also no significant difference when looking at 
the “remember” and “know” frequencies for false alarms on the innocent suspect (#$ [1, N = 29] 
= 1.01, p = 0.316). Innocent suspects that were identified after fair and biased intervening lineups 
were equally likely to be judged a “remember” experience (fair: 41.2%; biased: 30.8%) as a 
“know” experience (fair: 23.5%; biased: 38.4%). 
It is important to clearly note that I cannot make any strong inferences about these 
recognition experience judgments given the low sample sizes and the correlational nature of 
these data. However, among those who saw a biased intervening lineup, there was a higher 
percentage of “remember” judgments when participants selected the true culprit than when 
participants identified the innocent suspect. In contrast, the fair intervening lineup condition was 
associated with a higher proportion of “remember” judgments than “know” judgments whether 
or not the person identified was the culprit or the innocent suspect. Perhaps the fair intervening 
lineup kept the repetition of the innocent suspect outside of participants’ awareness and, thus, led 
to more confusion about where they had seen that face before. 
How are confidence and correct/incorrect identifications of the suspect associated for 
“remember” and “know” judgements?  
Refer to Figure 6 to see a graph of the proportion of hits and false alarms on the innocent 
suspect associated with each level of confidence, as a function of whether the participants 
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reported “remembering” or “knowing”. Note that the sample sizes within each confidence level 
are relatively small. “Low confidence” in Figure 6 is defined as 0% through to 30%, “medium 
confidence” is 40% to 60%, and “high confidence” is 70% or higher. 
First, let us consider the data from the target-present, final lineup condition (Figure 6, 
solid lines). For participants who reported low confidence, Figure 6 indicates equal proportions, 
and low frequency, of both “remember” and “know” judgments among those who chose the true 
culprit from the final lineup. There is a small increase in proportions of “remember” and “know” 
judgments for medium confidence among those who identification the culprit, but the 
proportions are still relatively equal, as was the case for low confidence. At the highest levels of 
confidence, though, the distribution of “remember” and “know” judgments appears different—
there is a high proportion of “remember” judgments, and a low proportion of “know” judgments.  
 
Figure 6. A chart of the suspect identifications in Experiment 1 at each level of confidence, 
separated also by whether participants reported “remember” or a “know” post-identification. 
Dotted lines indicate target-absent final lineups (innocent suspect identifications) and solid lines 
indicate target-present final lineups (true culprit identifications). IS = innocent suspect. 
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A very similar pattern was found for participants in the target-absent, final lineup 
condition among participants who selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup. At both 
low and medium levels of confidence, there are equally low proportions of “remember” and 
“know” judgments associated with innocent suspect identifications. High levels of confidence 
are associated with a similar R-K-G distribution to culprit identifications—a high percentage of 
“remember” judgments and low rate of “know” judgments for innocent suspect picks.  
Thus, the distribution of “remember”, “know”, and “guess” judgments for participants 
who misidentified the innocent suspect resembles the distribution seen for correct identifications 
when separated by confidence level. Very little can be concluded from these data because they 
are correlational and underpowered. Nevertheless, if this pattern held with a larger sample or 
repeated measures design, this might suggest that “remember” and “know” judgments and 
confidence levels are not diagnostic of whether the participant selected the true culprit or not 
when an innocent suspect has been repeated across multiple identification procedures—repeating 
someone across lineups might hinder the diagnostic value of these measures. 
Did participants who chose the innocent suspect from the intervening and final lineup 
report “remember” more frequently than participants who only identified the innocent suspect 
from the final lineup?  
This analysis included only participants who received a target-absent final lineup and 
identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup (forced-choice task included; N = 43). Thus, 
the statistical power of the tests was low due to the small sample size. However, because the 
relevant comparison is between those who identified that innocent suspect in the final lineup and 
had the opportunity to identify the innocent suspect in a previous identification procedure, this 
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reduction in statistical power was necessary. Additional R-K-G analyses relevant to this research 
question can be found in Appendix H. 
This analysis seeks to replicate a finding from Haw et al. (2007). That is, Haw et al. 
found that participants who identified the innocent suspect twice tended to report “remember” 
more frequently than those who did not, suggesting higher rates of “false recollection” when 
people misidentified the same person twice. A total of 22 people identified the innocent suspect 
from both the intervening lineup and the final lineup, and 21 identified the innocent suspect from 
the final lineup, but not an intervening lineup. Among participants who chose the innocent 
suspect from the intervening and final lineup, 50.0% reported “remembering” and 40.9% 
reported a “know” recognition experience. For those who only identified the innocent suspect 
from the final lineup, 19% reported “remembering” and 23.8% reported “knowing” the 
individual they identified. A Chi-Square analysis of these cell counts revealed that there was no 
association between the choosing condition and the R-K-G judgment (#$ [1, N = 29] = 0.28, p = 
0.599). However, the trends are consistent with Haw et al. (2007) and my predictions—there 
were more incorrect “remember” judgments when people selected the innocent suspect from the 
intervening lineup and the final lineup when compared with those who only selected the innocent 
suspect from the final lineup.  
Source monitoring measures  
There were two questions that specifically addressed whether people made an 
identification because they remember seeing that face in the video (“I can recall seeing this 
person’s face in the video” and “I was really sure this was the culprit from the video”), one 
specifically asking about whether the source could be a previous lineup (“I recall seeing them in 
a previous lineup”), and two referring to the encoding context without being specific about what 
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it was (“When I saw their face in the lineup, other information came to mind from the first time I 
saw their face” and “I could recall other details about the first time I saw their face”). These were 
included as post-identification questions to determine if people were able to successfully monitor 
the source of their memory experience. 
Analytic plan  
Multiple regressions were run with the responses to the specific questions highlighted in 
the previous paragraph as outcome variables. The two “video as source” questions were averaged 
to make a composite score, but there was only one “lineup as source” question so the original 
scores were used for those analyses. These outcome variables were continuous because the 
responses were from 1 (completely false) to 6 (completely true), so multiple regressions were 
used. For each question, a model was run with an interaction between final lineup identification 
decision (suspect pick or not) and intervening task condition, and this model was reduced if the 
interaction was nonsignificant. Standardized beta values are reported. 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for the video and lineup as source post-identification questions for 
each intervening task condition in Experiment 1. 
Intervening 
Task Condition 
Final Lineup Condition Lineup 
Outcome 
Video as 
Source 
Lineup as 
Source 
No Lineup Target Present  Hit 3.64 (1.28) 1.50 (0.81) 
  Filler 3.26 (0.95) 1.82 (0.85) 
 Target Absent False Alarm 3.00 (0.00)* - 
  Filler 3.57 (0.97) - 
Biased Lineup Target Present  Hit 3.26 (1.17) 1.83 (1.03) 
  Filler 4.31 (1.28) 2.31 (1.49) 
 Target Absent False Alarm 3.90 (1.03) 4.45 (1.23) 
  Filler 3.13 (0.83) 2.67 (1.59) 
Fair Lineup Target Present  Hit 3.78 (1.64) 2.10 (1.25) 
  Filler 3.33 (0.95) 2.46 (1.18) 
 Target Absent False Alarm 3.08 (0.73) 3.23 (2.04) 
  Filler 3.29 (0.99) 2.39 (1.03) 
Notes. Mean scores are displayed (rated out of 6). Higher scores indicate that participants think 
the source is a likely source of recognition. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. All 
values rounded to 2dp. * Cell contains only one person thus the standard deviation is zero. 
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Video as source  
First, the participants in the target-present, final lineup condition were analyzed (forced-
choice task data included). There was a significant interaction final lineup decision (hit versus 
filler selection) and intervening task condition (B = -0.28, p  = 0.017). This means that 
participants who received a biased intervening lineup and identified the correct culprit from the 
final lineup were less likely to report that the video was a source of their recognition than those 
who selected a filler from the final lineup. In contrast, participants in the control condition (who 
received no intervening lineup) showed the opposite pattern, with participants who identified the 
true culprit from the final lineup reporting that the video was a source of recognition more often 
that those who picked fillers from the final lineup. There were no significant effects when 
comparing hit and filler picks between the fair intervening lineup condition and the control 
condition (interactions: B = 0.01, p  = 0.909). Refer to Table 5 for relevant means. The means 
show that, as hypothesized, for those who received no intervening lineup and those who received 
a fair intervening lineup, the video was scored as a stronger source of recognition when they also 
selected the culprit. But, contrary to my predictions, the opposite was true for those in the biased 
intervening lineup condition—the video was rated as a source of memory more for participants 
who identified fillers from the target-present final lineup after seeing a biased intervening lineup 
with the innocent suspect. 
When analyzing the participants who received a target-absent, final lineup (forced-choice 
decisions again included), the biased lineup was used as a reference group instead for this 
analysis because the innocent suspect identifications were so low in the control condition. There 
was a significant interaction observed between final lineup decision (false alarm versus filler) 
and the fair intervening lineup condition (compared with the biased intervening lineup condition; 
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B = -0.18, p = 0.034). This indicates that, as anticipated, “video as source” reports were higher 
for people who selected the innocent suspect rather than a filler and saw that innocent suspect in 
a prior, biased intervening lineup (compared to people who received a fair intervening lineup). 
Again, refer to Table 5. for the relevant descriptive statistics. 
Previous lineup as source  
For both of the analyses in this section, the biased lineup was used as a reference group 
because the control condition did not receive an intervening lineup so it could not be a source of 
memory. When the target-present final lineup condition was analyzed, there were no significant 
interactions between final lineup decision (forced-choice included; hit versus filler) and 
intervening task condition, so the interaction effects were removed. There were no significant 
main effects either. Thus, there was no significant difference between the fair intervening lineup 
condition and the biased intervening lineup condition (B = 0.12, p = 0.143) and no significant 
effect when comparing participants who selected the true culprit in the final lineup and 
participants who identified fillers (B = -0.11, p = 0.149) with regard to reporting the lineup as a 
source of memory. Thus, the target-present final lineup results were consistent with my 
predictions—there was little evidence that participants thought the previous fair lineup 
containing the innocent suspect was a source of recognition when they successfully identified the 
culprit. The means can be found in Table 5. 
For participants who received a target-absent, final lineup, there were no significant 
interactions found between final lineup decision (forced-choice included; false alarm versus 
filler) and Intervening Task Condition, so the interaction effects were removed from the model. 
The biased lineup was used as a reference group for this analysis because the no lineup group did 
not receive an intervening lineup and, thus, it could not be a source of memory. A significant 
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main effect of identification decision on the degree to which they thought a previous lineup was 
the source of their recognition (B = 0.32, p < 0.001). Specifically, people who identified the 
innocent suspect from the final lineup were more like to say that a previous lineup was one 
source of their recognition compared with individuals who selected a filler. In addition, there was 
a significant effect when people who saw a fair intervening lineup were compared to participants 
who were in the control condition (B = -0.21, p = 0.010). This means that, as hypothesized, 
people who saw a biased intervening lineup were more likely to say that the previous lineup was 
the source of their recognition than if they saw a fair intervening lineup (see Table 5 again).   
Recognition associated with non-specific encoding context  
People who saw a fair intervening lineup reported being more unsure about the situation 
in which they first saw the face they identified (M = 3.22, SD = 1.41) when compared with those 
who had no intervening lineup (M = 3.92, SD = 1.32; B = -0.88, p = 0.027). Yet, there was no 
significant main effect when comparing the biased intervening lineup condition (M = 3.54, SD = 
1.42) to the control condition (B = -0.21, p = 0.125) or people who selected the innocent suspect 
(M = 3.70, SD = 1.29) or a filler (M = 3.40, SD = 1.46; B = 0.16, p = 0.146). There were also no 
significant results for the equivalent analyses in the target-present, final lineup condition, and no 
significant differences between conditions when examining ratings of participants’ recall of other 
details about the encoding event, for either target-absent and target-present final lineups. 
Conclusion on R-K-G and source monitoring measures  
Given the low sample sizes obtained for the R-K-G analyses, the lack of significance was 
unsurprising. Though no firm inferences can be made from these data, the patterns suggest that 
people were more likely to report “remember” when they identified the innocent suspect twice. 
This is consistent with previous literature (Haw et al., 2007), but the trends are not significant 
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and should be interpreted with caution. Culprit identifications tended to be linked with more 
“remember judgments” than “know” judgments regardless of intervening Task Condition. In 
contrast, innocent suspect identifications after a fair and biased intervening lineup seemed to be 
associated with “know” judgments more than “remember” judgments. 
The source monitoring results were overall very consistent with my predictions and the 
R-K-G results. Participants receiving the target-present final lineup were less likely to report the 
lineup as a source of recognition and more likely to rate the video as a source of memory when 
they identified the true culprit. There was one exception though—participants who received a 
biased intervening lineup reported the video as a source of recognition more often when they 
chose a filler. This was not expected, but may indicate that these participants chose the filler that 
most resembled the salient, innocent suspect face that appeared in the biased lineup. So, they 
reasoned this person must have also been in video as the memory experience from the 
intervening lineup was so strong. Finally, people who received the target-absent final lineup and 
identified the innocent suspect were more likely to report the lineup as a source of memory than 
participants who picked fillers, particularly when they received a fair or biased intervening 
lineup. Interestingly, participants who selected the innocent suspect in both the biased and fair 
intervening lineup condition also attributed their memory to the video quite often, suggesting that 
the intervening lineups are associated with more source misattributions. 
Hypothesis Set 3A: Commitment Effects 
Analytic plan  
Analyses relating to the investigation of potential commitment effects only included 
participants who received an intervening lineup (not the control condition) and a final, target-
absent lineup (N = 110). Innocent suspect identification rates for the final lineup, including the 
forced-choice identifications, were used here, and intervening lineup choice was also coded for 
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use in these analyses (0 = “filler identification”; 1 = “innocent suspect identification”). A Chi-
Square analysis was used to determine if choosing the innocent suspect from the intervening 
lineup was related to choosing that same innocent suspect from the final lineup. Next, I 
examined some potential explanations for why this pattern might have occurred. If a 
commitment process is responsible, and people are able to self-report this motivation, I expected 
to see higher scores on the post-identification, commitment process questions when individuals 
chose the innocent suspect from both lineups (rather than only made this mistake for the final 
lineup). To analyze these post-identification process questions, a multivariate t-test was used 
(Hotelling’s T2). Note, though, that participants were only required to answer the first of the 
commitment related questions. The other three questions appeared only when participants 
reported that they believed they selected the same person in the intervening and final lineup. 
Thus, the sample sizes were smaller for responses that assessing participants who did not 
actually identify the same innocent suspect from the intervening and final lineup. 
Is choosing the innocent suspect from an intervening lineup related to choosing the 
same innocent suspect from the final lineup?  
Participants choosing the innocent suspect from the final lineup was not independent 
from their choosing of the innocent suspect in the intervening lineup (X2[1, N = 216] = 23.97, 
p<.001). There was a higher rate of false alarms on the innocent suspect for participants that 
identified the innocent suspect from an intervening lineup (P[Final False Alarm | Intervening 
False Alarm] = 0.46, N = 48) than participants who identified a filler in the intervening lineup or 
rejected the intervening lineup (P[Final False Alarm | Intervening Filler Pick or Correct 
Rejection] = 0.13, N = 168). 
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Commitment effect versus. mere preference  
Is there evidence of a commitment process for those who identified the innocent suspect 
twice? Analyses were run for the four commitment-relevant questions as outcome variables 
(refer to Appendix B for the exact wording of these questions). Higher scores for these questions 
indicate a higher levels of commitment processes. These were self-report questions, so some 
participants believed they chose the same person twice when they had not. However, because 
this question concerns participants’ motivations, their subjective belief about their lineup 
decisions was used. 
Table 6. Summary of means, standard deviations, and sample sizes for responses to the optional, 
post-identification questions designed to measure commitment processes for Experiment 1. 
Group Commitment 
Question 1 
Commitment 
Question 2 
Commitment 
Question 3 
Commitment 
Question 4 
Identified IS* from 
intervening and final lineups 
 
4.41 (1.22) 
N = 21 
4.36 (1.18) 
N = 22 
3.4 (0.82) 
N = 20 
2.45 (1.00) 
N = 20 
Identified IS* from final 
lineup only 
4.24 (1.55) 
N = 22 
4.00 (1.58) 
N = 5 
3.00 (1.00) 
N = 5 
2.80 (0.84) 
N = 5 
Notes. * IS refers to “innocent suspect.” Means are displayed with standard deviations in 
parentheses and sample sizes denoted by N. All values are rounded to 2 decimal places.  
 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 6 indicate little difference in responses between people 
who identified the innocent suspect twice, and those who identified the innocent suspect only 
from the final lineup. A multivariate t-test confirmed that none of the differences seen between 
groups of participants for these commitment process questions were significant (T2[4, 16] = 0.40, 
p = 0.806). Although there is an association between choosing the innocent suspect from the 
intervening lineup and the final lineup, these data provide no evidence that participants are 
driven to choose the innocent suspect again because they desire to appear consistent. It is 
possible, of course, that commitment may be responsible for some of the decisions made by 
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eyewitnesses. But the current study finds no evidence for a commitment process  and mere 
consistency of preference might be the simpler explanation at this point. 
Hypotheses Set 4: Memory for the Culprit. 
Analytic plan  
The final set of analyses are possible because half of the eyewitnesses in each 
experimental condition viewed a final, target-present lineup that did not included any of the 
lineup members who were shown previously. That is, the true culprit and innocent suspect never 
appeared in the same lineup, and fillers were never repeated. Participants were also given a 
forced-choice task if they chose to say “not present” for the final, target-present lineup so 
everyone had to decide between the lineup members eventually. Forcing participants to make an 
identification in the final, target-present lineup creates a test of whether the intervening lineups 
impaired the participant’s memory for the true culprit. For these analyses, the number of correct 
identifications (hits) is the outcome variable (0 = “not a hit”, 1 = “hit”) and intervening lineup 
condition used as a categorical predictor. Only participants who received a final, target-present 
lineup are included in these analyses (N = 155). Some additional exploratory analyses can be 
found in Appendix F. 
Is memory impaired when participants see an intervening lineup?  
Several analyses were conducted to determine whether participants were less able to 
identify the true culprit after receiving an intervening lineup. The key comparisons were between 
participants in the fair and biased intervening lineup conditions and the control, no intervening 
lineup condition for those in the target-present final lineup condition. The focus was on the hit 
rates in each condition—was their variation in the rate of successful identifications of the culprit 
across experimental conditions? The final lineup measures willingness to choose, whereas the 
forced-choice data is purely a memory test. 
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Were participants able to identify the culprit at above chance levels?  
For these lineups, the chance that a person would select the culprit by guessing is 1/6. If 
participants identified the culprit at a rate significantly above 1/6, this would be evidence that the 
participants were able to recognize the culprit and were not guessing. When participants’ final 
lineup decision was examined, 43 selected the culprit from the target present final lineup. Thus, 
the hit rate for initial decisions was 28% (95% CI [0.21, 0.35]) which was significantly higher 
than chance; X2(1, N = 155) = 12.90, p<.001. Similarly, when the decisions after participants 
were forced to pick from the lineup were analyzed, a total of 78 people selected the culprit (43 
culprit identifications plus 35 forced culprit identifications). This hit rate was, obviously, higher 
at 50% (95% CI [ 0.42, 0.58]) and was significantly above chance; X2(1, N = 155) = 124.00, 
p<.001. So, participants were able to recognize the culprit in the lineup and were not guessing.  
Was there evidence of memory impairment and is it exacerbated by a biased 
intervening lineup?  
The conditions with intervening lineups were compared to the control condition to 
determine whether hit rates were reduced when participants saw an intervening lineup. Figure 7 
is a graph of the final lineup hit rates for each intervening task condition, including information 
about individuals who chose without encouragement and those who only selected the culprit 
after being forced to choose from the lineup. Contrary to hypotheses, the logistic regression 
analyses did not reveal any significant differences between final lineup hit rates for the biased 
intervening lineup and control condition (B = 0.28, p = 0.539, , ! = 1.32, 95% CI [0.54, 3.25]) or 
for participants who received a fair intervening lineup compared with the control condition (B = 
0.38, p = 0.388, ! = 1.46, 95% CI [0.62, 3.51]). Results were the same when the data included 
participants who only selected the culprit once they were forced to choose—both when 
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comparing identification decisions from the control condition to the biased intervening lineup 
condition (B = 0.20, p = 0.621, ! = 1.22, 95% CI [0.55, 2.72]) and the fair intervening lineup 
condition (B = -0.34, p = 0.390, ! = 0.71, 95% CI [0.33, 1.54]). The intervening lineups did not 
reduce accurate identifications of the culprit, as participants who saw intervening lineups did not 
have significantly lower hit rates than participants who saw no intervening lineup. 
Though there was no evidence of memory impairment in participants decision patterns, I 
nevertheless went on to analyze participants confidence within each intervening lineup condition 
while controlling for their final lineup choice. Did the intervening lineups make participants less 
confident in their final lineup decisions? No significant interactions were found between 
intervening task condition and final lineup decision, and the addition of interactions did not 
significantly improve the models (forced-choice confidence: F(2, 151) = 1.26, p = 0.288). Thus, 
a main effects model was chosen. When assessing the confidence data that included decisions 
made after participants were forced to choose, there was no significant difference in confidence 
levels across intervening lineup conditions. Biased intervening lineups (52%; B = -0.001, p = 
0.882) and fair intervening lineups (58%; B = 0.12, p = 0.200) resulted in approximately the 
same level of confidence as was seen in the control group (53%). However, people who 
identified the true culprit had significantly higher confidence (62%) than participants who made 
any other type of identification decision (52%; B = 0.19, p = 0.021). Thus, there is no evidence 
that intervening lineups prevent accurate identification of the culprit, or affect the certainty with 
which participants identified the culprit. 
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Did  participants who identified a filler or the innocent suspect from an intervening 
lineup show memory impairment?  
Previous research has shown that a participant might show memory impairment in a 
situation where the participant identifies someone from a lineup and is initially led to believe that 
choice is correct. After this, the experimenter pretends to have made an error and the participant 
is presented with a new lineup and told that the feedback they received was wrong (Smalarz & 
Wells, 2014). Although participants received no explicit feedback on their intervening lineup 
decisions here, I was able to examine whether choosing a person who was not the culprit from 
the final lineup influenced hit rates for the final, forced-choice lineup decisions. There was no 
significant difference in culprit identification rates found between people who identified an 
incorrect person from the intervening task (47% hit rate) compared with people who did not 
choose from the intervening lineup (54% hit rate; X2[1, N = 155] = 0.38, p = 0.539). Thus, even 
choosing the incorrect person in an earlier lineup did not impair memory for the culprit.  
Signal Detection Theory: Using d’ to examine discriminability across conditions  
The d’ value is calculated in situations where there is a correct target and an incorrect 
distractor item, as is the case here, and is a standardized composite value that describes how well 
people can distinguish between the correct and incorrect targets. A higher d’ value indicates a 
large difference in the hit rate and false alarm rate—people make more correct decisions than 
they do incorrect decisions. In contrast, a low or negative d’ value indicates that the false alarm 
rate and hit rate and more similar and, therefore, the procedure does not help decision-makers 
discriminate well between the true target and a distractor stimulus. The values for this 
experiment can be found in Table 7. 
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When examining the final lineup decisions for participants in the control condition, the 
hit rate was high (24%)  and the false alarm rate was low (2%). The same pattern occurred when 
examining the forced-choice decisions too (53% hits vs. 1% false alarms) and the d’ value 
indicated good discriminability among participants in this condition (refer to Table 7). The fair 
intervening lineup condition demonstrated worse discriminability compared with the control 
condition, with high culprit identifications (32%) and moderate false alarm rates for the innocent 
suspect (12%). Again, a similar pattern was found when the forced-choice decisions in the fair 
intervening lineup condition were included in these data (45% hits vs. 28% false alarms). 
Finally, the biased intervening lineup condition had a very low d’ value associated with 
participants’ responses, and a very high false alarm rate (34%). Although the culprit 
identification rate also remained high (30%) the small difference in these values means that 
participants struggled to differentiate between the culprit and innocent suspect after viewing a 
biased intervening lineup containing the innocent suspect. Again, the same pattern was found 
when forced choice decisions were examined (58% hits vs. 52% false alarms). 
 
Table 7. A summary of the d prime (d’) values calculated for each intervening task condition in 
Experiment 1, for final lineup decisions and when the forced-choice task was included. 
Intervening Task Condition d’ for final lineup 
decisions 
d’ when forced-choice 
decisions included 
No lineup (control) 1.36 1.35 
Biased intervening lineup 0.15 -0.11 
Fair intervening lineup 0.46 0.71 
Notes. All values rounded to 2dp. 
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Figure 7. A graph showing the hit rate (proportion of correct identifications of the culprit) in 
each intervening task condition. The light grey sections indicate the number of additional 
participants who identified the culprit after they were forced to choose from the final lineup. 
Error bars represent 95% CIs. 
 
Conclusion  
These results show that there was no significant difference in willingness to identify the 
true culprit (final lineup decision) or ability to identify the culprit (forced-choice task included) 
regardless of whether participants received a fair, biased, or no intervening lineup. Figure 7 is a 
graph that clearly demonstrates these findings. In addition, participants confidence in these 
decisions did not appear to suffer as a result of misleading intervening lineup information. Thus, 
in this experiment, there is no evidence that the intervening lineups prevent people from making 
accurate decisions when the culprit is presented to them using the “modified test” design—
surrounded by new fillers only, without the repeated innocent suspect. In addition, it appears that 
as the suggestiveness of a procedure increases (control condition < fair intervening lineup 
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condition < biased intervening lineup condition), participants’ ability to discriminate between the 
culprit and innocent suspect decreased, as evidenced by the d’ values. 
Experiment 1 Discussion 
Experiment 1 produced a robust repeated-suspect effect. The repeated-suspect effect was 
not limited to a particular suspect, a particular photo of a suspect, a particular crime video, a 
particular set of fillers, or suggestive intervening identification procedures. For all conditions 
involving more than one identification procedure with a repeated innocent person, there was a 
significant increase in misidentifications of the innocent suspect. In addition, I also found that 
biased intervening lineups produced much higher rates of innocent suspect misidentifications in 
the final lineup than did fair intervening lineups.  
The finding that the influence of a biased lineup could not be remedied by a subsequent 
fair lineup means that the statement in the dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court decision in 
Manson vs. Braithwaite is unsubstantiated—administering a fair lineup cannot correct for the 
problems created by an earlier administration of a biased lineup (as shown, also, with an initial 
showup procedure by Haw et al., 2007). Similarly, these results also show that the practice of 
showing an eyewitness multiple lineups containing the same police suspect does not improve 
outcomes, as is typically the reasoning the police provide. In fact, here, the hit rate remained 
unchanged, and the false alarm rate increased. Even a previous, fair lineup significantly 
increased innocent suspect identifications in a later lineup with new fillers. The results are 
consistent with the proposition that any time a suspect is presented in more than one 
identification procedure to the same eyewitness, the initial procedure contaminates the results 
from any subsequent procedures. 
Analyses of the post-identification questions in Experiment 1 were included to looking at 
the relative contribution of three potential psychological mechanisms underlying these repeated-
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suspect effects. Responses to the categorical R-K-G question were analyzed to assess how the 
proportion of familiarity (“know” judgments) and recollection (“remember” judgments) 
processes changed across intervening task conditions. When participants who received a fair 
intervening lineup were compared to participants who saw a biased intervening lineup, different 
proportions of “remember” and “know” judgments were found. There was a lower percentage of 
“remember” judgments and a higher percentage of “know” judgments for participants who 
selected the innocent suspect after seeing a biased intervening lineup when compared with 
participations who selected the true culprit after a biased intervening lineup. In contrast, when a 
fair intervening lineup was presented to participants, there were approximately equal 
distributions of “remember” and “know” judgments regardless of whether a participant selected 
the true culprit or the innocent suspect. Furthermore, when participants were very confident, 
there was a higher proportion of “remember” judgments and a lower proportion of “know” 
judgments when compared to the R-K-G judgments associated with lower confidence culprit and 
innocent suspect identifications. Thus, distribution of R-K-G judgments and high, medium, and 
low confidence in identifications was approximately the same whether or not the person 
identified was a repeated innocent suspect or the true culprit. 
Consistent with the R-K-G findings, the source-monitoring questions revealed that a 
biased intervening lineup was associated with more reports that a previous lineup was the source 
of recognition when compared to those in the fair intervening lineup condition. However, a 
substantial portion of these individuals had identified the innocent suspect despite being asked to 
think only about the person who appeared in the video. Interestingly, participants who selected 
the innocent suspect from the final lineup, after viewing a biased intervening lineup or a fair 
intervening lineup, often rated the video as a source of memory. This suggests that the 
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intervening lineups were resulting in source misattribution—people who identified the innocent 
suspect but had no particular source come to mind for that person attributed the recognition to 
the most plausible source, the video. People in the biased lineup condition often reported 
knowing the innocent suspect was in the previous lineup, but also thought the video was another 
reason that they recognized the innocent suspect. 
There were no significant differences found between people who chose the innocent 
suspect and those who did not in terms their reports of how motivated they were to appear 
consistent. Thus, there was no evidence that a commitment process was a contributing factor for 
participants who choose the innocent suspect in the intervening lineup and the final lineup. 
Instead, these data suggest there is no reason to reject the simpler interpretation of this pattern—
people who preferred the suspect as their choice when evaluating an intervening lineup continue 
to prefer that same person in the final lineup. The act of identifying someone from a lineup might 
narrow attention towards a particular lineup member, similar to a biased lineup. Therefore, 
participants’ recognition experience might have been stronger under conditions where they 
received a biased lineup or identified the innocent suspect from an intervening lineup. 
Ultimately, although identifying the innocent suspect might increase preference for the innocent 
suspect, there is no evidence that commitment processes or a need to appear consistent is 
responsible for choosing the innocent suspect again after having chosen that person once. 
The final purpose of Experiment 1 was to determine whether the original memory for the 
culprit was in any way impacted by viewing an intervening lineup. The identification decisions 
and confidence associated with the target-present final lineups did not suggest that the 
presentation of intervening lineups reduced participants’ abilities to identify the culprit—the 
memory trace for the culprit was maintained to a similar extent across conditions. In fact, when 
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examining the data after they were forced to choose, hit rates were at about 50% for all 
conditions. This seems to suggest that even intervening lineup conditions that make the innocent 
suspect stand out (e.g., biased intervening lineup or choosing a lineup member in a previous 
lineup) does not prevent a successful identification of the culprit later, so long as the culprit is the 
only person in the line that has been seen before. Thus, these data are consistent with the idea 
that exposure to an innocent suspect creates a second memory trace that is associated with the 
original memory for the culprit, but does not alter the memory for the culprit.  
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CHAPTER 3.    EXPERIMENT TWO  
Overview 
Experiment 2 had four experimental phases, again separated by ten-minute filler tasks in 
which participants completed puzzles on paper and relinquished control of the computer to the 
experimenter. Participants began by watching one of the crime events containing one of the 
suspects. There were three intervening lineup phases following this, separated by the 10 minutes 
of puzzles. The first task could be a biased, target-absent lineup, a fair, target-absent lineup, or 
no lineup (a reading comprehension task). The second intervening task was either a fair, target-
absent lineup or another reading task. After a final 10-minute period, participants were given the 
final, fair lineup phase followed by process-related post-identification questions.  
Experiment 2 builds on the findings in Experiment 1 in two main ways. First, an 
additional intervening lineup was added to the design, so the effects associated with more 
encoding opportunities could be assessed for the participants randomly assigned to the conditions 
with two intervening lineups. Second, this experiment sought to explore the potential impact of 
social influence. Unlike in Experiment 1, the experimenter was present in the room for 
identification procedures in Experiment 2, and the way the instructions were delivered suggested 
to the participant that the experimenter had control over which task they received next. Thus, in 
addition to the suggestive nature of a repeated individual across lineups, the participant was 
allowed to infer that the experimenter chose to give them the new lineup with the repeated 
person. In contrast to Experiment 1, this experiment did not investigate whether participants 
maintained their memory for the true culprit—the final lineup was always target absent. All 
lineups in Experiment 2 were, therefore, target absent and contained a single innocent suspect 
that was repeated in any lineup procedures a participant received. 
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Predictions 
Hypotheses Set 1B: The Repeated-Suspect Effect  
As in Experiment 1, I expected to find a repeated-suspect effect. This means that 
participants who saw an intervening lineup containing the innocent suspect should be 
significantly more likely to misidentify that innocent suspect again in the final lineup compared 
with participants who received no intervening lineups (control condition). I also anticipated two 
circumstances under which the repeated-suspect effect would be larger in this experiment (i.e., 
produce more misidentifications of the innocent suspect). When the first intervening lineup was 
biased, this was hypothesized to increase the amount of attention that participants directed at the 
innocent suspect relative to a fair lineup and, as a result, exacerbate the number of identifications 
errors of that same person in a later lineup, which is a replication of Experiment 1. Similarly, 
when the participant received two intervening lineups before being presented with the final 
lineup, the repeated-suspect effect was expected to be stronger because, in this case, participants 
will have seen the innocent suspect twice before the final lineup, strengthening the memory trace 
for that face. The strongest repeated-suspect effect should occur when both of these 
manipulations are introduced to a procedure—when a participant first saw an innocent suspect in 
a biased lineup, and then again in a new, fair lineup, before they made their last identification 
decision about another fair lineup which also contained the innocent suspect.  
The effect of repeating an innocent suspect across lineups was also expected to influence 
participants’ confidence reports. When people identified an innocent suspect that they saw in a 
previous lineup, they were expected to be more confident in that incorrect identification decision 
compared with participants who received no intervening lineups. This increase in confidence 
levels should be especially prominent when the participant saw the innocent suspect in two 
previous lineups. In addition, a biased lineup should boost confidence more than a fair lineup, as 
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they will feel like they have a stronger memory for the innocent suspect’s face. Finally, as with 
the predictions for the identification decisions, participants who received a biased lineup and saw 
the innocent suspect in two intervening lineups should demonstrate the largest boost in 
confidence when identifying the innocent suspect in the final lineup. This should be evidenced 
by an interaction between the variable indicating whether a participant selected the innocent 
suspect in the final lineup or not and the intervening lineup condition with confidence levels as 
the outcome variable. These patterns are expected to occur when the identification and 
confidence data are analyzed with and without the forced-choice task decisions and confidence. 
Hypotheses Set 2B: Remember-Know-Guess and Source Monitoring Processes 
Associations between the experimental conditions and R-K-G judgments were already 
investigated in Experiment 1, as well as participants’ reports of their sources of recognition. 
Experiment 2 allowed us to replicate and extend these hypotheses, and yielded slightly larger cell 
sizes for some of the comparisons. As in Experiment 1, the post-identification questions were 
used to test these hypotheses. The predictions follow a similar pattern to those in Experiment 1, 
but have some additional predictions relevant to receiving more than one intervening lineup, 
which was anticipated to draw attention to the repeated innocent suspect in a similar way to a 
biased lineup, even if the intervening lineups were both fair. 
For participants who selected the innocent suspect, the number of intervening lineups was 
expected to change the distribution of “remember,” “know,” and “guess” judgments. Each 
addition intervening lineup provided more exposure to the same innocent suspect, and therefore 
was expected to be associated with higher numbers of “remember” judgments, especially when 
one of the intervening lineups was a biased lineup. In addition, participants who received two 
lineups were expected to report the lineup as a source of memory more than participants who 
saw one or no intervening lineups. The type of intervening lineup was expected to influence 
 110 
source judgments too, with biased lineups increase the “lineup as source” scores. Participants 
were expected to report the video as a source of recognition more frequently when they received 
a biased intervening lineup, and also when they received more than one intervening lineup. 
Finally, participants who chose the innocent suspect from at least one intervening lineup should 
report a “remember” experience more than a “know” experience, and are expected to attribute 
the source of their recognition to the lineups, and possibility the video if they misattribute the 
source of their strong recognition experience. 
Hypotheses Set 3B: Commitment Effects 
As in Experiment 1, this experimental design offered an opportunity to examine the 
motivations of people who selected the innocent suspect from the intervening lineups prior to 
selecting them again in the final lineup. First, people who selected the innocent suspect from an 
intervening lineup were expected to show a greater tendency to select that person again in the 
final lineup, as was found in Experiment 1. Second, responses to the post-identification questions 
were used to shed light on why these participants selected the innocent suspect multiple times. If 
the underlying reason for their multiple identifications of this innocent suspect was a 
commitment process, higher ratings were expected on the relevant commitment questions for 
participants who identified the innocent suspect multiple times compared with participants who 
only selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup and not from any intervening lineups. In 
contrast, if mere preference was the reason that the innocent suspect is chosen twice, little or no 
difference in responses to these post-identification commitment questions as a function of which 
experiment condition the participant was randomly assigned to.  
Hypotheses Set 5: Social Influence 
One of the more unique hypotheses in this work concerned the potential role of demand 
characteristics as a form of social influence being triggered by the repetition manipulation. In 
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actual cases, such as in the White case, repeating the suspect in a new lineup might lead 
witnesses to infer that the lineup administrator is trying to get the witness to pick that person. In 
order to give a better test of this possibility, a procedural change was introduced by having the 
experimenter in the room for the whole session, and it was implied that the experimenter was in 
charge of choosing and bringing up each task that participants saw. The repetition was expected 
to have an impact on participants decisions by serving as a form of informational social 
influence. That is, in an eyewitness identification context, repetition might imply to the witness 
that there was something special about the repeated individual and strongly suggests the repeated 
person was the culprit.  
As in Experiment 1, data bearing on these social influence possibilities was sought by 
using post-identification questions. These included a “yes” or “no” question to assess whether 
participants felt like the experimenter was trying to influence them and, if they did feel 
influenced, the participant was asked to explain why in an open response textbox. It was 
predicted that participants who received a biased lineup or two intervening lineups would report 
feeling like the experimenter was attempting to influence them more frequently that participants 
in other conditions. The open responses from participants who reported feeling influenced were 
assessed for qualitative differences between conditions.  
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate students from Iowa State University were recruited using an online 
system where psychology laboratories could post advertisements for studies. This study was 
completed in return for partial course credit. Pilot testing indicated that this study took 
approximately 45-50 minutes. A total of 349 students were run in person, but quite a few 
exclusions need to be made as a result of computer problems. When this happened, the 
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participant had seen some of the materials, but not completed the task, so their data could not be 
used and they were no longer naïve and could not start over. Several participants were also 
excluded due to a randomization programming error in one counterbalance. After exclusions, the 
sample size was 303 (refer to Table 7 for a summary of the sample sizes in each condition). 
Demographic information was not collected, but all participants were undergraduate students 
from Iowa State University. This study was approved by the IRB Board at Iowa State University 
(ID: 19-322, see Appendix I). Some of these participants were collected in Fall Semester 2019, 
and the remainder were collected in Spring semester 2020. However, data collection was cut off 
on March 13th 2020 due to the COVID-19 world-wide pandemic that prohibited in-person 
testing. Because this experiment could not be run online, data collection stopped earlier than 
intended. Thus, some of the counterbalances have smaller sample sizes than others. The plan is 
to finish data collection at a later time and even out the sample sizes across conditions once in-
person experiments are permitted again in the future. 
Design 
Similar to Experiment 1, this was an experimental study with a 3 (intervening task phase 
1: biased intervening lineup, fair Intervening lineup, or intervening reading task) x 2 (intervening 
task phase 2: fair intervening lineup or intervening reading task) between-subjects design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of the tasks during the first phase of 
intervening tasks, and one of the second phase of intervening tasks. Unlike Experiment 1, this 
experiment had a third phase too, but there was no manipulation in this phase—it was always a 
target-absent, fair lineup. Thus, there were six possible between-subjects’ conditions (refer to 
Table 8 for a summary of the number of participants in each condition). Figure 8 contains a 
diagram to help describe the design and procedure. 
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Table 8. A summary of the sample sizes in each condition for Experiment 2 
 Intervening Lineup Phase 2   
Intervening Lineup  
Phase 1 
 
Fair Lineup 
  
Reading Task 
TOTAL 
Biased Intervening Lineup 62 63 125 
Fair Intervening Lineup 54 44 98 
Reading Task 35 45 80 
TOTAL 151 152 303 
Notes. All lineups were always target absent, containing the innocent suspect’s photo and five 
photos of individuals who are fillers. 
 
Materials 
The materials used for Experiment 2 are the same as those used in Experiment 1. The 
lineups and pilot testing data can be found in Appendix A. Appendix C contains the instructions 
and post-identification questions presented to participants in a Qualtrics survey throughout 
Experiment 2. Appendix D contains the reading comprehension tasks used in the place of 
intervening lineups for control conditions. 
Procedure 
Participants signed up for a one hour, in-lab session and met an experimenter outside the 
laboratory. Participants were asked to leave their belongings in the main area to avoid 
distractions during the experiment, and then asked to sit at the computer and read the consent 
form. The experimenter explained that the consent document described what the experiment 
would involve, how their privacy was protected, and any plans for the data collected. If 
participants had no questions about the document or study, they were asked to sign the 
document, and check the boxes indicating that they were 18 years old with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. 
Next, the experimenter for that session introduced the task and explained to participants 
that they would be remaining in the room for the duration of the experiment. Participants were 
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told that they would be “completing a number of different tasks that will be broken up by ‘rest 
period’ in which you will complete some puzzles of your choosing.” In addition, the 
experimenter’s presence in the room was explained: “I will be in the room with you for the whole 
session because, during these rest periods, I will need to take over the computer and check your 
answers so that I can bring up the correct materials for the next task.” Then, the participant was 
asked if they had any questions. If not, they were told to go to the next page and begin. 
The procedure was very similar to Experiment 1, beginning with one of the four possible 
crime videos (drug deal or office theft; suspect 1 or suspect 2). After watching the video, 
participants had a screen that said they would now spend 10 minutes on a task of their choosing. 
The experimenter would say “This is one of the ‘rest periods’ I told you about. Which puzzle 
would you like?” On the screen, participants were instructed to tell the experimenter whether 
they wanted a crossword, sudoku, or word find. When participants clicked to the next page, a 
countdown would start so they would know when 10 minutes was up. At this point, once the 
participant had started on their puzzle, the experimenter would turn the screen away from the 
participant and pretend to do something with the experimental task. The experimenter’s presence 
in the room was intended to permit the participant to infer that the experimenter was choosing 
the tasks that they received. Thus, it was important they appear like the experimenters seemed 
like they were, actually, spending some time doing this during the filler tasks. In reality, the 
experimenters were looking up the weather, movie times, playing tic-tac-toe with google, or 
some other quick task in a new Google Chrome tab to make their activity on the computer 
realistic. The page would automatically advance to the next task after 10 minutes. When this 
happened, the experimenter asked the participant to return to the computer task and said “Now 
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you are set up to receive a [police lineup / reading task]. The instructions are all on the screen, 
so move through them at your own pace and let me know if you have any questions.” 
The next task was the first Intervening Task Phase. Participants received either a biased 
intervening lineup (target absent), a fair intervening lineup (target absent), or a reading 
comprehension task (control condition; see Appendix D). The instructions and materials used 
here were identical to the intervening lineup phase used in Experiment 1 (refer to Appendix A 
for the lineup materials and Appendix C for the full instructions for Experiment 2), with 
participants randomly assigned to each condition. For those who received a lineup, participants 
needed to make an identification decision (select one of the photos or indicate “not present”), 
explain the reason behind their decision in an open-response format, and then rate their 
confidence in their decision. Participants in the control group needed to get two multiple choice 
reading comprehension questions correct. Then, participants moved on to the next 10-minute 
filler task. They could continue with the puzzle from the last ‘rest period’ or ask for a new one. 
Again, the experimenter pretended to set up the next task for them by turning the screen away 
from the participant and taking over the computer. 
Once 10 minutes elapsed, the program automatically advanced to the next task, which 
was the second Intervening Task Phase. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either a 
fair intervening lineup (target absent) or a reading comprehension task (control condition) during 
this phase. This is one of the main differences between Experiment 1 and 2 in this dissertation—
Experiment 2 had an additional intervening task phase and an additional filler task after this, so 
some participants saw the innocent suspect in two different lineups before seeing them again in 
the final lineup. Once participants recorded their responses about this lineup or answered the 
reading comprehension questions, they began the final filler task period. Again, the experimenter 
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turned the screen away so they could pretend to bring up the next task, and the participant spent 
10 minutes working on a puzzle of their choice. 
The final lineup phase was also different from Experiment 1. All participants received a 
target-absent, fair lineup for the final phase of the experiment. Participants were initially allowed 
to say “not present” if they did not think that the culprit was among the photos. After stating their 
reasoning in an open-response box and rating their confidence, though, these participants were 
asked to indicate who they would have chosen if they had to pick, explain why, and rate their 
confidence in that forced choice decision. This was followed by the same post-identification 
questionnaire used in Experiment 1 (found in Appendix C). Once these questions were 
completed, participants were debriefed and dismissed by the experimenter. 
Results 
Materials Check 
Were there any differences in repeated-suspect effect outcomes based on which 
suspect served as the culprit and which served as the innocent suspect?  
For these analyses, I used incorrect identifications of the innocent suspect as the outcome 
variable in a logistic regression (1 = innocent suspect identification, 0 = did not identify the 
innocent suspect). To determine whether the number of lineups interacted with which suspect 
served as the culprit to predict false alarm rates, the interaction between suspect and number of 
intervening lineups was examined. There was no significant interaction (B = -0.29, p = 0.466, ! 
= 0.75, 95% CI [0.35, 1.64]) and no main effect of suspect (B = -0.20, p = 0.734, ! = 0.82, 95% 
CI [0.25, 2.59]), suggesting that suspect need not be included in analyses as a control variable—
which suspect served as the culprit did not influence the strength of the repeated-suspect effect. 
Next, the six combinations of Intervening Task Condition were entered as predictors to 
determine how type and order of intervening tasks mattered for how the suspect identity 
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influenced false alarm rates. Again, there were no significant interactions (-1.23 ≤ B  ≤	 -0.49, 
0.232 ≤ p ≤ 0.635, 0.29 ≤ ! ≤ 0.61) and no main effect of suspect (B = 0.05, p = 0.945, ! = 
1.05, 95% CI [0.22, 5.10]). Thus, suspect was not a required control variable for any of the 
analyses in Experiment 2 because the outcomes remained unchanged by which person served as 
the culprit. 
Manipulation Checks 
Were the biased lineups influencing participants’ identification decisions?  
As in Experiment 1, participants who received a biased intervening lineup for the first 
intervening task identified the innocent suspect significantly more frequently (26%) than 
participants who received a fair intervening lineup (7%; B = -1.50, p = 0.001, ! = 0.22, 95% CI 
[0.09, 0.50]). Thus, the biased intervening lineups were associated with a 19% increase in 
innocent suspect misidentifications during the intervening lineup phase, which means that the 
biased lineups had their intended effect. See Table 9 for a summary of participants’ intervening 
lineup decisions. 
Hypotheses Set 1B: Repeated-Suspect Effect 
Identification decisions  
To assess the effect of a repeated, innocent suspect on participant’s identifications in the 
final lineup, their final lineup decisions we first coded as either one (“false alarm on the innocent 
suspect”) or zero (“not a false alarm on the innocent suspect”). Each participant was also coded 
as either seeing one intervening lineup (“1”) or not (“0”), and two intervening lineups (“1”) or 
not (“0”) in separate variables. Each of the six between-subjects’ groups was labelled to be used 
as a factor in these analyses. 
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Analytic plan 
A logistic regression analysis was used to assess whether the number of previous lineups 
containing the innocent suspect, or the type of lineup, influenced the rate of false alarms on the 
innocent suspect for the final lineup. The number of false alarms was the binary outcome 
variable, and the number of lineups or the condition label served as predictor variables. The 
initial final lineup decisions were analyzed first, which were the decisions made when 
participants were allowed to select “not present”. Then, the overall decisions that included 
identifications made after people were forced to choose (thus, there were only innocent suspect 
or filler identification decisions in these data) were analyzed separately. 
Table 9. A summary of identification decisions for the first and second intervening tasks in 
Experiment 2 as a function of condition. 
First Intervening 
Task 
ID decision Proportion  Second Intervening 
Task 
ID decision Proportion 
No Intervening 
Lineup (Control) 
IS - Control (No 
Lineup) 
IS - 
Filler - Filler - 
Reject - Reject - 
IS - Fair Intervening 
Lineup 
IS 0.06 
Filler - Filler 0.29 
Reject - Reject 0.66 
Biased Intervening 
Lineup 
IS 0.25 Control (No 
Lineup) 
IS - 
Filler 0.05 Filler - 
Reject 0.70 Reject - 
IS 0.26 Fair Intervening 
Lineup 
IS 0.24 
Filler 0.06 Filler 0.32 
Reject 0.68 Reject 0.45 
Fair Intervening 
Lineup 
IS 0.07 Control (No 
Lineup) 
IS - 
Filler 0.23 Filler - 
Reject 0.70 Reject - 
IS 0.07 Fair Intervening 
Lineup 
IS 0.15 
Filler 0.24 Filler 0.39 
Reject 0.69 Reject 0.46 
Notes. IS = Innocent Suspect Identification, Filler = Filler Identification, and Reject = Selected 
“Not Present”/ Lineup Rejection. 
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Number of intervening lineups  
The variables created to indicate whether a participant received one or two intervening 
lineups were significant predictors of participants’ final lineup decisions. A single intervening 
lineup led to a marginally significant increase in false alarms on the innocent suspect (one 
intervening lineup: B = 1.24, p = 0.051, ! = 3.44, 95% CI [1.14, 14.88]). Two intervening 
lineups were associated with significantly higher rates of innocent suspect identifications than no 
intervening lineup (two intervening lineups: B = 1.59, p = 0.012, ! = 4.88, 95% CI [1.62, 
21.12]). When the forced choice decisions were also included in these analyses, similar effects 
were found. One intervening lineup had a nonsignificant impact on false alarms, but was 
associated with a higher innocent suspect identification rate than the no lineups condition (B = 
0.49, p = 0.261, ! = 1.63, 95% CI [0.73, 4.05]). Two intervening lineups was associated with a 
significant increase in incorrect identifications of the innocent suspect (B = 1.08, p = 0.013, ! = 
2.93, 95% CI [1.30, 7.29]). Thus, two intervening lineups consistently increased the rate of false 
alarms on the innocent suspect in the final lineup compared to a condition with no intervening 
lineup, but the effect of one intervening lineup was weaker.  
The difference between the effect of one intervening lineup and two intervening lineups 
on false alarm rates was only significant when forced choice decisions were included though. 
That is, for final lineup decisions, there was a 20% false alarm rate after one intervening  lineup 
and a 26% false alarm rate after two intervening lineups, which was a nonsignificant difference 
(#$ [1, N = 258] = 1.05, p = 0.152). When the forced-choice task was included, though, 26% of 
participants identified the innocent suspect after one intervening lineup and 39% after two 
intervening lineups, which was a significant difference (#$ [1, N = 258] = 4.21, p = 0.02). See 
Figure 9 for a graph of these data. 
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Figure 9. False alarm rate on the innocent suspect according to the number of lineups a 
participant saw in Experiment 2, with bars split by initial and after forced choice identifications. 
 
Nature and order of intervening lineups 
Refer to Table 10 for a complete summary of the final identification decisions (initial and 
forced-choice) associated with each combination of intervening tasks. To analyze these data, the 
false alarms rates (on the innocent suspect) was compared across six different conditions, based 
on which intervening task a participant received during the first phase (biased, fair, or no 
intervening lineup) and the second phase (fair or no intervening lineup). The participants who 
received no intervening lineups served as the reference group in these analyses and, as expected, 
this condition had the lowest rate of false alarms for both initial final lineup decisions (7% chose 
the innocent suspect) and after they were forced to pick from the lineup (18%). Refer to Table 11 
for a summary of the results. 
Participants who received an initial biased lineup made significantly more 
misidentifications of the innocent suspect compared to the condition in which no intervening 
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lineups were seen. This was true when the biased lineup was followed by a fair intervening 
lineup or no intervening lineup, and when assessing initial final lineup decisions (biased then fair 
lineup: B = 2.04, p = 0.002, ! = 7.69, 95% CI [2.43, 34.47]]; biased then no lineup: B = 1.64, p = 
0.013, ! = 5.16, 95% CI [1.60, 23.29]) and forced-choice decisions (biased then fair lineup: B = 
1.66, p <.001, ! = 5.26, 95% CI [2.19, 13.85]; biased then no lineup: B = 0.91, p = 0.054, ! = 
2.48, 95% CI [1.02, 6.56]). Note, though, the difference between forced choice decisions for the 
condition where a biased lineup is followed by no lineup compared with the control condition is 
only marginally significant. 
Table 10. Proportions showing the final lineup choosing patterns as a function of intervening 
lineup condition in Experiment 2. 
First Intervening 
Task Condition 
Second Intervening 
Task Condition 
Final Lineup 
Decision 
Final Lineup Decision 
Including Forced-Choice 
No Lineup No Lineup IS 0.07 IS 0.18 
Filler 0.31 Filler 0.82 
Reject 0.62   
Fair Lineup IS 0.17 IS 0.23 
Filler 0.40 Filler 0.77 
Reject 0.43   
Biased Lineup No Lineup IS 0.27 IS 0.35 
Filler 0.43 Filler 0.63 
Reject 0.32   
Fair Lineup IS 0.35 IS 0.53 
Filler 0.18 Filler 0.47 
Reject 0.47   
Fair Lineup No Lineup IS 0.11 IS 0.16 
Filler 0.41 Filler 0.84 
Reject 0.48   
Fair Lineup IS 0.15 IS 0.22 
Filler 0.37 Filler 0.78 
Reject 0.48   
Notes. IS = Innocent Suspect Identification, Filler = Filler Identification, and Reject = Selected 
“Not Present”/ Lineup Rejection. 
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Other than when there was a biased lineup for the first intervening task, there were no 
conditions with significantly different false alarm rates to the control condition. However, though 
not statistically significant, the patterns show that any previous lineup containing the innocent 
suspect increased misidentifications of innocent suspect in a later lineup. For instance, two fair 
intervening lineups had the next largest influence on later false alarms. When only one fair 
intervening lineup was received, the largest effect was seen when that lineup was closer in time 
to the final lineup, rather than the video (similar to the findings in Pezdek & Blandon-Gitlin, 
2005). However, because these patterns are nonsignificant, I must assume that these differences 
may not be robust. 
Table 11. Logistic regression results and the relevant proportion of false alarms for each 
possible combination of intervening task for Experiment 2. 
Lineup Data First Task Second Task Proportion of 
FAs on the IS 
B p ! 
Final 
Lineup 
Decisions 
No Lineup No Lineup 0.07 Reference Group 
No Lineup Fair Lineup 0.17 1.06 0.155 2.89 
Biased Lineup Fair Lineup 0.35 2.04 0.002 7.69 
Biased Lineup No Lineup 0.27 1.64 0.013 5.16 
Fair Lineup Fair Lineup 0.15 0.89 0.210 2.44 
Fair Lineup No Lineup 0.11 0.58 0.444 1.79 
Including 
Forced-
Choice 
Decisions 
No Lineup No Lineup 0.18 Reference Group 
No Lineup Fair Lineup 0.23 0.32 0.574 1.78 
Biased Lineup Fair Lineup 0.53 1.66 <.001 5.26 
Biased Lineup No Lineup 0.35 0.91 0.054 2.48 
Fair Lineup Fair Lineup 0.22 0.28 0.584 1.32 
Fair Lineup No Lineup 0.16 -0.13 0.814 0.88 
Notes. FA = false alarm, IS = innocent suspect, B = parameter estimate, p = significance value, 
and ! = odds ratio. All values rounded to 2dp except p values (3dp).  
 
 
Confidence associated with identification decisions  
As in Experiment 1, confidence levels could be measured in two ways: confidence in 
final lineup decision (referred to as confidence) and confidence that includes confidence in 
124 
 
identifications that were made only once participants were forced to choose someone from the 
lineup (referred to as forced-choice confidence). Thus, for forced-choice confidence, when 
participants chose “not present” from the final lineup, their response to the forced-choice task 
was used instead. 
Analytic plan  
Multiple regression analyses were run with either final lineup or forced-choice 
confidence as the outcome variable. The variable indicating the number of intervening lineups, 
or which combination of intervening tasks a participant received was included as a predictor, as 
well as whether they selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup or not. An interaction 
between these two predictors was included to see if the effect of the intervening tasks on 
participants’ confidence level was moderated by their final lineup decision (false alarm or not) 
but was removed if it was nonsignificant. Standardized beta values are reported. 
Number of intervening lineups 
There was a significant interaction between the number of intervening lineups that a 
participant received and their final lineup choice for predicting confidence and forced-choice 
confidence levels. This interaction is depicted in Figure 10. Participants who received one 
intervening lineup had significantly higher confidence levels than participants who received no 
intervening lineup, but only when they selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup (no 
lineups: 39%; one lineup: 63%). There was no significant difference in confidence level for the 
equivalent groups of participants who made a different final lineup decision, such as a filler 
identification or a lineup rejection (no lineups: 58%, one lineup: 58%, B = 0.25, p = 0.048). A 
similar effect was found when comparing participants who received two intervening lineups and 
those who received no lineups (B = 0.28, p = 0.024). Participants who received two intervening 
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lineups rather than no intervening lineups were significantly more confident, but only when they 
also selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup (two lineups: 68%). Participants who did 
not select the innocent suspect, and instead identified a filler or rejected the lineup, were equally 
confident regardless of the number of lineups they received (two lineups: 58%).  
When forced-choice confidence was included, the patterns were the same as the patterns 
seen for the final lineup confidence. There was a significant interaction between the number of 
lineups a participant received (one or two intervening lineups versus no intervening lineups) and 
the variable indicating final lineup choice with forced-choice decisions included on forced-
choice confidence. Participants who saw one intervening lineup were significantly more 
confident than those who did not have any intervening lineups, but this pattern was only present 
when participants also selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup (no lineups: 45%; one 
lineup: 62%; B = 0.20, p = 0.040). Confidence levels were equal when compared the same 
conditions for participants who selected a filler for the final lineup or when forced to choose (no 
lineups: 54%; one lineup: 52%). Receiving two intervening lineups was also associated with 
higher confidence than the no intervening lineups condition but, again, only for participants who 
selected the innocent suspect (two lineups: 64%) not participants who selected a filler (two 
lineups: 51%; B = 0.23, p = 0.017). 
Nature and order of intervening lineups  
There were six different combinations of conditions that participants were randomly 
assigned to during the first and second intervening task phases. When assessing confidence, there 
was a significant interaction between whether a participant selected the innocent suspect from 
the final lineup and the combination of intervening tasks they received. Participants who 
received a biased intervening lineup followed by a fair intervening lineup were 69% confident on 
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average in their identifications of the innocent suspect, but those who completed only non-lineup 
tasks during the intervening phases were 39% confident in their innocent suspect identifications 
(B = 0.26, p = 0.013). Similarly, participants who were presented with a biased intervening 
lineup followed by a non-lineup task were 68% confident in their identification of the innocent 
suspect from the final lineup (B = 0.24, p = 0.026). In contrast, when participants selected a filler 
or rejected the lineup, there was no significant difference in confidence levels for any of the 
intervening lineup conditions (control: 58%; biased, fair: 56%; biased, no lineup: 58%). There 
were no other significant effects. 
 
 
Figure 10. A graphical representation of the interaction between the number of lineups and 
whether a participant selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup for Experiment 2 on 
confidence. Error bars represent 95% CIs. Sample sizes are smaller for the “Identified Innocent 
Suspect” bars than the other bars. 
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When analyzing forced-choice confidence, there were also significant interactions 
between the intervening task conditions and participants final lineup decisions. Participants who 
identified the innocent suspect after receiving a biased intervening lineup followed by a fair 
lineup were significantly more confident in their innocent suspect identifications (64%) than 
people who received no intervening lineup (45%; B = 0.22, p = 0.009). The same interaction was 
found when assessing the participants who saw a biased intervening lineup followed by a non-
lineup task (68%, B = 0.20, p = 0.017). There was also a marginally significant interaction of the 
same type for participants who received two fair intervening lineups containing the innocent 
suspect prior to their final lineup (62%; B = 0.15, p = 0.090). However, this was not the case for 
participants who identified a filler, either initially or after being forced to choose from the lineup 
(control: 54%; biased, fair: 56%; biased, no lineup: 53%; fair, fair: 53%). 
Hypotheses Set 2B: Remember-Know-Guess Processes and Source Monitoring 
Categorical Remember-Know-Guess judgment 
Analytic plan 
The proportion of R-K-G judgments in each intervening task condition were compiled in 
Table 11, as a function of whether participants received a target-present or target-absent final 
lineup. This permitted a comparison of how “remember”, “know”, and “guess” were distributed 
across conditions when participants made culprit identifications or innocent suspect 
identifications. Chi-Square analyses were used to determine whether the distribution of R-K-G 
judgments was different for innocent suspect identifications within the various intervening task 
conditions. Supporting analyses using multinomial regression can be found in Appendix H. The 
number of “remember” and “know” judgments associated with participants who identified at 
least one innocent suspect during the intervening tasks and also the final lineup. These 
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participants were compared to the R-K-G judgments made by participants who only selected the 
innocent suspect from the final lineup to determine whether there was more “false recall” among 
participants who chose the innocent suspect multiple times. 
Number of lineups  
First, the percentage of “remember” and “know” was examined for participants who 
identified the innocent suspect in the final lineup for each number of intervening lineups—no 
intervening lineups, one intervening lineup, and two intervening lineups. A full summary of 
these data can be found in Table 12. A Chi-Square analysis was run to evaluate the distribution 
of “remember” and “know” judgments for participants based on whether they received one or 
two intervening lineups. The test was non-significant (#$ [1, N = 82] = 0.43, p = 0.513) 
indicating that R-K-G judgments did not differ based on the number of lineups seen by 
participants who selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup. Specifically, among 
participants who identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup after seeing one intervening 
lineup, 45.9% reported “know” compared with 21.7% who reported “remember.” When 
participants identified the innocent suspect after receiving two intervening lineups, 35.6% of 
participants reported a “know” judgment and 24.4% reported a “remember” experience. Though 
no significant effects were found, there appeared to be more “know” judgments associated with 
intervening lineups. Contrary to hypotheses, presenting participants with more than one target-
absent intervening lineup did not appear to increase the percentage of “remember” judgments. 
Combination of intervening tasks. Next, the distribution of R-K-G judgments was 
assessed for each of the combinations of intervening tasks, focusing on participants who selected 
the innocent suspect from the final lineup again. A full summary of these data can also be found 
in Table 12. The sample sizes in some of these cells were far too low for any kind of 
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comprehensive, adequately-powered, categorical analysis. Chi-Square analyses were used to 
compare the impact a biased intervening lineup followed by a fair intervening lineup on R-K-G 
judgments compared with only a biased lineup followed by a reading task, or two fair lineups. 
When comparing the influence of a biased intervening lineup followed by a fair intervening 
lineup to a biased lineup was followed by a non-lineup task, there was no significant association 
between intervening lineup condition and the number of “remember” and “know” judgments (#$ 
[1, N = 34] = 1.40, p = 0.236). Participants who received a biased intervening lineup followed by 
a fair intervening lineup did not differ in the number of “remember” and “know judgments 
compared with people who received two fair lineups (#$ [1, N = 45] = 0.31, p = 0.580).  
As in Experiment 1, the sample sizes make it difficult to make any firm conclusions 
regarding dual-process recognition. However, consistent with the findings for the number of 
lineups, reports of “knowing” were overall far more common for all combinations of intervening 
tasks with the exception of when participants received no lineup. There was some evidence of 
higher rates of “remembering” when participants received a fair lineup for the second 
intervening lineup, regardless of what type of task was first. 
Were there more “remember” judgments for those who identified the innocent suspect 
from the final lineup and at least once from an intervening lineup compared with participants 
who only identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup?  
Again, only participants who selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup were 
included in this analysis. Participants were coded as “did not identify the innocent suspect from 
an intervening lineup” (coded as “0”, N = 44) and “identified the innocent suspect from one or 
two intervening lineups” (coded as “1”, N = 38). Among those who identified the innocent 
suspect from at least one intervening lineup, 31.6% reported “remembering” the innocent 
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suspect, and 55.3% reported “knowing” the innocent suspect. For participants who only 
identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup, although they did receive at least one 
intervening lineup containing the innocent suspect, 15.9% judged their recognition experience as 
“remember” and 27.3% reported a “know” judgments. There was no significant association 
between whether participants identified the innocent suspect from an intervening lineup and their 
R-K-G judgment (#$ [1, N = 82] = 0.002, p = 0.972), but both “remember” and “know” 
judgments were much more common among participants who selected the innocent suspect from 
at least one intervening lineup before identifying them in the final lineup. Choosing someone 
from a lineup may narrow attention on that individual, making any recognition of that person 
later on feel much stronger, as compared to people who received the same intervening tasks, but 
did not to identify the innocent suspect. However, it is important not to read into these patterns 
too much as the statistical test was nonsignificant. 
How are confidence and innocent suspect identifications associated for “remember” 
and “know” judgments?  
Refer to Figure 11 for a graph of participants who reported “remembering” and 
“knowing” the person they identified from the final lineup. The lines indicate the proportion of 
participants who selected the innocent suspect at each level of confidence, as a function of their 
R-K-G judgment. Note that the sample sizes, particularly at low levels of confidence, are small 
and so no inferential statistics were computed for these data. The distribution of “remember” and 
“know” judgments appears to change based on the confidence level associated with the 
identification decision. When participants were more confident, there was a higher proportion of 
“know” judgments than for medium levels of confidence, and a much higher proportion of 
“know” judgments than the participants who reported low confidence in the innocent suspect 
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identification. The proportion of “remember” judgments remained fairly stable and lower than 
the percentage of “know” judgments across the levels of confidence associated with participants 
innocent suspect identifications.  
Table 12. R-K-G judgments for suspect identifications separated by the number of lineups or the 
combination of intervening task conditions for Experiment 2. 
Intervening Task 
Conditions 
N who 
identified the IS 
Distribution of Judgments 
Remember Know Guess 
No Lineups 8 25.0% 0.0% 75.0% 
One Lineup 37 21.7% 45.9% 32.4% 
Two Lineups 45 24.4% 35.6% 40.0% 
No LUP No LUP 8 25.0% 0.0% 75.0% 
Biased LUP Fair LUP 33 24.2% 30.3% 45.5% 
Biased LUP No LUP 22 18.2% 54.5% 27.2% 
Fair LUP Fair LUP 12 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 
Fair LUP No LUP 7 14.3% 42.9% 42.9% 
No LUP Fair LUP 8 37.5% 25.0% 37.5% 
Notes. IS = Innocent Suspect and LUP = Lineup. Rows total to 100%. All proportions are 
rounded to 1dp. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. A chart displaying the Experiment 2 false alarm rate at low, medium, and high 
confidence as a function of whether the participant reported a “remember” or “know” 
recognition experience post-identification. 
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Thus, as suggested by the equivalent chart in Experiment 1, R-K-G judgments and 
confidence judgments in a repeated-suspect paradigm may not be diagnostic of accuracy. 
However, in Experiment 2, the relative proportion of “remember” judgments does not increase as 
much as was seen in Experiment 1 when confidence levels were high. Here, the “know” 
judgments seemed more closely related to the confidence associated with innocent suspect 
identifications than “remember” judgments.     
Source Monitoring Measures  
A multiple regression was used to examine the impact of intervening lineup type and 
number on source monitoring abilities. These analyses also included whether condition 
interacted with selecting the innocent suspect in the final lineup to predict source monitoring 
ability. Descriptive statistics for participant who identified the innocent suspect from the final 
lineup can be found in Table 13. Standardized beta values are reported. 
Video as source  
The two post-identification questions relevant to determining whether participants 
believed the video to be the source of any recognition were averaged to create a composite score. 
There was a significant interaction found between the number of intervening lineups and whether 
the participant selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup for responses to this “video as 
source” question (B = 0.22, p = 0.014). Participants tended report that the video was a greater 
source of recognition when they identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup, and 
received one or two intervening lineups. Participants who selected a filler from the final lineup 
tended to show the opposite pattern, with the video reported a source more when no intervening 
lineup was received compared with one or two intervening lineups. Essentially, people who were 
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given intervening lineups containing the innocent suspect and chose the innocent suspect from 
the final lineup were more likely to incorrectly attribute their feeling of recognition to the video. 
Similar results were found when the combination of intervening tasks was considered as 
well as participants’ final lineup choice—participants who selected the innocent suspect reported 
thinking that the video was a source of recognition. Relative to the condition in which no 
intervening lineups were presented, all lineup conditions increased reports that the video was the 
source when participants misidentified the innocent suspect from the final lineup at a significant 
or marginally significant level: 1) biased lineup, fair lineup, B = 0.27, p = 0.043; 2) biased 
lineup, no lineup, B = 0.25, p = 0.067; 3) fair lineup, fair lineup, B = 0.38, p = 0.007; 4) fair 
lineup, no lineup, B = 0.28, p = 0.037; and, 5) no lineup, fair lineup, B = 0.32, p = 0.007. Thus, 
any type and number of intervening lineups seemed to increase source confusion compared with 
the control condition. When an innocent suspect appeared in multiple lineups, this was 
associated with more identifications of the innocent suspect from the final lineup and the 
associated feeling of recognition being attributed, at least in part, to the video. Participants who 
identified fillers also tended to attribute their recognition to the video, but the average score was 
lower (indicating that they felt like the video played a smaller role in recognition) and there were 
no large differences between intervening task conditions. 
Lineup as source  
The influence of the number of intervening lineups on reports that a previous lineup was 
a source of recognition, as well as whether participants identified the innocent suspect or a filler 
from the final lineup. There was only a marginally significant interaction between these variables 
(B = 0.15, p = 0.062), so that effect was removed. The number of intervening lineups and the 
final lineup choice both yielded significant main effects on responses to the “lineup as source” 
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question. Each additional intervening lineup increased ratings on this question regardless of a 
participant’s final lineup decision (B = 0.19, p = 0.005). In addition, ratings in response to this 
question were lower when participants selected a filler from the final lineup rather than the 
innocent suspect (B = 0.37, p<.001). This suggests that increasing the number of intervening 
lineups drew attention to the fact that an individual is repeated, causing all participants to report 
previous lineups as a source of recognition more frequently. Participants who identified the 
innocent suspect were also more likely to attribute recognition of the innocent suspect to a 
previous lineup, which was maybe in part due to the weak interaction effect. This is particularly 
interesting in light of the results in the previous section—participants who identified the innocent 
suspect attribute their recognition of this person to the previous lineups as well as the video.  
 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics for the video and lineup as source post-identification questions 
for participants who identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup in Experiment 2. 
Intervening Task Conditions Video as Source Lineup as Source 
No Lineups 2.81 (0.28) - 
One Lineup 3.54 (0.56) 4.14 (1.75) 
Two Lineups 3.59 (0.45) 4.24 (1.54) 
No Lineup No Lineup 2.81 (0.28) - 
No Lineup Fair Lineup 3.37 (0.41) 2.86 (1.77) 
Biased Lineup Fair Lineup 3.53 (0.48) 4.13 (1.58) 
Biased Lineup No Lineup 3.59 (0.64) 4.78 (1.48) 
Fair Lineup Fair Lineup 3.73 (0.35) 4.50 (1.31) 
Fair Lineup No Lineup 3.37 (0.45) 3.50 (1.73) 
Notes. LUP = Lineup. Mean scores are displayed (rated out of 6). Higher scores indicate that 
participants think the source is a likely source of recognition. Standard deviations are presented 
in parentheses. All values rounded to 2dp. 
 
 
An analysis of the six combinations of intervening tasks and final lineup identification 
decision was conducted next. Any condition where participants saw a biased lineup (biased then 
fair intervening lineup, biased intervening lineup then non-lineup task), and any condition where 
participants received two intervening lineups (biased then fair intervening lineups, and two fair 
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intervening lineups) was associated with significantly higher ratings on the “lineup as source” 
question when compared to the no lineups condition. This was only true, though, for participants 
who identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup (evidenced by significant and 
marginally significant interactions with final lineup decision: biased & no lineup, B = 0.29, p = 
0.016; fair & fair, B = 0.23, p = 0.068).  
These results add to the results suggesting that biased lineups and more than one 
intervening lineup containing a repeated innocent suspect may draw attention to that innocent 
suspect, or make the repetition more salient. Under these conditions, participants are more likely 
to report a previous lineup as a source of memory. As Table 13 clearly shows, the conditions 
associated with increase reporting of the lineup as a source of memory for those who 
misidentified the innocent suspect were also the conditions in which people reporting the video 
as a fairly strong source of recognition. Thus, participants seemed to believe that the person they 
identified was in the original video and a previous lineup. 
Non-specific context as source 
Two questions were designed to address whether participants could recall a specific 
source when they identified someone from the final lineup. Thus, these questions did not ask 
about a specific source and simply examined whether participants were able to recall any details 
from the context in which they first saw the face they identified. However, there were no 
significant effects when examining intervening task conditions and final lineup decision, so these 
results are not reported here. 
Summary of R-K-G judgments and source monitoring measures  
The majority of these results were consistent with the target-absent final lineup findings 
from Experiment 1. Biased intervening lineups and more than one intervening lineup tended to 
136 
 
be associated with much higher percentages of “know” judgments, and some increase in 
“remember” judgments when participants received two intervening lineups. Thus, feelings of 
familiarity were stronger when participants were in conditions that drew their attention to the 
innocent suspect, but biased lineups alone did not increase incorrect “remember” judgments, as 
was hypothesized—two lineups appeared to be key to increasing “remember” judgments. There 
was a higher percentage of “remember” judgments and “know” judgments among participants 
who chose the innocent suspect from at least one intervening lineup when compared to 
participants who only identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup, which is mostly 
consistent with the “false recollection” finding in Haw et al. (2007). Finally, participants who 
received more than one intervening lineup, especially is one of those lineups was biased, tended 
to report that the lineup and the video was a source of recognition. Thus, they seemed to notice 
the repetition and can remember seeing the innocent suspect in the intervening lineups, but 
become confused and make an incorrect attribution that the innocent suspect was in the original 
video too. 
Hypotheses Set 3B: Commitment Effects 
Analytic plan  
These analyses included only participants who received at least one intervening lineup (N 
= 258). The forced-choice lineup decisions were used for this analysis. A new variable was 
created in which participants who chose the innocent suspect from at least one intervening lineup 
were coded as “1” (and “0” for anyone who never selected the innocent suspect from an 
intervening lineup). First, a Chi-Square analysis was used to determine whether choosing the 
innocent suspect from any of the intervening lineups was independent from choosing the 
innocent suspect from the final lineup (using the data that includes the forced-choice, final lineup 
decisions). The next step was to examine if there was any evidence of a commitment process 
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using participants responses to the four, commitment relevant post-identification questions. If a 
commitment process is responsible for this association, the responses for individuals who 
selected the innocent suspect from the intervening and final lineups should be higher compared 
with people who did not choose the innocent suspect from an intervening lineup, analyzed using 
a multivariate t-test (Hotelling’s T2). Note that the first question should be the focus of these 
results because that is the only question that all participants were required to respond to. The 
other questions only appeared if they reported that they thought they had selected the same 
person multiple times. 
Was there an association between selecting the innocent suspect in a previous, 
intervening lineup and selecting the innocent suspect from the final lineup?  
The Chi-Square analysis revealed a significant association between choosing the innocent 
suspect from at least one intervening lineup and choosing the innocent suspect from the final 
lineup (#$[1, N = 258] 55.86, p <.001). In other words, participants who identified the innocent 
suspect from at least one of the intervening lineups were more likely to identify the innocent 
suspect from the final lineup compared with people who did not identify the innocent suspect 
from any intervening lineups, (P[Final False Alarm | Intervening False Alarm] = 0.78, N = 49). 
Participants who did not select the innocent suspect from one of the intervening lineups and, 
instead, selected a filler, rejected the lineups, or received a non-lineup task, had a lower rate of 
false alarms on the innocent suspect (P[Final False Alarm | Another Intervening Lineup 
Decision] = 0.21, N = 209). 
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Table 14. Summary of means, standard deviations, and sample sizes for responses to the post-
identification questions designed to measure commitment processes in Experiment 2. 
Group Commitment 
Question 1 
Commitment 
Question 2 
Commitment 
Question 3 
Commitment 
Question 4 
Identified IS* from 
intervening and final lineups 
 
4.76 (0.59) 
N = 38 
4.58 (0.90) 
N = 33 
3.29 (0.71) 
N = 35 
2.40 (1.03) 
N = 35 
Identified IS* from final 
lineup only 
4.70 (0.85) 
N = 44 
5.33 (0.58) 
N = 3 
3.33 (0.87) 
N = 9 
2.11 (0.60) 
N = 9 
Notes. * IS refers to “innocent suspect.” Means are displayed with standard deviations in 
parentheses and sample sizes denoted by N. All values are rounded to 2 dp.  
 
 
Commitment process versus mere preference  
One of the research questions in both Experiment 1 and 2 concerned with whether there 
was evidence to suggest that the association between choosing in the intervening lineup and the 
final lineup due to a commitment process. A summary of the descriptive statistics for the post-
identification commitment questions can be found in Table 14. Only participants who chose the 
innocent suspect from the final lineup were included, and I compared participants who chose the 
innocent suspect from at least one intervening lineup to those who did not identify the innocent 
suspect until the final lineup. A multivariate t-test analysis indicated that there were no 
significant differences on any of these measures among participants who misidentified the 
innocent suspect from the final lineup based on whether they identified the innocent suspect in 
one of the intervening lineups (T2 (4, 27) = 1.40, p = 0.259). As in Experiment 1, I found no 
evidence that commitment processes contribute to these choosing patterns. Participants who 
identified the innocent suspect earlier in the paradigm did not report feeling compelled to select 
that person. These data are consistent with the explanation that what has been called a 
commitment effect is merely consistent preference for a lineup member, across different lineups. 
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Hypotheses Set 5: Social Influence 
Analytic plan 
First, the number of participants reporting social influence in each condition was obtained 
(coded as 1 = “felt influenced”, 0 = “did not feel influenced”). Then, a logistic regression was run 
to determine whether particular intervening task conditions were associated with higher numbers 
of participants feeling influenced. The number of intervening lineups and six the specific 
combinations of intervening tasks were run in separate models as predictors of social influence 
reporting. Next, the open responses were gathered from participants who reported feeling 
influenced and were organized based on the reason that was provided for feeling influenced. The 
nature of these responses and the themes that were most common in the responses are discussed. 
Binary response 
Refer to Table 15 for a breakdown of the proportion of individuals in each intervening 
task condition who reported feeling as though the experimenter was trying to influence their 
responses. As these numbers indicate, the number of people who felt this was low overall. 
However, reports of feeling influenced were more common when participants received more 
intervening lineups (zero lineups: 0%; one lineup: 6%; two lineups: 9%). In fact, the number of 
lineups had a significant effect on the rate at which participants reported feeling influenced (B = 
0.82, p = 0.047, ! = 2.27, 95% CI [1.06, 5.44]). Logistic regression analyses were not 
appropriate with these data across the six intervening task combinations due to low reporting of 
influence. However, the proportions in Table 14 suggest a similar pattern—intervening lineups 
increase the number of people reporting feeling influenced. This seems to be particularly 
common when participants received a biased intervening lineup first, followed by a fair 
intervening lineup (13% of participants reported feeling influenced). There were no reports of 
feeling influence for participants who did not receive any intervening lineups. 
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Table 15. A summary of the proportion of participants in each intervening task condition who 
reported feeling like the experimenter was trying to influence them during Experiment 2. 
Intervening Task Condition N Proportion reporting influence 
No Lineups 45 0.00 
One Lineup 142 0.06 
Two Lineups 116 0.09 
No Lineup No Lineup 45 0.00 
Biased Lineup Fair Lineup 62 0.13 
Biased Lineup No Lineup 63 0.05 
Fair Lineup Fair Lineup 54 0.04 
Fair Lineup No Lineup 44 0.11 
No Lineup Fair Lineup 35 0.00 
Notes. All proportions rounded to 2dp.  
Open response 
A total of 18 written responses from participants who reported feeling influenced by the 
experimenter were obtained. The full list of responses can be found in Appendix G. The 
responses were organized by theme and also intervening lineup condition to determine whether 
there were any consistent themes or patterns. Table 16 contains a list of 10 responses (56% of 
participants reporting feeling influenced), all of which refer to the repetition of a person 
throughout the procedure as the reason they felt influenced. The majority of these participants 
were in the intervening task condition with an initial biased intervening lineup, followed by a fair 
intervening lineup. This supports the conclusion that more than one intervening lineup, 
particularly if one lineup is a biased, makes the repeated individual very salient. As a result, 
participants notice the repetition, and they interpret this to mean that the repeated individual is 
the suspect and the person that they should identify. This supports the hypothesis that repetition 
of the innocent suspect is, in itself, a form of social influence, and that people who are acting as 
an eyewitness will interpret the repetition as a nudge from the administrator to identify the 
repeated person. 
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Table 16. Table of open responses from participants who reported feeling influenced by the 
experimenter due to the repetition of the innocent suspect in Experiment 2. 
Intervening Task Condition Open Response 
Biased Lineup, Fair Lineup 
 
“One photo was present all 3 times. I was prompted to choose.” 
“The same one guy popped up on every single lineup which made 
me think that I should have choose him but I did not.” 
“In the first lineup, photo 5 looked the most similar and then line 
up 2 he went to photo 4 and then during the last line up he went 
back to photo 5.” 
“Some of the pictures were consistent throughout. One, as far as I 
could tell, changed based on the brightness of the picture.” 
“The same person was placed in all three lineups, making it clear 
that that was their suspect.” 
“Some of the backgrounds in the individual’s pictures were 
different colors, at least one picture was present in two or more of 
the lineups.” 
“The same man in all 3 lineups.” 
Biased Lineup, No Lineup “I am not completely sure. But if I had to guess, the research 
wanted me to choose #5 the first time and #6 the second time by 
keeping ONLY that picture for both times I was asked.” 
Fair Lineup, Fair Lineup “As I continued to pick not present in the lineup there were a few 
individuals who kept showing up in the lineup multiple times.” 
Fair Lineup, No Lineup “They put in the same person I chose in the first lineup in the 
second lineup to see whether or not I would check the same one.” 
Notes. For a table with all open responses from participants reporting feeling influenced, refer to 
Appendix F. Responses have been altered from the original quotes to address spelling errors. 
 
Experiment 2 Discussion 
The results from Experiment 2 were largely consistent with the results found in 
Experiment with regard to research questions that applied to both studies. As in Experiment 1, 
the repeated-suspect effect was found consistently for all groups who received at least one 
intervening lineup, regardless of the type of intervening lineup. However, the repeated-suspect 
effect was stronger when one of the lineups that participants saw was a biased lineup, and when 
participants received two intervening lineups, rather than one. In addition, people who identified 
the innocent suspect from the final lineup tended to be more confident in that decision the more 
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intervening lineups they received—thus, the number of times they saw the innocent suspect was 
related to their confidence in their final misidentification.  
These findings suggest that the more lineups a person is presented with, the more 
problematic the effect of a repeated-innocent suspect will be, and this is true even if the lineups 
are all fair. Furthermore, this provides further evidence that the impact of a biased lineup cannot 
be correct by a subsequent fair lineup, as was suggested by the dissenting judges in Manson v. 
Braithwaite (1977)—the biased lineups consistently produced the worst outcomes along with 
higher levels of confidence in innocent suspect identifications. In fact, following a biased lineup 
by two different fair lineups containing the innocent suspect always produced the highest number 
of misidentifications of the innocent suspect. Thus, even two lineups administered according to 
recommendations cannot correct for a prior, biased lineup. Also, it is impossible to achieve an 
uncontaminated identification in situations involving a single eyewitness attempting multiple 
identifications of the same suspect. 
To evaluate some of the mechanisms that feed into repeated-suspect effects, Experiment 
2 included the same post-identification questions as Experiment 1. These analyses were, 
however, underpowered again. Typically, R-K-G judgments are used in cognitive psychology 
experiments where repeated-measure are used to overcome the statistical power issue. The 
current studies confirm that a traditional eyewitness paradigm is unsuitable for these types of 
measures unless an extremely large sample is obtained. However, even though none of the 
results were significant, there were some interesting patterns. “Know” judgments were more 
common among participants who identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup and 
whenever a participant received an intervening lineup (biased or fair). “Remember” judgments 
were somewhat more common when a lineup was seen during the second intervening task phase 
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rather than a reading task. Finally, both “remember” and “know” judgments were more frequent 
for participants who identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup and at least one 
intervening lineup when compared with participants who only identified the culprit from the 
final lineup. This is partially consistent with the “false recall” patterns found in Haw et al. 
(2007). However, because none of these patterns were significant, no conclusions can be made 
about the role of familiarity and recollection processes in Experiment 2.  
The source-monitoring measures, however, produced some very interesting results. 
Participants who identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup, and received at least one 
intervening lineup, reported that they felt that the video and the lineup were sources of 
recognition to a greater extent than participants who did not identify the innocent suspect or 
receive intervening lineups. Similarly, biased lineups and two lineups tended to be associated 
with reports that the lineups and the video were sources of recognition. This results is 
noteworthy as it suggests that participants were aware of the repetition of the innocent suspect 
throughout the lineups, as they reported the lineups as a source. Interestingly, though, they also 
undertook a faulty decision-making process that resulted in the conclusion that their feeling of 
recognition and the presence of the innocent suspect in the lineups was sufficient evidence that 
the innocent suspect was the person in the video. 
As in Experiment 1, there was no evidence that commitment processes played a role in 
producing the repeated-suspect effects in Experiment 2. Participants who selected the innocent 
suspect from at least one intervening lineup and the final lineup did not indicate that they were 
doing so because they were motivated to appear consistent and commit to their prior choice, even 
it if was wrong. Therefore, commitment effects, as defined by social psychologists, did not seem 
to be responsible for the correlation between choosing the innocent suspect from an intervening 
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lineup and also the final lineup, a pattern that is typically seen in repeated-suspect paradigms 
including the current studies. Rather, the more parsimonious explanation of a consistent 
preference for a particular lineup member, even when that person is embedded among different 
fillers, seems to be the best explanation for higher rate of innocent suspect misidentifications 
from the final lineup among those who chose the innocent suspect from an intervening lineup. 
Finally, Experiment 2 investigated the potential for social influence (such as demand 
characteristics) to affect participants’ decisions across multiple identification procedures 
containing a repeated individual. First, the repetition of the innocent suspect was manipulation of 
a type of informational social influence, because participants might interpret the repetition as an 
indication that they should identify the repeated person. Second, the experimenter was in the 
room while the participant completed the task and appeared to have control over which lineup or 
task the participant received next. These design features created demand characteristics—
encouraged participants to infer that a particular decision was what the experimenter wanted.  
Although only a small portion of participants reporting feeling like the experimenter was 
trying to influence their decisions, such reports were more frequent when the participant received 
more intervening lineups (and, thus, more repetitions of the innocent suspect). The open 
responses collected also referred to the repetition frequently, with participants indicating that 
they felt that this was the experimenter trying to influence them. Therefore, this experiment 
demonstrates the important role that social influence can play in eyewitness decisions when 
multiple identification procedures including a single suspect are presented to an eyewitness, and 
how the repetition alone could lead eyewitnesses to infer that the repeated person is guilty. 
In-person data collection was interrupted by the coronavirus pandemic that occurred in 
2020, and this experiment relied on the participant being able to attend an in-person session due 
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to the social influence hypotheses. Although the target sample size was not met and sample sizes 
were uneven across conditions, Experiment 2 still produced some very interesting results. 
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CHAPTER 4.    GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This dissertation opened with a problem exemplified by wrongful conviction case of John 
Jerome White (Innocence Project, 2019). At first glance, White’s case appears to be a classic 
demonstration of the issue that arises when the same suspect is included in multiple lineups—
repeating a suspect in a second lineup with all new fillers inflates the chances of a mistaken 
identification. The White case is not unusual in this sense—many high-profile wrongful 
convictions involved multiple identifications of the same suspect (e.g., Ronald Cotton; Innocence 
Project, 2020), and it is almost certainly more prevalent than the available data show. However, 
what was unique about the White case was that the final lineup also, inadvertently, contained the 
true culprit as a filler. Of course, this was not discovered until many years later when White was 
exonerated and DNA testing was available. But this fact distinguishes the White case from other 
wrongful conviction cases because, although the eyewitness was faced with the person who 
actually committed the offence against her, she chose to identify the innocent person who had 
appeared in a previous lineup, White.  
The White case and other, systematic evaluations of exoneration cases show that repeated 
identification attempts are a common theme in cases of wrongful conviction (Garrett, 2011), and 
that presenting multiple identification procedures to an eyewitness is common in police practice 
(e.g., Behrman & Davey, 2001; Steblay, 2011). Despite this, the effect of repeating a suspect 
across multiple identification procedures has received comparatively little attention in the 
literature when compared to other factors that affect eyewitness identification (Wells et al., 
2020). This dissertation presented two studies designed to examine the increase in 
misidentifications that occurs after presenting an eyewitness with multiple identification 
procedures that all contain a repeated, innocent suspect—called the repeated-suspect effect. 
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Experiment 1 also sought to determine whether the memory for the true culprit, or participants’ 
willingness to identify the true culprit, was altered by intervening lineups. In addition, I 
incorporated a series of experimental manipulations that were expected to increase the number of 
misidentifications that occurred after intervening identification procedures and potentially 
change the relative contribution of specific cognitive and social psychological mechanisms that 
are believed to produce repeated-suspect effects.  
The most significant finding was that biased intervening lineups or more than one 
intervening lineup containing a repeated, innocent person exacerbated the rate at which that 
person is incorrectly identified in a final lineup. All results are discussed here organized 
according to the specific predictions made at the beginning of this paper. Each prediction and the 
associated results will be discussed, along with potential reasons for any unusual results or 
unsupported hypotheses and the implications of the findings. The discussion then moves to a 
more general analysis of what these studies can tell us about the behavior of eyewitnesses during 
identification procedures and what this work contributes to our current knowledge of the 
processes involved in repeated-suspect paradigms. This dissertation finishes with a discussion of 
the practical implications of the current work for improving identification procedures in the field 
and protecting innocent suspects from wrongful conviction. 
Hypotheses Set 1: Repeated-Suspect Effects 
Across both experiments presented here, it was predicted that participants who received 
intervening lineups containing the innocent suspect would show a higher innocent suspect 
misidentification rate in final lineup when compared to participants who completed a non-lineup 
intervening task (the classic, repeated-suspect effect). Two additional manipulations were also 
expected to result in larger repeated-suspect effects: when participants received an intervening 
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lineup that was biased (Experiment 1, and the first lineup phase in Experiment 2) and when 
participants received more than one intervening lineup (Experiment 2).  
Consistent with the previous literature and my hypotheses, participants were significantly 
more likely to misidentify the innocent suspect after seeing the innocent suspect’s face in a 
previous lineup compared with participants who did not receive an intervening lineup 
(Experiment 1 and 2). Moreover, intervening biased lineups increased innocent suspect 
misidentifications in a later lineup to a greater extent than did fair lineups (a larger repeated-
suspect effect), both when only one intervening lineup was presented (Experiment 1), and when 
the biased lineup was the first of two intervening lineups (Experiment 2). Two intervening 
lineups also produced a higher misidentification rates than did a single intervening lineup or no 
intervening lineup (Experiment 2). Hence, all of my hypotheses about the influence of a 
repeated, innocent suspect on identification decisions were supported in both experiments. 
These results support the idea that multiple identification procedures involving the same 
suspect is a suggestive identification procedure that can taint eyewitness testimony and reduce an 
eyewitness’ ability to discriminate between a true culprit and someone they have merely seen 
previously. However, this conclusion could have been made using the results from previous 
repeated-suspect studies (see Steblay & Dysart, 2016 for a review). The more nuanced 
conclusions that these data support relate to the impact of biased intervening lineups and more 
than one intervening lineup containing a repeated person—these conditions have not been 
explored in previous research. Now, there is clear empirical data to show that the dissenting 
opinion in Manson v. Braithwaite (1977) suggested an ineffective solution to a suggestive lineup 
procedure. The dissenting judges encouraged prosecutors to simply conduct a subsequent, fair 
procedure with the same suspect if an eyewitness had already participated in a suggestive 
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identification procedure. Here, I clearly demonstrate that this claim is incorrect and any previous 
lineup, fair or biased, will in increase the chance that an eyewitness will misidentify an innocent 
person from a subsequent, fair lineup—there is no evidence supporting the notion of a remedy 
for a biased lineup once an eyewitness has been “contaminated” in this way.  
Furthermore, these studies suggest that the repeated-suspect effect increases with the 
number of repetitions (as a participant is shown more intervening lineups containing the same 
person). This is another, unique finding from Experiment 2. Future research could investigate the 
boundary conditions of this effect, for instance is each repetition associated with the same 
average increase in misidentifications, or is each repetition associated with smaller and smaller 
increases? In addition, it seems that procedures that draw attention to the repeated individual 
tend to exacerbate the repeated-suspect effect. If the salience of the innocent suspect during the 
intervening phase is responsible for the larger effect, logic would suggest that the repeated-
suspect effect would be stronger when other methods are used to draw attention to the innocent 
suspect. Common examples of conditions that can draw attention to the suspect and artificially 
increase identifications include non-blind lineup administration, providing the eyewitness with 
positive feedback, or a different approach to biasing the lineup (e.g., a different background on 
the photo of the suspect) than was used in the current study (Wells et al., 2020). Future research 
should investigate some of these other ways to manipulate how noticeable the innocent suspect is 
during the intervening lineups to confirm this logic.  
Hypotheses Set 2: Dual-Process Recognition and Source Monitoring 
Remember-Know-Guess Judgments (R-K-G) 
Self-reported, categorical assessments of participants’ recognition processes have been 
used in some past studies to determine the conditions in which familiarity (a “know” judgment) 
and recollection processes contribute to repeated-suspect effects (e.g., Haw et al., 2007). Based 
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on previous work using R-K-G judgments, it was hypothesized that fair intervening lineups, 
more than one intervening lineup, and innocent suspect would be associated with more “know” 
judgments. These conditions are likely to make the innocent suspect face more familiar, but may 
not create a recognition experience that is detailed enough for participants to decide that this is 
the person saw in the crime video specifically. Larger proportions of “remember” judgments 
were anticipated for biased intervening lineups, for more than one intervening lineup, when 
participants chose the innocent suspect in more than one lineup, and for true culprit 
identifications. These hypotheses were based on the idea that biased lineups, more than one 
intervening lineup, and correct identifications were expected to produce stronger recognition 
experiences, and hence more experience that felt like recollection. 
The current design presented a challenge for assessing these predictions, however. 
Analytic conditions were all determined by participants—participants self-selected into 
conditions by identifying the suspect from the final lineup or not, and by self-reporting their 
recognition experience on the R-K-G measure. Thus, these data were correlational and the 
statistical tests were underpowered with uneven cell sizes. In the past, researchers have 
circumvented this issue by adopting a repeated-measures design (e.g., Haw et al., 2007) which 
allows participants to calibrate their R-K-G self-reports over the course of the experiment and 
increase statistical power. But eyewitness researchers who wish to use a traditional eyewitness 
identification design and assess dual-process recognition should plan to collect many more 
participants than were collected here, or take a different approach. 
Though the tests were underpowered, particularly in Experiment 1, some of the 
conditions in the experiment changed the distribution of “remember” and “know” in interesting 
ways. In Experiment 1, identifications of the true culprit after a biased intervening lineup were 
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associated with a higher percentage of “remember” judgments and a lower proportion of “know” 
judgments than participants who identified the innocent suspect. However, when participants 
received a fair intervening lineup, the distribution of “remember” and “know” judgments was 
relatively equal regardless of whether the culprit or innocent suspect was identified. In addition, 
participants who received intervening lineups demonstrated a larger proportion of both 
“remember” and “know” judgments when with the control condition (Experiment 1 and 2). 
Finally, participants who chose the innocent suspect from the final lineup as well as at least one 
intervening lineup appeared to report “remember” more often than participants who only selected 
the innocent suspect from the final lineup (Experiment 1 and 2). However, because none of the 
statistical tests were significant, none of these patterns can be interpreted with confidence. 
Source Monitoring Judgments 
Participants were also asked post-identification questions about the source of their 
memory for the person they identified in the final lineup. In situations like those seen in the 
current experimental designs, participants who are able to accurately evaluate the source of 
recognition are more likely to be accurate. For instance, if a participant was able to parse that a 
face was familiar only because it was in a previous lineup, not because it ever appeared in the 
video, that participant may successfully avoid misidentifying the innocent suspect. However, it is 
well-established that people are generally poor at monitoring the source of a memory, though 
they are very skilled at determining whether something, like a face, has been seen before (e.g., 
Brown et al., 1977; see Johnson et al., 1993, Lindsay, 2008, and Macpherson, 2015 for 
overviews of source monitoring research). It was predicted that source monitoring failures would 
be associated with some experimental condition more than others in this repeated-suspect 
paradigm. Biased intervening lineups (Experiments 1 and 2) and more than one intervening 
lineup (Experiment 2) were expected to make the innocent suspect’s presence in the intervening 
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lineups obvious and, thus, increase reports that the lineups were a source of recognition. Fair 
intervening lineups do not draw attention to the innocent suspect and, therefore, were expected to 
be linked to low reports of the lineups as a source, and more source attributions to the video. 
People who made culprit identifications or received no intervening lineups were hypothesized to 
make high source attributions to the video only because no one was repeated across lineups in 
these conditions. 
In Experiment 1, biased intervening lineups and no intervening lineups were associated 
with higher scores for the video as a source of recognition. Attributions to the intervening lineup 
as a source were fairly consistent regardless of condition, though higher scores were found for 
participants who made an identification from the intervening lineup. Thus, when participants 
chose someone from the intervening lineup, they were more likely to cite the lineup as a source 
of recognition. Experiment 2 also had some particularly interesting source monitoring results. 
Participants who received any number of intervening lineups were more likely to attribute their 
recognition to both the lineups and the video, especially when the first intervening lineup was 
biased. This was not hypothesized, but is a fascinating finding—it suggests that people 
acknowledged that someone from the lineups was repeated in the final lineup, but also 
incorrectly inferred that their recognition experience was, at least in part, due to that person 
appearing in the video. Is this a case of genuine source confusion? Or are participants making a 
conscious misattribution (Brown et al., 1977; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989)? In other words, maybe 
these participants truly believed that they saw the innocent suspect in the video. Alternatively, 
maybe participants knew that they could not remember seeing the person they identified in the 
crime video—they only remembered seeing them in the lineups—but still chose to report that the 
person they identified was in the video. The latter explanation is not a memory effect. Rather, the 
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cause of this type of conscious misattribution is a demand characteristic (Cialdini, 2009) or 
attempting to relieve any cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) participants felt as a result of 
identifying someone they could not recall being in the video. 
Hypotheses Set 3: Commitment Effects 
Participants who chose an innocent suspect from an intervening procedure also tended to 
be more likely to choose that person from the final lineup, and past researcher have called this a 
“commitment effect”. That pattern of identifications was clearly replicated in both experiments. 
However, there was no evidence to support the contention that this pattern was the result of 
psychological commitment. The commitment explanation implies that eyewitnesses make the 
same decision that they made earlier at a later time because they are motivated to appear 
consistent (Foote, 1951; Burke & Reitzes, 1991). However, none of the existing repeated-suspect 
effect data, including the current studies, suggests that this is the motivation underlying the 
correlational association between identifying the innocent suspect from an intervening lineup and 
identifying that same innocent suspect in a final lineup. 
To address this research question, post-identification questions were included in the 
current study that to assess how important participants felt it was to commit to their decisions 
and choose consistently across lineups. These measures relied on participants’ self-report 
accuracy and participants’ willingness to report their motivation truthfully. Thus, the use of these 
post-identification questions assumes that people can and will report their motivations to appear 
consistent to others. However, the questions were fairly straightforward and did not ask for 
details about the use of any complex cognitive processes. These are the kinds of judgments that 
people are able to self-report on fairly accurately—retrospective reports about an experience or 
feeling during a task. It was expected that, if commitment processes contribute to repeated-
suspect effects, participants would report feeling it was important to commit to their earlier 
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identifications if they identified the innocent suspect more than once. However, there was no 
difference between people who chose the innocent suspect from at least one intervening lineup 
and the final lineup, and people who only identified the innocent suspect from the final lineup on 
these commitment questions. Hence, I found no support for the commitment concept. A simpler 
explanation for the patterns found so consistently in these paradigms is that witnesses who 
preferred the innocent suspect in one lineup would prefer that same person in a later lineup.  
To illustrate why this explanation is also logical, consider an example with a culprit-
present intervening lineup and a later culprit-present lineup. Almost certainly one would observe 
that those who identified the culprit from the first lineup would also identify the culprit from the 
second lineup. There is no need to posit that this consistency was motivated by a commitment to 
their first identification of the culprit because it is clear that preferring the same person in both 
lineups is not evidence of psychological commitment. It is likely that there are conditions, 
especially in actual cases, where eyewitnesses might feel commitment to their prior 
identification. But the consistency effect observed in repeated-suspect experiments should not, in 
itself, be construed as a commitment effect when there is no evidence of a motivational 
mechanism consistent with commitment processes and self-consistency theory (Kiesler et al., 
1968; Swann & Bosson, 2010). To the extent that eyewitness researchers want to explore the 
construct of psychological commitment, it is possible to create experiments to test the idea. 
Social psychologists who study commitment, for instance, typically have some participants make 
decisions that are then revealed publicly to others whereas other participants are led to believe 
that their decisions are known only to them (e.g., Schienker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994). 
Manipulating how publicly participants make their decisions has been done in the context of 
mugshot-exposure effects, but not repeated-suspect effects (Brigham & Cairns, 1988). 
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Hypotheses Set 4: Memory for the Culprit 
The design in Experiment 1 made use of a “modified test” design (McCloskey & 
Zaragoza, 1985) to analyze whether intervening identification procedures influenced 
participants’ abilities to identify the culprit. Half of the participants in Experiment 1 were 
randomly assigned to receive a target-present final lineup after either a biased intervening lineup, 
a fair intervening lineup, or no intervening lineup. If the face appearing in the intervening lineups 
was encoded separately from the memory for the true culprit, although both memory traces 
would be associated with the crime event, the “modified test” design was expected to show no 
evidence that participants’ abilities to identify the culprit were hindered by the intervening 
lineups. However, if the faces from the intervening lineups (particularly a biased lineup that 
narrows attention to one face) change the participants’ memory for the culprit’s face somehow, 
this would produce lower hit rates for intervening lineup conditions. The main comparisons for 
these hypotheses were between correct identification rates of the true culprit after no intervening 
lineups or after either a biased or fair intervening lineup for the forced-choice, final, culprit-
present identification. In addition to presenting the culprit alone, the forced-choice aspect of this 
final lineup is critical to this test because it eliminates the possibility that shifts in decision 
criterion are responsible for any differences, or lack thereof. 
The findings were consistent with previous work (Hinz & Pezdek, 2001) and the theory 
that intervening lineups form a new, separate memory that is related to, but does not impose 
upon, the memory for the true culprit. Simply put, there was very little difference in the hit rates 
across the three intervening task conditions—regardless of what intervening task participants 
were given, participants were equally able to identify the true culprit from the final culprit-
present lineup. In fact, their choosing rates across conditions were fairly consistent both before 
and after being forced to choose a lineup member, so neither their willingness to choose the 
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culprit, nor their ability to choose the correct person even if they were uncertain, was changed by 
the intervening lineups. Thus, it appears that the memory for the culprit was maintained in the 
face of misleading lineup information. 
Although consistent with the theory that misleading, post-event information, such as a 
target-absent lineup, creates a second memory that does not alter the original memory, these 
results do not mean that intervening lineups cannot ever impact an eyewitness’s ability to 
identify the culprit. One situation where the culprit is identified less often after intervening 
lineups is when the true culprit and the repeated innocent suspect both appear in the final lineup, 
as occurred in the White case. This situation was assessed in many previous repeated-suspect 
studies (e.g., Gorenstein & Ellsworth, 1980; Haw et al., 2007; Hinz & Pezdek, 2001; Pezdek & 
Blandon-Gitlin, 2005). When the two faces are pitted against one another at retrieval, some 
participants are misled and select the innocent suspect rather than the true culprit. Participants 
may have also remembered the true culprit—this type of test cannot determine whether that was 
the case—but found the repeated individual to be more familiar than the culprit. 
Two other factors can alter people’s ability to correctly identify the perpetrator that were 
not tested in the current experiment: feedback, and the similarity between the misleading lineup 
member and the culprit. Research shows that when an eyewitness receives confirming feedback 
about an incorrect, intervening lineup decision, this can impair participants’ abilities to correct 
identify the culprit in a later culprit-present, forced-choice lineup when compared to participant 
who receive no feedback (Smalarz & Wells, 2014). That is, when a participant is told that an 
incorrect identification was right, but this is subsequently retracted by the experimenter and they 
are presented with a new lineup, identification accuracy for the actual culprit was impaired. In 
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addition, this effect was most pronounced when the person from the intervening lineup looked 
very different from the culprit.  
It is, therefore, possible that if participants had been given feedback about their 
intervening lineup decisions or if similarity had been manipulated in a systematic way, hit rates 
on the critical lineups may have been affected by the intervening task conditions. However, as it 
stands, the results from Experiment 1 do not suggest that a fair or biased intervening lineup can 
hinder true culprit identifications at a later time. These findings suggest that the mere fact that 
the witness in the White case received an intervening lineup might not have been enough to 
prevent her from identifying the true culprit when she saw him in the second, live lineup if White 
had not been in that lineup. However, including the person who the witness previously identified 
(White) as well as the actual culprit (Parham) in the live lineup prevents us from knowing if the 
witness could have identified Parham. Furthermore, because we know nothing about the 
intervening lineup, it is possible that the witness received feedback after she identified White. 
Smalarz and Wells (2014) also suggests that feedback in this case would be particularly 
problematic given how dissimilar White and the true culprit, Parham, look (see Figure 1). 
Hypotheses Set 5: Social Influence and Demand Characteristics 
Experiment 2 investigated a factor that has typically received very little attention in 
eyewitness identification research as a whole, and almost no consideration in the repeated-
suspect effect literature. Although memory processes tend to be the central focus of eyewitness 
identification research, there are many non-memory factors that can lead eyewitnesses to 
mistakenly identify someone from a lineup. A vivid and shocking real-life example of this is the 
case of Franky Carillo, an innocent man who was convicted of murder based exclusively on the 
eyewitness testimony of five people (Innocence Project, 2020). In this case, although the 
eyewitnesses had no memory due to impossible witnessing conditions, they ended up confidently 
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identifying Carillo through a combination of demand characteristics and conformity. None of the 
witnesses ever developed a false memory and every one of them always knew that they never 
saw the shooter. But they figured out which person the police thought was the shooter and made 
their identification based on that knowledge. For Experiment 2, the focus was on demand 
characteristics that are created by the nature of the repeated-suspect paradigm itself.  
First, I expected that participants who noticed the repetition of the innocent suspect 
across the lineups would consider the reason for the repetition. In the context of a lineup, the 
most obvious inference is that the repeated person is the culprit, the person creating the lineups 
knows this, and the repetition is a clue about who the participant should pick from the lineup. 
Although there was an interest in social influence driving these experiments, there was no direct 
manipulation of social influence other than that some witnesses were in fact manipulated by the 
repeated showing of an innocent suspect. A post-identification question was included to 
determine whether participants felt like the experimenter was trying to influence their decisions. 
Also, participants who thought the experimenter was trying to influence their decisions were 
asked to explain why. 
As hypothesized, with each additional intervening lineup, participants were significantly 
more likely to report that they felt like the experimenter was trying to communicate that they 
should select a particular lineup member. So, participants seemed to infer that the presence of a 
repeated person throughout the lineups was a hint from the experimenter about who the suspect 
was. Furthermore, when the open responses were evaluated, more than half of the participants 
who reported feeling like the experimenter was trying to influence them referred to the repeated 
individual as the reason for this feeling. Free responses about the repeated individual were also 
most common when one of the intervening lineups was biased, which would have made the 
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repeated person particularly salient.  
This study presents the first empirical investigation into the role of demand 
characteristics in repeated-suspect effects. Furthermore, it adds to the growing body of literature 
demonstrating that there are many non-memory factors that can have profound effects on 
eyewitness decision-making. However, social influence factors are still underappreciated in the 
eyewitness literature. There are a number of reasons for this, only some of which I will mention 
here. Social influence manipulations are difficult to implement and typically require in-person 
participation. Experiment 2 was modified from Experiment 1 to include an experimenter’s 
presence for the duration of the task so as to make it clear to the participant that the experimenter 
was explicitly making decisions about the lineups that were presented to them. This is more time 
consuming and resource intensive than online research or tasks that are purely computer-based, 
which deters researchers. In fact, this was a real challenge for data collection in the current 
Experiment 2. Due to the coronavirus pandemic, data collection needed to stop earlier than was 
planned, and the social influence manipulation prevented moving the study online. Though the 
pandemic was an anomaly, the situation does demonstrate the relative inflexibility of social 
influence experiments. 
Conclusions Relevant to Eyewitness Identification Policies 
On Existing Recommendations for Multiple Identification Procedures 
The current study adds to the existing literature recommending against multiple 
identification procedures with the same suspect and eyewitness (e.g., Steblay & Dysart, 2016; 
Wells et al., 2020). In fact, in the recent comprehensive review of eyewitness identification 
research by Wells and colleagues (2020), the recommendation against such practices is very 
strong. Multiple identification attempts are discouraged globally “no matter how compelling the 
argument in favor of a second identification might seem” (Wells et al., 2020, pp. 25). Unlike 
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other forms of evidence, such as physical, forensic evidence, repeated tests involving the same 
eyewitness will not improve their decisions—eyewitness identification is one situation where 
extra tests actually make the evidence less reliable. The only situation where multiple eyewitness 
identifications may be desirable is if multiple different eyewitness identify the same suspect 
independently from one another. Those circumstances would give rise to converging evidence, 
and can be very probative in a criminal investigation. 
Thus, the experiments presented here add to the existing view that there is only one 
opportunity to obtain an “uncontaminated” identification from an eyewitness for any particular 
suspect. Any subsequent identifications will be irreversibly contaminated by the first 
identification test (Steblay & Dysart, 2016; Wells et al., 2020). Furthermore, many other 
recommendations for eyewitness identification procedures center around restricting the 
information that the eyewitness has about the investigation and the suspect (e.g., Kovera & 
Evelo, 2017; Wells & Luus, 1990). Repeating a single person across multiple lineups provides 
participants with information that they should not have, as demonstrated in Experiment 2. When 
comparing the participants’ free responses, the participants who saw intervening lineups often 
mentioned the repeated person, explaining that they thought the experimenter was trying to 
signal that this was the culprit from the video. 
Novel Conclusions Regarding Multiple Lineups with a Repeated Suspect 
In addition to supporting existing recommendations, there are some additional, novel 
recommendations that can be made using the current results in this dissertation. First, the 
potential for “contamination” of an eyewitness is increased when one of the intervening lineups 
is biased towards an innocent suspect, or when multiple intervening lineups containing the 
innocent suspect are presented. Though this could have been inferred from other literature, these 
conditions had never been tested empirically. In particular, despite what the dissenting judgment 
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in Manson v. Braithwaite (1977) stated, the use of a biased intervening lineup is a critical error in 
eyewitness identification. A biased intervening lineup itself is suggestive, but also any 
subsequent procedure will be tainted by the information communicated by the biased lineup even 
if the new lineup is, when assessed in isolation, a fair procedure. Finally, the current studies 
show that repetition alone leads participants to infer that the experimenter was trying to get them 
to pick this person. This is a demand characteristic that would occur in the real world too. 
Eyewitnesses would infer that the police chose to include this person in both lineups because that 
is the suspect. In the same way that a biased lineup cannot be fixed, there is no solution once the 
repetition has occurred, so the practice of presenting the same suspect on multiple occasions 
should always be avoided in real cases. 
Another interesting finding relates to the Experiment 1, in which some participants had 
the opportunity to identify the true culprit in the final lineup. It appeared that correct 
identifications were unaffected by previous lineups containing a different suspect so, 
theoretically, if a subsequent lineup could be guaranteed to include the true culprit, then an 
eyewitness’s decision for the lineup could be reliable. Although this is theoretically possible, 
there would be no way to know when the true culprit is present in an actual lineup. In addition, 
as already mentioned, past studies show that they are many ways that accurate retrieval can be 
impaired in this type of procedure. For instance, by providing the eyewitness with confirming 
feedback for an incorrect pick before a final, target-present lineup (Smalarz & Wells, 2014).  
Considerations for Eyewitness Identification Procedures in the Field 
In the real world, research shows that eyewitnesses evaluating simultaneous lineups fail 
to identify the police suspect 59.2% of the time (35.5% rejections, 23.7% filler identifications; 
Wells et al. 2020, Table 1). Thus, the vast majority of lineups cannot be used to secure a 
conviction. If the eyewitness picks a filler or rejects the lineup, the eyewitness’s reliability may 
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be questioned (Smalarz et al., 2019). The police officer may feel quite certain about their 
suspect, though, and consider other reasons for the eyewitness’s decision. What if there was a 
problem with that lineup and that is why the eyewitness made that decision? Was the photo of 
the suspect poor quality and that is the reason that the eyewitness did not recognize them? The 
police may undergo similar reasoning if the eyewitness reluctantly identifies the suspect or does 
so with low confidence. Under these circumstances, it would be common practice to arrange 
another lineup and give the eyewitness “another chance.” Given the high proportion of lineups 
that are rejected, presenting multiple identification procedures is likely quite common. 
The current work demonstrates that this practice is ill-advised. When an eyewitness does 
not choose the suspect from a lineup, the current data suggests that a subsequent lineup with the 
same suspect endangers innocent suspects and may derail an investigation if the suspect is not 
guilty. However, the practice of “burning” eyewitnesses who select a filler is also generally 
unhelpful for an investigation. Once an eyewitness has seen one identification procedure 
containing a suspect, though, that eyewitness cannot make reliable identifications concerning 
that suspect at a later time in a different identification procedure. Thus, as established in previous 
work, the best solution is to make sure the first identification attempt is well-constructed so that 
the identification will be useful and admissible in court. 
One way to achieve this, in addition to adhering to the various recommendations in Wells 
et al. (2020), is by requiring a reasonable level of suspicion before putting someone in an 
identification procedure. There is significant variation in the standard required before a suspect 
can be presented to an eyewitness in a lineup, so the base rate of true culprits appearing in 
lineups will also vary. If there is very little evidence required by a particular precinct before a 
suspect is placed in a lineup, the base rate of true culprits placed in identification procedures will 
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be lower than a precinct where firm evidence from other investigative work is necessary before 
administering a lineup. However, police sometimes use lineups as a means to obtain 
incriminating evidence, rather than to confirm their suspicions based on other evidence (Wells & 
Quigley-McBride, 2016). Given the risk associated with being placed in any lineup procedure, 
let alone multiple lineups, more than a hunch should be required before someone is subjected to 
a lineup. Furthermore, if there is sufficient evidence available that a person is guilty, ensuring the 
lineup is properly constructed and administered the first time will secure reliable, informative, 
and admissible eyewitness evidence (Smalarz et al., 2019; Wells & Quigley-McBride, 2016).  
Revisiting the Manson v. Braithwaite (1977) Admissibility Criteria 
One important consideration for multiple identification attempts is that the current 
admissibility law cannot prevent subsequent identifications of the same suspect with the same 
eyewitness being admitted as evidence at trial. In fact, each additional identification attempt is 
likely to facilitate meeting the admissibility criteria even while contaminating the identification 
process. To explore why this is the case, I will first describe the five Manson criteria (originally 
from Neil v Biggers, 1972) that were formulated to determine when suggestive eyewitness 
evidence should be admissible in court (Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). 
When determining whether or not an eyewitness identification procedure should be 
admissible, the court undertakes a two-step analysis. The first step is to assess whether or not the 
procedure used to obtain the identification was suggestive—if the procedure was not suggestive, 
the evidence is admitted. However, if the procedure is found to be suggestive (e.g., a showup or a 
biased lineup), the court will go on to assess whether or not the eyewitness identification 
evidence is, nevertheless, reliable using the five criteria from Manson. To do this, the judge will 
consider the circumstances surrounding the eyewitness’s experience during the crime, and 
information obtained after the crime event that can speak to the reliability of the eyewitness’s 
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memory. The court will consider the quality of the view that the eyewitness had of the culprit 
during the crime and how much attention the eyewitness paid to the culprit during the crime. 
They will also evaluate whether the description the eyewitness gave of the culprit matches the 
suspect, how much time has passed between the crime and the lineup procedure in question, and 
how certain the eyewitness was in their identification decision.  
Before I critique these criteria in light of multiple identification procedure situations, I 
will note that researchers have already criticized these criteria for being out of date given the 
empirical data available now concerning eyewitness identification decisions (Wells & Quinlivan, 
2009). For instance, certainty can indicate an eyewitness is reliable only in very specific 
circumstances, and will change as a function of the quality of the identification procedure as well 
as numerous other factors (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Furthermore, assessment of these criteria will 
rely on self-reports from the eyewitness in almost every case. By the time a prosecutor is ready 
to address admissibility concerns at trial, the eyewitness has received confirmatory feedback 
regarding their identification. Confirmatory, post-identification feedback inflates eyewitness 
confidence (the “certainty” criterion) and retrospectively alters eyewitnesses’ recollection of the 
crime in ways that are consistent with a correct identification—eyewitnesses report believing that 
they had a better view and paid closer attention during the crime than they would have reported 
had they received no feedback (Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 2014).  
The irony of this is that the Manson approach to admissibility might actually incentivize 
prosecutors and police investigators to perform multiple identification procedures. Police 
investigators might feel the need to conduct another lineup with the same suspect and eyewitness 
to ensure they have a confident and compelling eyewitness decision that can support the 
conviction. Police and lawyers will often coach their eyewitnesses to ensure their testimony 
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comes across in way that meets the Manson criteria. If the first time the eyewitness saw the 
suspect, though, they rejected the lineup, no amount of coaching can make this decision helpful 
in court. Similarly, if the first identification attempt was a showup, police might follow it up with 
a lineup to make certain that the eyewitness evidence is persuasive and admissible. If the follow-
up procedure is not suggestive, it will likely pass the first step of the admissibility test, without 
requiring an analysis of the five criteria in the second step of the legal test. 
Let us consider the White case again to demonstrate. There is some information about the 
conditions during the crime, such as the eyewitness’s view and attention during the crime, and 
her description of the perpetrator. The victim was not wearing her prescription glasses during the 
crime and could only provide the police with a vague description of her attacker. All that is 
known about the first lineup is that it was a photo lineup, and the victim selected White from that 
lineup. However, something about the identification decision led the police investigator to 
conduct another, live lineup containing White. Given the nature of the victim’s experience 
during the crime, the prosecutor was likely going to rely on the eyewitness’s certainty to ensure 
their testimony was admissible at trial. So, if the eyewitness was uncertain when selecting White 
the first time, the police may have felt the need to secure a more confident identification using a 
second lineup. Although research suggests that the second lineup was suggestive and unreliable, 
that evidence was admissible at trial and led to the wrongful conviction of White. 
In sum, even if the law recognizes multiple identification procedures with a repeated 
individual as suggestive, the final identification in string of identifications could still pass the 
admissibility test. The repetition itself provides a form of feedback—as demonstrated in 
Experiment 2 of the current dissertation. Participants who notice the repeated person will infer 
that this is the suspect and therefore the person they should identify and should have identified in 
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the previous lineup. So, the mere repetition of a lineup member will make an eyewitness appear 
more certain, and potentially result in eyewitnesses retrospectively altering their reports of the 
view they had and the amount of attention paid during the crime to better align with their 
“correct” identification (Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 2014). Thus, even if the subsequent 
identification with the repeated individual was deemed suggestive under the first step of the test, 
it can still pass the five criteria under the second step and be rules “nevertheless reliable”. Any 
case in which an eyewitness has seen the suspect in multiple lineups, it is the first lineup decision 
that should be considered in light of the Manson criteria or the eyewitness’s testimony should be 
inadmissible. In addition to the current dissertation and other repeated-suspect effect studies, a 
recent analysis of eyewitness confidence by Wixted and Wells (2017) found that the only reliable 
confidence statement from an eyewitness is one taken immediately after the first identification 
attempt—any confidence associated with a later procedure is not a reliable indicator of 
eyewitness identification accuracy. This is also consistent with the nature of the association 
between confidence, innocent suspect misidentifications, and recognition strength reports in 
Experiments 1 and 2—the patterns seen for correct identifications in which there was no 
repetition of the suspect across lineups looked extremely similar to the trends associated with 
identifications of repeated innocent suspects. 
The Importance of Non-Memory Factors in Eyewitness Identification Research 
The final message that should be taken away from this dissertation is the importance of 
including non-memory factors in eyewitness identification research. I have already discussed 
some of the challenges associated with experiments that manipulate social influence variables 
such as demand characteristics or cognitive dissonance. However, the current work demonstrates 
the value of investigating the social cognitive aspects of eyewitness errors.  
It is widely recognized that there are myriad factors that are operating on eyewitnesses in 
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any given identification procedure, some of which have a measurable impact on decision-making 
and others that do not. Previous articles have summarized the various mechanisms typically 
referred to in repeated-suspect effect articles. For instance, when compiling the key, research-
based recommendations for eyewitness identification protocols, Wells and colleagues (2020) 
focused on source misattribution, commitment effects, and the potential for the repetition to 
provide the eyewitness with information they should not have. Similarly, the review by Steblay 
and Dysart (2016) highlighted the role of source confusion, commitment, and the inherent 
suggestibility associated with repeating someone across procedures as key mechanisms. Here, I 
drew from cognitive and social psychology to identify five potential mechanisms that might 
contribute to misidentifications in a repeated-suspect paradigm three of which are memory-
related processes (dual-process recognition, source monitoring, and memory for the true culprit) 
and two that were social-influence processes (commitment and demand characteristics). 
The non-memory, social-influence processes that were explored in this work are not the 
only non-memory processes that could influence eyewitnesses in eyewitness identification, or 
even in the more specific context of repeated-suspect effects. Obedience to authority (Milgram, 
1967), for example, is likely to play a significant role in the interactions between a police officer 
or prosecutor, and an eyewitness. Cognitive dissonance (in addition to tradition misinformation 
and source monitoring effects) could explain some situations where eyewitnesses report seeing 
something that was not true or retrospectively change their account of their experience during the 
crime. The goal here was not to precisely indicate what processes were occurring and the nature 
of their effects. Rather, the goal was to provide a more complete explanation of the processes 
involved in repeated-suspect effects than was seen in previous work, and to not limit those 
processes to memory and cognition theories.  
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Final Remarks 
In effect, the perspective driving the current dissertation is that it is likely that there are 
multiple processes responsible for the repeated-suspect effect and exploring a wider variety of 
mechanisms was expect to provide a greater understanding of the patterns in repeated-suspect 
paradigms. Like so many real-world problems, there are likely to be both cognitive (e.g., 
memory confusions) and social (e.g., demand characteristics) factors at play for repeated-suspect 
effects and which of these factors will dominate at any given time is likely to depend on various 
situational factors. Under some circumstances, repeated showing of a suspect to an eyewitness is 
likely to communicate to the eyewitness that they ought to be picking that person, which is a 
form of social influence. Under other circumstances, repeated showing of the suspect is likely to 
produce an identification based purely on familiarity or based on a source misattribution, which 
are memory processes. Rather than trying to attribute the repeated-suspect effect to only one 
process, future research might be able to establish more clearly the conditions under which each 
of these processes plays a larger or smaller role in producing error, as well as how the processes 
might work together to alter the magnitude of the repeated-suspect effect. 
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APPENDIX A. LINEUP MATERIALS CREATION 
 
Details Regarding the Creation of the Lineups 
 
Suspect Photos 
First, two individuals that matched a similar, vague description were identified. They 
were both young, Caucasian men with a slender build, short hair, and no facial hair. Two white 
long-sleeved undershirts and two dark blue, short-sleeved, oversized scrubs were purchased for 
each of our suspects to wear for the lineup photographs. These clothes were used to ensure that 
their photographs matched the filler photographs I obtained from the Florida Inmate Database 
(www.dc.state.fl.us). On five separate occasions, approximately one week apart and at different 
times of day, the suspects were asked to come to photograph sessions that took place in an office 
with a blue wall—again, with the goal of matching the photos in the Florida Inmate Database. 
Multiple photos were taken at each session with different poses, expressions, and lighting to 
achieve a variety of photos of the same individuals. As a result, even though participants were 
shown multiple lineups containing the same individual, they never saw the same photo of the 
same individual twice. 
Filming the Crime Event 
Two different crime events were filmed for use in these experiments, each lasting 20 
seconds. These were filmed using a Canon handheld camera and the videos were edited in 
iMovie. One event involved staging a theft in an office. The culprit entered the room, looked 
around, took money out of a wallet, picked up a computer, phone, and iPod off the desk, and 
then left. The second event was a staged drug deal in which the culprit was standing by a tree 
looking at his phone. Then, a woman approached and a small bag was exchanged for money. 
After she left, the culprit resumed looking at his phone. These events were filmed on different 
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days, but both culprits were filmed for each event at the same time so that lighting and other 
items in the shot would be the same. The event was filmed multiple times, and from three 
different angles. One shot was from far away and to the left of the culprit, another from far away 
to the right, and another closer to the culprit in the middle. The videos were edited so that most 
of the crime was seen from far away but there was approximately 3 seconds where there was a 
close up of the suspects face. Three versions of each video were made—one with normal lighting 
(best quality video), one with reduced color quality (medium quality), and one with increased 
exposure (lowest quality) in case the difficulty of the task needed to be increased. For the 
Experiments described in this document, the medium quality videos were used. 
Filler Photos 
My research assistants spent time searching the Florida Inmate Database to find 
individuals that would match the same description as the two suspects used to create our videos 
and suspect photos. They search for individuals who were young, Caucasian, and with no 
distinguishing features (e.g., face tattoos). Some of the photographs would be used to created 
biased lineups too, so the research assistants were told that young, Caucasian men with glasses, a 
heavier stature, or facial hair should be found too. From that list, 110 were identified by the 
principal investigator as similar enough to the suspect photos to be used in pilot testing. These 
photographs were used to create a Qualtrics survey that was administered on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. For this survey, each potential filler appeared with one of the suspect photos 
and the participant was asked to rate how similar these two individuals looked. Once data 
collection was complete, each of these filler photos was associated with a mean similarity rating 
for each of our two suspects. 
Creating the Lineups 
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Once similarity data between the potential fillers and the two suspects had been obtained, 
these were used to create five fair lineups in which the average similarity between the fillers and 
the two suspects was approximately equal. The aim of this was to create five sets of fillers that 
created lineups with the same filler similarity regardless of which suspect was used. In addition, 
two biased lineups were created in which the suspects stood out—the fillers were all heavy set, 
wore glasses, had thick facial hair, or were distinctive in some other way that meant they were 
not good choice regardless of which suspect was in the video. These lineups can be found in 
below. To ensure that the fair lineups were achieving adequate filler siphoning and the biased 
lineups were not, these materials were pilot tested on Mechanical Turk. Participants were 
randomly assigned to view one of the four videos of the crimes and then saw one target-absent 
lineups at random. This was followed by a random target-present lineup (though, this lineup was 
never the lineup with the same fillers as the target-absent lineup). These data are included below 
in Tables 1a-g to 2a-g. Fair lineups 1 and 3 did not work well for at least one of the suspects—in 
each case, a filler was receiving more identifications than the actual suspect. The other fair 
lineups (2, 4, and 5), though, demonstrated appropriate levels of filler siphoning and hits for both 
suspects. These data also confirmed that the biased lineups were, in fact, biasing people to 
choose the suspects, both when target present and when target absent. 
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Pilot testing data for lineups used in the Experiments 1 and 2 
 
 
Table 1a. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Fair Lineup 1 containing Suspect 1. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3* Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
Target Present 0.03 0.13 0.27 0.13 0.17 0.27 
Target Absent 0.04 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.24 
Notes. Fair Lineup 1 with *Suspect 1 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
 
 
Table 1b. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Fair Lineup 2 containing Suspect 1. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 Photo 4 Photo 5* Photo 6 
Target Present 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.08 0.46 0.23 
Target Absent 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.10 0.29 0.29 
Notes. Fair Lineup 2 with *Suspect 1 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
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Table 1c. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Fair Lineup 3 containing Suspect 1. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2* Photo 3 Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
Target Present 0.13 0.28 0.03 0.06 0.50 0.00 
Target Absent 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.22 0.30 0.07 
Notes. Fair Lineup 3 with *Suspect 1 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
 
 
 
Table 1d. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Fair Lineup 4 containing Suspect 1. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 Photo 4* Photo 5 Photo 6 
Target Present 0.03 0.25 0.06 0.41 0.06 0.19 
Target Absent 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.25 0.21 0.07 
Notes. Fair Lineup 4 with *Suspect 1 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
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Table 1e. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Fair Lineup 5 containing Suspect 1. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6* 
Target Present 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.54 
Target Absent 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.20 0.20 
Notes. Fair Lineup 5 with *Suspect 1 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1f. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Biased Lineup 1 containing Suspect 1. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2* Photo 3 Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
Target Present 0.04 0.68 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.12 
Target Absent 0.18 0.35 0.06 0.03 0.29 0.09 
Notes. Biased Lineup 1 with *Suspect 1 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
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Table 1g. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Biased Lineup 2 containing Suspect 1. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 Photo 4 Photo 5* Photo 6 
Target Present 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.76 0.03 
Target Absent 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.50 0.00 
Notes. Biased Lineup 2 with *Suspect 1 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
 
 
 
Table 2a. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Fair Lineup 1 containing Suspect 2. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3* Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
Target Present 0.07 0.04 0.33 0.15 0.11 0.30 
Target Absent 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.03 0.43 
Notes. Fair Lineup 1 with *Suspect 2 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
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Table 2b. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Fair Lineup 2 containing Suspect 2. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 Photo 4 Photo 5* Photo 6 
Target Present 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.29 0.39 0.13 
Target Absent 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.13 0.22 0.35 
Notes. Fair Lineup 2 with *Suspect 2 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
 
 
 
Table 2c. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Fair Lineup 3 containing Suspect 2. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2* Photo 3 Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
Target Present 0.14 0.43 0.10 0.07 0.24 0.02 
Target Absent 0.07 0.32 0.07 0.14 0.36 0.04 
Notes. Fair Lineup 3 with *Suspect 2 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
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Table 2d. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Fair Lineup 4 containing Suspect 2. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 Photo 4* Photo 5 Photo 6 
Target Present 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.52 0.04 0.12 
Target Absent 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.42 0.04 0.15 
Notes. Fair Lineup 4 with *Suspect 2 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
 
 
 
Table 2e. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Fair Lineup 5 containing Suspect 2. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6* 
Target Present 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.49 
Target Absent 0.12 0.09 0.44 0.12 0.00 0.23 
Notes. Fair Lineup 5 with *Suspect 2 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
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Table 2f. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Biased Lineup 1 containing Suspect 2. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2* Photo 3 Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
Target Present 0.04 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.02 
Target Absent 0.08 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 
Notes. Biased Lineup 1 with *Suspect 2 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
 
 
 
Table 2g. Table summarizing the choosing rates for Biased Lineup 2 containing Suspect 2. 
Lineup Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 Photo 4 Photo 5* Photo 6 
Target Present 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.88 0.00 
Target Absent 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.74 0.00 
Notes. Biased Lineup 2 with *Suspect 2 is displayed above, and would be target present when a 
participant saw this suspect in the video crime event. All values are rounded to 2dp. 
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APPENDIX B. INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Consent Process 
 
Welcome to the experiment! Please read through and sign the consent form at your own pace. 
Feel free to ask the experimenter if you have any questions. Give the completed form to the 
experimenter. 
 
 
Video: Crime Event 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study. 
 
The first part of this experiment session involves watching a video.  
 
When you proceed to the next page, the video will start to play. The video is not very long, but it 
is relevant to your next task, so please do your best to pay close attention.  
 
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now. Otherwise, when you are ready to 
see the video, click “Continue”. 
 
 
{Crime video plays - program will automatically advance to the next screen} 
 
 
Filler Task 1 
 
Your next task is to count the number of syllables in a series of words. 
 
Please enter in the number of syllables for as many words as you can in the next 10 minutes. 
 
Click “Continue” to begin. 
 
 
Please enter the number of syllables in each word in the textbox provided. 
 
{Screen contains a list of words with textboxes to enter in the number of syllables} 
{Screen will automatically advance after 10 minutes} 
 
 
Intervening Task: Biased Lineup, Fair Lineup, or Reading Comprehension. 
 
Please read the instructions for the next phase of the experiment.  
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Soon, you will be shown six photographs of individuals. This is called a lineup, which is a 
procedure used by police to gather evidence when they find a person that they think committed a 
crime. This person is called the “suspect.” If there were any eyewitnesses to the crime, the police 
will test their suspicions about this person by asking an eyewitness to view a lineup containing 
this suspect. 
 
However, the police are sometimes incorrect in their suspicions and the suspect is not the culprit. 
So, a lineup will sometimes contain the person that the eyewitness saw committing the crime, 
and sometimes that person will not be among those in the lineup. 
 
 
Your task is to determine if one of the people in this lineup is the person that you saw in the 
video viewed at the start of this session. Then, you will be asked to answer some more questions 
about your lineup decision. 
 
The person from the video may or may not be one of the people in the lineup. If you think that 
the person from the video is not there, do not feel like you need to make an identification. 
 
If you do think that the person from the video is in the lineup, please select the relevant photo 
number, e.g., “Photo 1”.  
If you do not think that the person from the video is in the lineup, please select “Not Present”. 
 
Click “Continue” to view the lineup. 
 
 
{Lineup Displayed – either Biased, or fair, always containing the innocent suspect} 
 
Please click on the photo number of the individual that you think you recognize from the video, 
or select “Not Present” if you do not recognize anyone in the lineup. 
 
Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 
Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
              Not Present 
 
Why did you make the decision you did about the lineup? 
 
{textbox written entry} 
 
How confident are you in your decision about this lineup? 
 
0% - not at all confident 10%  20%  30%  40%  50% 
 
60%  70%  80%  90%  100% - completely confident 
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Filler Task 2 
 
Your next task is to count the number of vowels contained in this passage. You will have 10 
minutes for this task. 
 
 If you finish counting, enter the number of vowels in the text box provided and then click 
“Continue” for a new passage. 
 
Click “Continue” to begin this task. 
 
 
Please count the number of vowels in the passage below. 
 
{There will be 4 passages about 500 words each, which will be shown to the participants in a 
random order with a textbox below each to enter the number of vowels} 
{Screen will automatically advance to Screen 10 after 10 minutes} 
 
 
Final Fair Lineup: Target present or target absent. 
 
For the next task, you will be asked to view another lineup and decide if one of the people in the 
lineup is from the video you watched at the start of the session. You will also answer some 
questions about your decision. 
 
Remember that the person from the video may or may not be one of the people in the lineup. If 
you think that the person from the video is not there, do not feel like you need to make an 
identification. 
 
If you do think that the person from the video is in the lineup, please select the relevant photo 
number, e.g., “Photo 1”.  
If you do not think that the person from the video is in the lineup, please select “Not Present”. 
 
Click “Continue” to view the lineup. 
 
 
{Lineup Displayed – Fair and containing the innocent suspect} 
 
Please click on the photo number of the individual that you recognize from the video, or select 
“Not Present” if you do not recognize anyone in the lineup. 
 
Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 
Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
              Not Present 
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Why did you make the decision you did about the lineup? 
 
{textbox written entry} 
 
How confident are you in your decision about this lineup? 
0% - not at all confident 10%  20%  30%  40%  50% 
 
60%  70%  80%  90%  100% - completely confident 
 
 
{if they indicate “Not Present”} 
If you had to pick someone from this lineup, which photograph would be your first choice? 
Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 
Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
 
Why would this photo be your choice if you had to identify someone? 
{textbox written entry} 
 
How confident are you in this decision about the lineup? 
0% - not at all confident 10%  20%  30%  40%  50% 
 
60%  70%  80%  90%  100% - completely confident 
 
 
Post-identification Questions 
What are the mechanisms involved in the repeated suspect effect? 
 
1. Remember-Know-Guess Questions 
 
You will now be asked to provide information about your memory performance—specifically, to 
tell us about some qualitative aspects of your decision.  
 
For example, if you selected a face from the lineup, you will be asked to describe your memory 
using one of several descriptors—REMEMBER, KNOW, or GUESS.   
 
You should say that you REMEMBER the face if you can remember any specific detail of 
having seen the face before. It could be that you remember what it looked like on the screen, or 
what you thought about when you saw it, or something you noticed in the room. Any specific 
detail will do.  
 
At other times in your memory, you may simply KNOW that something happened, but you 
cannot remember any details about it. So a photograph might look familiar, but you cannot 
remember any details of seeing that face before, or the reaction you had to this face. This is 
similar to what happens when you see a photograph of someone who looks familiar without 
being able to remember when or where you have seen them or met them before.  
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Keep in mind that a KNOW response does not necessarily mean you are unsure. You can have a 
strong feeling that the face is familiar, but not remember any specific details about having 
encountered it previously. We are interested in whether you REMEMBER the person you 
selected from the lineup, or just KNOW you have seen the person you selected before.  
 
If you realize that your answer was just a guess, say GUESS.  That is, even though you cannot 
remember any details and the face does not seem overly familiar to you, you made a guess as to 
whether this person was in the video. Guessing is not a bad thing—it is a normal process and we 
are interested in when people choose from a lineup because they made a GUESS, and when 
people choose because they REMEMBER or KNOW the face. 
 
Finally, if you did not select a face from the lineup, please select the button labeled NOT 
PRESENT, thereby indicating that you did not select a face from the lineup.   
 
 
Please provide some information about the quality of your memory. If you selected a face from 
the lineup, choose one of the REMEMBER, KNOW, or GUESS options below. If you did not 
select a face, please select the NOT PRESENT option.  
  
- REMEMBER -- I remember details about what the face looked like or what I thought about as 
I saw the face the first time I saw it. 
 
- KNOW -- I do not remember details, but I have a strong feeling that the face is familiar to me.   
 
- GUESS -- I do not remember details or have a strong feeling of familiarity. Instead, I am just 
guessing that about whether I have seen this face before.   
 
- NOT PRESENT -- I did not select a face from the lineup. 
 
 
[If they select R]  
 
How much contextual detail do you remember from your first encounter with this face? e.g., 
can you bring to mind details about the circumstances in which you first saw this face? 
 
1 - Nothing       2 - A little        3 - Some     4 - Quite a lot       5 - A great deal 
 
 
[If they selected R, K or G]  
 
What about your experience led you to select the response that you did? Describe your 
experience when you were viewing this lineup and why you chose the photo that you did.    
 
[OPEN RESPONSE BOX] 
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2. Source Monitoring Framework Questions 
 
Please rate how true the following statements are when you think about your experience when 
you saw the photo that you selected from the lineup.  
 
(Participants will assign ratings from “1 – completely false” to “6 – completely true”). 
- I can recall seeing this person’s face in the video. 
- I felt like that person’s face was familiar. 
- I thought that I recognized them, but I did not know why. 
- When I saw their face in the lineup, other information came to mind from the first time I 
saw their face. 
- I know that I have seen them before but I don’t know where. 
- I recall seeing them in a previous lineup. 
- I was just guessing and this person seemed like the best choice. 
- I could recall other details about the first time I saw their face. 
- I was really sure this was the culprit from the video. 
- I knew I had seen them before, but no other information came to mind. 
- I felt hesitant to identify them. 
- I could have picked any of the photos—they all look similar to me. 
 
 
3. Commitment Effect Questions 
 
Please rate how important it felt to you that you made consistent decisions about the lineups 
throughout the session. 
1 - Not at all important 
2 – Unimportant 
3 – Somewhat unimportant 
4 – Somewhat important 
5 – Important 
6 – Extremely important 
 
Did you select someone in the initial lineup? If yes, how important was it to pick that person 
again in the last lineup if you saw them? 
1 - Not at all important 
2 – Unimportant 
3 – Somewhat unimportant 
4 – Somewhat important 
5 – Important 
6 – Extremely important 
 
To what extent was this because you knew for sure you were correct? 
1 - Not at all 
2 – Somewhat 
3 – A moderate amount 
4 – A considerable amount 
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To what extent was this because you felt that you should commit to your earlier decision? 
 
1 - Not at all 
2 – Somewhat 
3 – A moderate amount 
4 – A considerable amount 
 
 
4. Social Influence Questions 
 
Did you feel like the experimenter was trying to get you to make a particular decision at any 
time? 
Yes    No 
 
[If yes] What about the procedure or experimenter’s behavior made you think that there was a 
particular decision or outcome that was preferred over the others? 
 
[OPEN RESPONSE BOX] 
 
 
End Survey 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. Please let the experimenter know that you are 
finished with the tasks. 
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APPENDIX C. INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Consent Process 
 
Welcome to the experiment! Please read through and sign the consent form at your own pace. 
Feel free to ask the experimenter if you have any questions. Give the completed form to the 
experimenter. 
 
 
Video: Crime Event 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study. 
 
The first part of this experiment session involves watching a video.  
 
When you proceed to the next page, the video will start to play. The video is not very long, but it 
is relevant to your next task, so please do your best to pay close attention.  
 
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now. Otherwise, when you are ready to 
see the video, click “Continue”. 
 
 
{Crime video plays - program will automatically advance to the next screen} 
 
 
Filler Task 1 
 
You will now spend 10 minutes on a task of your choosing. 
 
Please let the experimenter know that you are ready to do the 10-minute task and tell them which 
of the following tasks you would like to do: 
 
1. Crossword Puzzle 
2. Sudoku Puzzle 
3. Word Find Puzzle 
 
Please go on to the next page to start the 10-minute timer. 
 
 
Please work on your chosen task for 10 minutes. 
 
{A clock counting down 10 minutes will be on the screen} 
{Screen will automatically advance after 10 minutes} 
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Intervening Task 1: Biased Lineup, Fair Lineup, or Reading Comprehension 
 
Please read the instructions for the next phase of the experiment.  
 
Soon, you will be shown six photographs of individuals. This is called a lineup, which is a 
procedure used by police to gather evidence when they find a person that they think committed a 
crime. This person is called the “suspect.” If there were any eyewitnesses to the crime, the police 
will test their suspicions about this person by asking an eyewitness to view a lineup containing 
this suspect. 
 
However, the police are sometimes incorrect in their suspicions and the suspect is not the culprit. 
So, a lineup will sometimes contain the person that the eyewitness saw committing the crime, 
and sometimes that person will not be among those in the lineup. 
 
 
Your task is to determine if one of the people in this lineup is the person that you saw in the 
video viewed at the start of this session. Then, you will be asked to answer some more questions 
about your lineup decision. 
 
The person from the video may or may not be one of the people in the lineup. If you think that 
the person from the video is not there, do not feel like you need to make an identification. 
 
If you do think that the person from the video is in the lineup, please select the relevant photo 
number, e.g., “Photo 1”.  
If you do not think that the person from the video is in the lineup, please select “Not Present”. 
 
Click “Continue” to view the lineup. 
  
 
{Lineup Displayed – either Biased, or fair, always containing the innocent suspect} 
 
Please click on the photo number of the individual that you think you recognize from the video, 
or select “Not Present” if you do not recognize anyone in the lineup. 
 
Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 
Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
              Not Present 
 
Why did you make the decision you did about the lineup? 
 
{textbox written entry} 
 
How confident are you in your decision about this lineup? 
0% - not at all confident 10%  20%  30%  40%  50% 
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60%  70%  80%  90%  100% - completely confident 
 
 
Filler Task 2 
 
As before, you will now spend 10 minutes on a task of your choosing. 
 
Please let the experimenter know that you are ready to do the 10-minute task and tell them which 
of the following tasks you would like to do: 
 
1. Crossword Puzzle 
2. Sudoku Puzzle 
3. Word Find Puzzle 
 
You may also continue with the puzzle you were working on during the last 10 minute period. 
 
Please go on to the next page to start the 10-minute timer. 
 
 
Please work on your chosen task for 10 minutes. 
 
{A clock counting down 10 minutes will be on the screen} 
{Screen will automatically advance after 10 minutes} 
 
 
Intervening Task 2: Fair Lineup or Reading Comprehension 
 
Now, you will view another lineup and decide if one of the people in the lineup is from the video 
you watched at the start of the session. You will also answer some questions about your decision. 
 
Remember that the person from the video may or may not be one of the people in the lineup. If 
you think that the person from the video is not there, do not feel like you need to make an 
identification. 
 
If you do think that the person from the video is in the lineup, please select the relevant photo 
number, e.g., “Photo 1”.  
If you do not think that the person from the video is in the lineup, please select “Not Present”. 
 
Click “Continue” to view the lineup. 
 
 
{Fair Lineup Displayed - always containing the innocent suspect} 
 
Please click on the photo number of the individual that you recognize from the video, or select 
“Not Present” if you do not recognize anyone in the lineup. 
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Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 
Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
              Not Present 
 
Why did you make the decision you did about the lineup? 
 
{textbox written entry} 
 
How confident are you in your decision about this lineup? 
 
0% - not at all confident 10%  20%  30%  40%  50% 
 
60%  70%  80%  90%  100% - completely confident 
 
 
Filler Task 3 
 
As before, you will now spend 10 minutes on a task of your choosing. 
 
Please let the experimenter know that you are ready to do the 10-minute task and tell them which 
of the following tasks you would like to do: 
 
1. Crossword Puzzle 
2. Sudoku Puzzle 
3. Word Find Puzzle 
 
You may also continue with the puzzle you were working on during the last 10 minute period. 
 
Please go on to the next page to start the 10-minute timer. 
 
 
Please work on your chosen task for 10 minutes. 
 
{A clock counting down 10 minutes will be on the screen} 
{Screen will automatically advance after 10 minutes} 
 
 
Final Lineup Task: A fair, target-absent lineup. 
 
For the next task, you will be asked to view another lineup and decide if one of the people in the 
lineup is from the video you watched at the start of the session. You will also answer some 
questions about your decision. 
 
Remember that the person from the video may or may not be one of the people in the lineup. If 
you think that the person from the video is not there, do not feel like you need to make an 
identification. 
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If you do think that the person from the video is in the lineup, please select the relevant photo 
number, e.g., “Photo 1”.  
If you do not think that the person from the video is in the lineup, please select “Not Present”. 
 
Click “Continue” to view the lineup. 
 
 
{Lineup Displayed – Fair and containing the innocent suspect} 
 
Please click on the photo number of the individual that you recognize from the video, or select 
“Not Present” if you do not recognize anyone in the lineup. 
 
Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 
Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
              Not Present 
 
Why did you make the decision you did about the lineup? 
 
{textbox written entry} 
 
How confident are you in your decision about this lineup? 
 
0% - not at all confident 10%  20%  30%  40%  50% 
 
60%  70%  80%  90%  100% - completely confident 
 
 
{if they indicate “Not Present”} 
 
If you had to pick someone from this lineup, which photograph would be your first choice? 
 
Photo 1 Photo 2 Photo 3 
Photo 4 Photo 5 Photo 6 
 
Why would this photo be your choice if you had to choose? 
 
{textbox written entry} 
 
How confident are you in this decision about the lineup? 
 
0% - not at all confident 10%  20%  30%  40%  50% 
 
60%  70%  80%  90%  100% - completely confident 
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Post-identification Questions 
What are the mechanisms involved in the repeated suspect effect? 
 
5. Remember-Know-Guess Questions 
 
You will now be asked to provide information about your memory performance—specifically, to 
tell us about some qualitative aspects of your decision.  
 
For example, if you selected a face from the lineup, you will be asked to describe your memory 
using one of several descriptors—REMEMBER, KNOW, or GUESS.   
 
You should say that you REMEMBER the face if you can remember any specific detail of 
having seen the face before. It could be that you remember what it looked like on the screen, or 
what you thought about when you saw it, or something you noticed in the room. Any specific 
detail will do.  
 
At other times in your memory, you may simply KNOW that something happened, but you 
cannot remember any details about it. So a photograph might look familiar, but you cannot 
remember any details of seeing that face before, or the reaction you had to this face. This is 
similar to what happens when you see a photograph of someone who looks familiar without 
being able to remember when or where you have seen them or met them before.  
 
Keep in mind that a KNOW response does not necessarily mean you are unsure. You can have a 
strong feeling that the face is familiar, but not remember any specific details about having 
encountered it previously. We are interested in whether you REMEMBER the person you 
selected from the lineup, or just KNOW you have seen the person you selected before.  
 
If you realize that your answer was just a guess, say GUESS.  That is, even though you cannot 
remember any details and the face does not seem overly familiar to you, you made a guess as to 
whether this person was in the video. Guessing is not a bad thing—it is a normal process and we 
are interested in when people choose from a lineup because they made a GUESS, and when 
people choose because they REMEMBER or KNOW the face. 
 
Finally, if you did not select a face from the lineup, please select the button labeled NOT 
PRESENT, thereby indicating that you did not select a face from the lineup.   
 
 
Please provide some information about the quality of your memory. If you selected a face from 
the lineup, choose one of the REMEMBER, KNOW, or GUESS options below. If you did not 
select a face, please select the NOT PRESENT option.  
  
- REMEMBER -- I remember details about what the face looked like or what I thought about as 
I saw the face the first time I saw it. 
 
- KNOW -- I do not remember details, but I have a strong feeling that the face is familiar to me.   
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- GUESS -- I do not remember details or have a strong feeling of familiarity. Instead, I am just 
guessing that about whether I have seen this face before.   
 
- NOT PRESENT -- I did not select a face from the lineup. 
 
 
[If they select R]  
How much contextual detail do you remember from your first encounter with this face? e.g., 
can you bring to mind details about the circumstances in which you first saw this face? 
 
1 - Nothing       2 - A little        3 - Some     4 - Quite a lot       5 - A great deal 
 
 
[If they selected R, K or G]  
What about your experience led you to select the response that you did? Describe your 
experience when you were viewing this lineup and why you chose the photo that you did.    
 
[OPEN RESPONSE BOX] 
 
 
6. Source Monitoring Framework Questions 
 
Please rate how true the following statements are when you think about your experience when 
you saw the photo that you selected from the lineup.  
 
(Participants will assign ratings from “1 – completely false” to “6 – completely true”). 
- I can recall seeing this person’s face in the video. 
- I felt like that person’s face was familiar. 
- I thought that I recognized them, but I did not know why. 
- When I saw their face in the lineup, other information came to mind from the first time I 
saw their face. 
- I know that I have seen them before but I don’t know where. 
- I recall seeing them in a previous lineup. 
- I was just guessing and this person seemed like the best choice. 
- I could recall other details about the first time I saw their face. 
- I was really sure this was the culprit from the video. 
- I knew I had seen them before, but no other information came to mind. 
- I felt hesitant to identify them. 
- I could have picked any of the photos—they all look similar to me. 
 
 
7. Commitment Effect Questions 
 
Please rate how important it felt to you that you made consistent decisions about the lineups 
throughout the session. 
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1 - Not at all important 
2 – Unimportant 
3 – Somewhat unimportant 
4 – Somewhat important 
5 – Important 
6 – Extremely important 
 
Did you select someone in the initial lineup? If yes, how important was it to pick that person 
again in the last lineup if you saw them? 
1 - Not at all important 
2 – Unimportant 
3 – Somewhat unimportant 
4 – Somewhat important 
5 – Important 
6 – Extremely important 
 
To what extent was this because you knew for sure you were correct? 
1 - Not at all 
2 – Somewhat 
3 – A moderate amount 
4 – A considerable amount 
 
To what extent was this because you felt that you should commit to your earlier decision? 
 
1 - Not at all 
2 – Somewhat 
3 – A moderate amount 
4 – A considerable amount 
 
 
8. Social Influence Questions 
 
Did you feel like the experimenter was trying to get you to make a particular decision at any 
time? 
Yes    No 
 
[If yes] What about the procedure or experimenter’s behavior made you think that there was a 
particular decision or outcome that was preferred over the others? 
 
[OPEN RESPONSE BOX] 
 
 
End Survey 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. Please let the experimenter know that you are 
finished with the tasks. 
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APPENDIX D. READING COMPREHENSION TASKS 
 
ARTICLE ONE: Cyclone, hurricane, typhoon: What's the difference? 
Whatever you choose to call them, these monster storms are powerful natural events with the 
capacity to wreak incredible havoc. 
June 12, 2019 
By Ker Than 
 
As Cyclone Vayu rages in the Indian ocean, you may be wondering what a cyclone 
even is. But if you've ever survived a hurricane or typhoon, you already know the answer. 
That's because hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons are all the same weather phenomenon. 
Scientists just call these storms different things depending on where they occur.  
In the Atlantic and northern Pacific, the storms are called "hurricanes," after the 
Caribbean god of evil, named Hurrican. In the northwestern Pacific, the same powerful storms 
are called "typhoons." In the southeastern Indian Ocean and southwestern Pacific, they are 
called "severe tropical cyclones." In the northern Indian Ocean, they're called "severe cyclonic 
storms." In the southwestern Indian Ocean, they're just "tropical cyclones." 
To be classified as a hurricane, typhoon, or cyclone, a storm must reach wind speeds of 
at least 74 miles per hour (119 kilometers per hour). If a hurricane's winds reach speeds of 111 
miles per hour (179 kilometers per hour), it is upgraded to an "intense hurricane." If a typhoon 
hits 150 miles per hour (241 kilometers per hour) then it becomes a "supertyphoon.” 
 
Link: 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/09/130923-typhoon-hurricane-cyclone-primer-
natural-disaster/ 
 
Comprehension Questions  
Bold answer = correct 
 
Q1: Which of the following statements is true based on the article above? 
a. The hurricanes are different from cyclones and typhoons. 
b. Typhoons are different from cyclones and hurricanes. 
c. Hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons are different names for the same phenomenon. 
d. Hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons are all different phenomenon. 
 
Q2: According to the article, which of the following is associated with the fastest wind speeds? 
a. Severe tropical cyclone. 
b. Intense hurricane. 
c. Hurrican. 
d. Supertyphoon. 
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ARTICLE TWO: T. rex had an amazing sense of smell, gene study suggests 
Fresh analysis of modern genes and ancient brains backs up the notion that the meat-eating 
dinosaur had an especially powerful nose. 
June 12, 2019 
By Michael Greshko 
 
Talk about inhaling your food: The iconic predator Tyrannosaurus rex and its kin had 
some of the keenest senses of smell among all extinct dinosaurs, a new study finds. The 
work, published yesterday in Proceedings of the Royal Society B, attempts to roughly quantify 
how many genes would have been involved in T. rex’s sniffing skills, tens of millions of years 
after any traces of its DNA have decayed away.  
The idea that tyrannosaurs had good noses is not new. In 2008, for instance, researchers 
showed that T. rex and its siblings devoted large portions of their brains to processing smell. 
But the new study marks the latest in a growing movement to correlate living animals’ DNA 
with their bodies and sensory abilities, with the goal of better understanding the capabilities 
and behaviors of their long-extinct relatives. “It’s not Jurassic Park,” says lead study 
author Graham Hughes, a computational biologistat University College Dublin, referring to the 
famous fictional effort to reconstruct dino DNA. “It’s trying to look at how sensory evolution 
is really a major player [in] whether or not you become an apex predator.” 
 
Link: 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2019/06/t-rex-had-amazing-sense-of-small-genes-
reveal-dinosaurs-olfaction/ 
 
Comprehension Questions 
Bold answer = correct. 
 
Q1: How did scientists discover the strength of the T.Rex’s smell, according to this article? 
a. Studying the genes of the T.Rex 
b. Studying the Jurassic era 
c. Studying the nose of the T.Rex. 
d. Studying the extinction of the T.Rex 
 
Q2: How could these scientists tell that the T.Rex had a really great sense of smell? 
a. The nose was really big. 
b. The parts of the brain that were linked to the nose. 
c. The number of genes that were used for smell perception. 
d. Sensory evolution. 
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APPENDIX E. DUAL-PROCESS RECOGNITION COMPOSITE SCORE ANALYSES. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Graded Questions about Source and Subjective Memory Experience 
This section will address the mechanisms that people use to determine whether they 
should identify someone from the lineup using a new approach. Instead of a forced choice, 
multiple choice question as is typically used in the literature, I have asked a series of questions 
that participants will respond to on a scale. From their answers, I hope to obtain a more sensitive 
measure how well participants in different experimental conditions can effectively monitor the 
source of any familiarity or recollection experienced in the final lineup. 
Analytic Plan. During the design stage of this study, 12 questions were created with a 
priori groupings of these item to assess source monitoring and memory processes using a graded 
scale rather than a forced choice format. There were four a priori groupings for these questions, 
which are summarized in Table 3. Composite scores were calculated for each by obtaining the 
average for each person, for each item group. These scores were entered as predictors in a 
multinomial analysis with R-K-G judgment as the outcome variable. The results showed effects 
that were extremely similar to the effects from the analysis of the three factors. However, the a 
priori item groups resulted in a better fit to these data (test comparing model fit: D = 32.18. p 
<.001), so these are the results that have been used to assess the association between the 
composite scores and the R-K-G measure.  
The analyses were organized in a similar way to the R-K-G analyses, but the composites 
were continuous variables. So, multiple linear regression models were run with the composite 
scores with the Familiarity and Recollection Composites as outcome variables, in separate 
models. Intervening lineup condition (Biased or Fair, with Control condition as the reference 
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category) and participants selection from the final lineup (“hit” or “false alarm” = 1, “not a hit” 
or “not a false alarm” = 0) were used as predictors. The Target-Present and Target-Absent final 
lineup conditions were analyzed separately. A null model, main effects model, and interaction 
model was run, but if the interaction did not improve model fit, the main effects model was used. 
Association between questionnaire items and R-K-G measure. A summary of the results 
assessing the ability of each composite score (see Table 3) to predict participant’s R-K-G 
judgments for the forced-choice decisions are in Table 4. Significance of parameters was 
determined by examining 95% confidence intervals of the odd ratios. Each one unit increase in 
the Recollection Composite resulted in three times more “know” judgments than one of the 
“other” categories (“Guess” or “Not Present”; ! = 2.75). One unit more in the Recollection 
Composite was associated eight times more “remember” judgments than “other” judgments (! = 
7.89), which was again significant.  
Higher Familiarity Composite scores were associated with a significant increase in the 
likelihood that participants would report “know” rather than “other”—in fact, a “know” 
judgment was two times more likely than “other” with every increase in the Familiarity 
Composite score (! = 2.18). A one unit increase in the Familiarity Composite was also linked 
with a 44% decrease in the chance that participants would report “remember” rather than “other” 
(! = 0.56). Thus, the Familiarity and Recollection Composites discriminate fairly well between 
participants who report “remember” or “know” compared with those reporting “other”.  
Increases in the Guess Composite were related to three times more “know” judgments, 
and five times more “remember” judgments, compared with “other” judgments. The Certainty 
Composite was not helpful for predicting which of the categorical R-K-G options participants 
chose. Therefore, these Composite scores measure an similar construct to the categorical R-K-G 
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question, but with more variability. However, the relation between the Familiarity Composite 
and “know” judgments was not as clear as between the Recollection Composite and “remember” 
judgments. “Know” judgments seemed to be related to the Recollection Composite and the 
Guess Composite to a similar degree as the “Familiarity Composite”. Thus, this questionnaire 
may be less helpful for separating guessers from those relying on familiarity, but can help to 
isolate individuals who feel like they remembered the person that they identified. 
 
Table 3. Source monitoring framework items and a priori group they were associated with. 
Item Group 
(determined a priori) 
Item 
Familiarity Questions/ 
Composite Score 
- I felt like that person’s face was familiar. 
- I thought that I recognized them, but I did not know why. 
- I know that I have seen them before, but I do not know where. 
- I knew I had seen them before, but no other information came to mind. 
Recollection 
Questions/ Composite 
Score 
- I can recall seeing this person’s face in the video. 
- When I saw their face in the lineup, other information came to mind 
from the first time I saw their face. 
- I recall seeing them in a previous lineup. 
- I could recall other details about the first time I saw their face. 
Guess Questions/ 
Composite Score 
- I was just guessing and this person seemed like the best choice. 
- I could have picked any of the photos—they all look similar to me. 
Certainty Questions/ 
Composite Score 
- I was really sure this was the culprit from the video. 
- I felt hesitant to identify them. 
 
Target-Present Final Lineup. The Remember Composite model was not a good fit to 
these data, as neither the main effects model nor the interaction model was a significantly better 
fit than the null model; F(3, 107) = 1.41, p = 0.244, F(2, 105) = 2.04, p = 0.135, respectively 
(R2Adj = 0.03). There was a significant interaction (B = -0.23, p = 0.046) indicating that 
participants in the biased lineup condition had a lower mean score for the Recollection 
Composite than the control condition when the culprit was identified (Hit: Mbiased = 3.09, SDbiased 
= 1.17; Mcontrol = 3.38, SDcontrol = 0.78), but the opposite was true for non-hit decisions in the 
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final lineup (Not a hit: Mbiased = 3.36, SDbiased = 0.94; Mcontrol = 2.76, SDcontrol = 0.79). However, 
because model fit was poor, this result should be interpreted with caution. 
For the Familiarity Composite, the main effect model was the best fit to these data, as it 
was a better fit than the null model (F(3, 107) = 4.77, p = 0.004; R2Adj = 0.10), but the addition of 
interactions did not improve the fit (F(2, 105) = 0.05, p = 0.952). Participant who received a 
biased lineup did not have a significantly different score than those who were in the control 
condition (Mbiased = 3.25, SDbiased = 0.80; Mcontrol = 2.94, SDcontrol = 0.79; B = 0.16, p = 0.161), 
and the fair intervening lineup condition was associated with scores only marginally higher than 
the control condition (Mbiased = 3.27, SDbiased = 0.80; B = 0.19, p = 0.085). When comparing those 
who selected the culprit from the final lineup and those who did not (B = -0.30, p = 0.001), 
results showed that participants who selected the culprit had significantly higher Familiarity 
scores than those who did not (MHit = 3.65, SDHit = 0.66; MnotHit =3.30 , SDnotHit = 0.82). 
Target-Absent Final Lineup. For the Recollection Composite, the main effect model fit 
better than the null model (F(3, 96) = 9.51, p <.001; R2Adj = 0.21), and the interaction did not 
improve fit (F(2, 94) = 0.08, p = 0.919). Which intervening lineup condition a participant was in 
did not significantly influence their Recollection Composite score, with neither the biased 
intervening lineup (B = -0.02, p = 0.863; Mbiased = 3.72, SDbiased = 1.01) nor the fair intervening 
lineup (B = -0.13, p = 0.259; Mfair = 3.24, SDfair = 0.83) producing scores significantly different 
from the control condition (Mcontrol = 3.35, SDcontrol = 0.63). However, whether or not participants 
selected the innocent suspect did result in significant changes to the Recollection scores (B = 
0.46, p<.001). Participants who made a false alarm decision on the final lineup had significantly 
higher Recollection scores on average (MFA = 4.14, SDFA = 0.89) than those who made any other 
type of decision (MnotFA = 3.20, SDnotFA = 0.73).  
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For the Familiarity Composite, the main effects model was again the best fitting model 
(vs. Null: F(3, 96) = 2.66, p = 0.05; vs. Interaction: F(2, 94) = 0.07, p = 0.931; R2Adj = 0.05). 
There was no significant difference between participants who saw a biased intervening lineup 
and the control condition (B = -0.10, p = 0.482; Mbiased = 3.56, SDbiased = 0.99; Mcontrol = 3.40, 
SDcontrol = 0.87). There was, however, a significant difference in Familiarity scores when 
participants saw a fair intervening lineup compared with when they had the control task (B = -
0.28, p = 0.029; Mbiased = 3.11, SDbiased = 0.95)—the fair intervening lineup was associated with 
significantly lower scores on average. Whether the participant chose the innocent suspect or not, 
though, had no effect on participants Familiarity Composite scores (B = 0.15, p = 0.156; MFA = 
3.65, SDFA = 0.94; MnotFA = 3.30, SDnotFA = 0.96). 
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APPENDIX F. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR CORRECT IDENTIFICATIONS 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Composite scores were analyzed next (see Table 5 for the means and Table 6 for a 
summary of the results), and it was found that people who received a biased intervening lineup 
and identified the culprit tended to have lower scores on the Recollection Composite. In contrast, 
higher Recollection Composite scores were associated with participants in the Control Condition 
who selected the true culprit from the final lineup (Interaction between Biased Intervening 
Lineup [vs. Control Condition] and identification outcome: B = -0.23, p = 0.046). There were no 
other significant effects for the Recollection Composite. Higher scores on the Familiarity 
Composite were associated with identifications that were not hits (B = -0.30, p = 0.001), and 
there was a marginally significant difference between the fair intervening lineup condition and 
control condition (B = 0.19, p = 0.085). 
 
Table 5. A summary of the Familiarity and Recollection Composite scores for each intervening 
task condition, according final lineup decision in Experiment 1. 
Intervening Task 
Condition 
Decision Final Lineup 
Outcome 
Familiarity 
Composite 
Recollection 
Composite 
Control (No Lineup) Initial  Hit 2.63 (0.43) 3.38 (0.78) 
Not a Hit 3.14 (0.91) 2.76 (0.79) 
Forced-Choice  Hit 2.59 (0.41) 3.25 (0.79) 
Not a Hit 3.24 (0.92) 2.79 (0.83) 
Biased Lineup Initial  Hit 2.86 (0.77) 3.09 (0.17) 
Not a Hit 3.42 (0.77) 3.36 (0.94) 
Forced-Choice  Hit 3.02 (0.81) 3.16 (1.01) 
Not a Hit 3.61 (0.67) 3.46 (1.02) 
Fair Lineup Initial  Hit 2.98 (0.71) 3.44 (0.80) 
Not a Hit 3.43 (0.82) 3.32 (0.68) 
Forced-Choice  Hit 3.09 (0.76) 3.50 (0.76) 
Not a Hit 3.40 (0.82) 3.26 (0.68) 
Notes. Mean scores are reported with standard deviations in parentheses, rounded to 2 dp. 
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In addition, I examined whether selecting the innocent suspect during the intervening 
lineup task was associated with reduced Recollection or Familiarity Composite scores and culprit 
identifications. There was an interaction between Biased Intervening Lineup (vs. Control 
Condition) and identification outcome (B = -0.25, p = 0.029). That is, people who selected the 
wrong suspect in a previous lineup reported a weaker memory experience when identifying the 
culprit later. For the Familiarity Composite scores, there was no effect of intervening lineup 
choice here, so there was no evidence of weaker memory experiences in different Intervening 
Task Conditions based on whether they correctly identified the culprit. Hits were associated with 
lower Familiarity Composite scores overall (B = -0.31, p = 0.001), though, and Biased lineups 
were associated with significant higher Familiarity scores on average (B = 0.22, p = 0.045, see 
5). Thus, biased lineups seem to make people feel like their memory is weaker, regardless of 
their accuracy.  
 
Table 6. Summary of the multinomial analysis used to determine how well each group of items 
predicts participants forced choice R-K-G judgments. 
R-K-G 
Judgment 
Question Group M SD  !*  95% CI [!LL, !UL]^ 
Remember 
N = 161 
 
Recollection Composite 3.74 0.83 7.89 [4.34, 14.33] 
Familiarity Composite 2.98 0.82 0.56  [0.36, 0.88] 
Guess Composite 5.00 1.06 5.14  [3.42, 7.71] 
Certainty Composite 2.99 0.92 0.75 [0.49, 1.16] 
Know 
N = 165 
 
Recollection Composite 3.35 0.71 2.75 [1.62, 4.67] 
Familiarity Composite 3.72 0.80 2.18 [1.44, 3.31] 
Guess Composite 4.40 1.06 3.15 [2.21, 4.48] 
 Certainty Composite 2.82 0.90 0.95 [0.64, 1.41] 
Other  
N = 96 
Recollection Composite 2.61 0.69   
Familiarity Composite 2.99 0.82   
Guess Composite 3.19 0.81   
 Certainty Composite 2.16 0.87   
Notes. *Reference group for multinomial regression results is “Other.” Thus, there are no beta 
weights associated with this category. ^ 95% CIs that do not cross ! = 1 indicate a significant 
result. All values rounded to 2 decimal places. 
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APPENDIX G. SOCIAL INFLUENCES OPEN RESPONSE DATA 
 
Table 7. All open-responses from participants who reported feeling influenced, sorted by theme. 
Theme Condition Open Response 
Repetition of 
one person 
throughout 
procedure 
Biased LUP, Fair LUP “One photo was present all 3 times. I was prompted to 
choose.” 
Fair LUP, Fair LUP “As I continued to pick not present in the lineup there were a 
few individuals who kept showing up in the lineup multiple 
times.” 
Biased LUP, No LUP “I am not completely sure. But if I had to guess, the research 
wanted me to choose #5 the first time and #6 the second time 
by keeping ONLY that picture for both times I was asked.” 
Biased LUP, Fair LUP “Some of the pictures were consistent throughout. One, as far 
as I could tell, changed based on the brightness of the picture.” 
Biased LUP, Fair LUP “The same person was placed in all three lineups, making it 
clear that that was their suspect.” 
Biased LUP, Fair LUP “Some of the backgrounds in the individual’s pictures were 
different colors, at least one picture was present in two or 
more of the lineups.” 
Biased LUP, Fair LUP “The same man in all 3 lineups.” 
Biased LUP, Fair LUP “In the first lineup, photo 5 looked the most similar and then 
line up 2 he went to photo 4 and then during the last line up he 
went back to photo 5.” 
Fair LUP, No LUP “They put in the same person I chose in the first lineup in the 
second lineup to see whether or not I would check the same 
one.” 
Biased LUP, Fair LUP “The same one guy popped up on every single lineup which 
made me think that I should have choose him but I did not.” 
Forced to 
choose in 
final lineup 
Fair LUP, No LUP “Because even after choosing not present twice, I was still 
asked to choose who I thought the person was.” 
Fair LUP, No LUP “They made me pick someone from the lineup that would be 
the most similar to what I thought he looked like.” 
Inferring 
something 
about the 
goals of the 
experimenter 
Biased LUP, No LUP “The experiment was set up in such a way that the second 
lineup seems to be more familiar than the first lineup.” 
Biased LUP, Fair LUP “I don’t think the actual dude was present in the first or third 
lineups and I might have picked three different guys.” 
Fair LUP, No LUP “It makes you want to pick the right one when someone is 
watching.” 
Fair LUP, No LUP “I think all the suspects had similar features, so the 
experimenter is trying to see if I would change my answer 
based on general features that all of them had.” 
Fair LUP, Fair LUP “I feel like choosing the right suspect was the experiment but 
there were different suspects every time so it was hard to come 
to a final decision.” 
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APPENDIX H. ADDITIONAL R-K-G ANALAYSES 
 
Experiment 1 
Categorical Remember-Know-Guess Judgment 
Did participants in different conditions use recollection or familiarity to a greater extent 
when making lineup decisions? This was examined using participants responses to the forced-
choice, post-identification Remember-Know-Guess (R-K-G) question (Appendix B contains the 
instructions and question prompt). 
Analytic Plan. Participants’ R-K-G judgments were used as the outcome variable in a 
multinomial logistic regression analysis, which is used for in cases where there is a categorical 
outcome variable with more than two levels. Two categorical predictors were used in each 
model—which intervening lineup condition the participant was in, and whether they selected the 
innocent suspect or culprit in the final lineup. Participants in the target-present and target-absent 
final lineup conditions were analyzed separately, with intervening lineup condition and whether 
the participant made a false alarm or hit as the predictor variables.  
Three models were run for each: a model with an interaction between predictors, a model 
with only main effects, and a null model (no predictors). The fit of these models was compared 
and a final model selected to interpret. Then, I can examine these data further to determine if 
there are significantly more reports of  “remember” when participants received an intervening 
biased lineup compared with no lineup or a fair lineup. Similarly, I will determine if there were 
significantly more “know” judgments when people received a fair, intervening lineup as 
compared to those who received a biased lineup or no lineup. 
Target-Present Final Lineup. These analyses include only participants who received a 
final, target-present lineup containing the person they saw in the video. The main effects model 
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was a significantly better fit to the data than the null model (Main effects versus null model: D = 
18.92, p = 0.004), indicating that both Intervening Task Condition and whether the participant 
identified the person from the video is useful for predicting whether participants reported 
remember, know, or guess. The model containing an interaction between these categorical 
variables, though, was the best fit to these data (Interaction versus main effects model: D = 
14.97, p = 0.004). Thus, the interaction between which intervening task a participant received 
and whether they selected the culprit was best for sorting between those who reported remember, 
know, or guess. Thus, it seems that both the condition a person was in an whether they accurately 
identified the culprit from the lineup mattered for which R-K-G judgment they made.  
Assessing the odds ratios of each predictor (main effects only) showed that if people are 
randomly assigned to the biased intervening lineup condition rather than the control condition, 
they were 16% less likely to report a “familiarity” process (! = 0.84) than to report that they 
guessed. However, other participants in this condition were 22% more likely to report 
“remembering” the person they identified than they were to saying they were “guessing” (! = 
1.22). So, seeing a biased intervening lineup resulted in more “remember” and “guess” 
judgments, and fewer “know” judgments than when participants saw no intervening lineup.  
If participants saw a fair intervening lineup rather than completing the control task, they 
were 38% more likely to report a “familiarity” process than making a “guess” (! = 1.38). 
Participants in this condition also reported “remember” 78% more than they reported “guess” (! 
= 1.78). Therefore, “know” judgments and “remember” judgments were more common than 
“guess” judgments for participants who received a fair intervening lineup rather than no lineup. 
When someone accurately identified the culprit from the final lineup (a hit) rather than 
any other decision, this was associated with 84% more “know” judgments than “guess” 
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judgments (! = 1.84) and almost six times more “remember” judgments than “guess” judgments 
(! = 5.7479). Thus, people who made accurate identifications were much more likely to say that 
they remembered seeing that person in the video and also remembered details about the encoding 
experience. Refer to Table 8 to compare the proportion of participants who selected the culprit in 
each Intervening Lineup Condition, separated by their post-identification R-K-G judgment. 
Target-Absent Final Lineup. These analyses pertain to participants who received a 
final, target-absent lineup containing the innocent suspect only. The main effects model was a 
significantly better fit to the data than the null model (Main effects versus null model: D = 36.46, 
p <.001), indicating that both Intervening Task Condition and whether the participant identified 
the innocent suspect are helpful for predicting whether a participant said that they remembered, 
knew, or guessed. The test comparing the interaction model and the main effects model was only 
marginally significant (Interaction versus main effects model: D = 3.15, p = 0.053). Thus, the 
interaction between which intervening task a participant received and whether they selected the 
innocent was probably useful for sorting between those who reported remember, know, or guess, 
but not much better than the model just looking at the effects of these categorical variables 
independently. Although only marginally significant, this interaction would suggest that which 
condition a participant is in and whether they selected the innocent suspect in the final lineup 
would influence their R-K-G judgments. 
The odds ratios of each predictor in this multinomial model were examined too. People 
are randomly assigned to the biased intervening lineup condition rather than the control 
condition, they were 79% more likely to report a “familiarity” process (! = 1.79) than to report 
that they guessed. Though, other participants in this same condition were 9% less likely to report 
a “remember” process than “guessing” (! = 0.91). Thus, reporting a feeling of “familiarity” as 
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their memory experience was most common if a participant saw a biased intervening lineup 
rather than no intervening lineup.  
 
Table 8. A summary of the proportion of false alarms/hits in each intervening lineup and final 
lineup condition, separated by the remember-know-guess judgment the participant made. 
Intervening Lineup 
Condition 
Target-Present Final Lineup * Target-Absent Final Lineup ^ 
Remember Know Other Remember Know Other 
Control 0.73 0.31 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 
Biased 0.36 0.18 0.28 0.54 0.56 0.05 
Fair 0.50 0.25 0.18 0.33 0.11 0.00 
Notes. * Proportions indicate the proportion of people in that cell who selected the culprit that 
appeared in the video (a hit). ^ Proportions indicate the proportion of people in that cell who 
selected the innocent suspect (a false alarm). All values rounded to 2 decimal places. 
 
 
For those who received a fair intervening lineup rather than the intervening control task,  
they were almost three times more likely to report “knowing” than “guessing” (! = 2.75). 
Similarly, participants in this condition were almost two times more likely to say they 
“remembered” the person they select than say they “guessed” (! = 1.75). It seems, therefore, that 
both “know” and “remember” judgments are more frequent than “guess” judgments when people 
received a fair intervening lineup versus those who received a non-lineup intervening task. 
Finally, when comparing people who selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup 
to those who made another type of decision, the effects were very large. When someone selected 
the innocent suspect from the final lineup, they were 25 times more likely to report a 
“familiarity” experience when viewing the final lineup rather than say that is was a “guess” (! = 
25.21). Similarly, if a participant selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup, they were 
49 times more likely to judge their memory experience as “remembering” rather than “guessing” 
(! = 49.25). So, people are extremely unlikely to report that they were “guessing” when they 
selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup—many more of these participants attributed 
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their selection to a familiarity process or recollection. Refer to Table 8 again for the proportion 
innocent suspect identifications in each Intervening Lineup Condition and R-K-G judgment. 
Did participants who chose the innocent suspect twice show higher rates of false 
recall? In Haw and colleagues’ (2007) study, higher rates of false recognition were found for 
trials where participants choose the innocent suspect again in a final lineup after identifying them 
in a previous showup. Of those who received an intervening lineup and a target-absent final 
lineup (N = 110), only 20% chose the innocent suspect from both of the lineups. However, of the 
people who reported “remembering” as their memory experience during the final lineup, 39% 
had chosen the innocent suspect from both lineups. Only 4% of those who “guessed” and 26% of 
those using familiarity identified the innocent suspect from both of the lineups they received.  
These differences were exacerbated when the Intervening Task Condition was included. 
In fact, 62% of those who received a biased lineup, and made a “remember” judgment, chose the 
innocent suspect twice. A multinomial analysis revealed an interaction between Intervening Task 
Condition and whether or not a participant chose the innocent suspect twice, for predictin 
participant’s post-identification R-K-G judgment (Bknow = -18.30; Bremember = -9.06; Interaction 
model vs. main effects model: D = 206.54, p = 0.002). Similar to Haw and colleagues’ (2007), 
participants who choose the innocent suspect twice were over-represented in the “remember” 
category. Picking the innocent suspect in a previous lineup increased the rate of false recognition 
compared with when the innocent suspect was not identified in an intervening lineup (refer to 
Table 9). These patterns are consistent with “preference” rather than “commitment.” The act of 
choosing seems similar to a biased lineup, as choosing narrows the attention onto the innocent 
suspect and, consequently, increases the rate of false recognition, especially when the first 
identification was made from a biased lineup (in which the innocent suspect already stands out). 
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Table 9. Summary of the proportion if participants in the target-absent final lineup condition 
who selected the innocent suspect, separated by intervening lineup condition and RKG judgment. 
Intervening 
Lineup Condition 
R-K-G Post-
identification Judgment 
N Proportion of people in this group who 
identified the IS* from both lineups 
Biased Remember  13 0.62 
Know 16 0.56 
Other 21 0.00 
Fair Remember 15 0.20 
Know 19 0.00 
Other 16 0.08 
Notes. * IS = innocent suspect. N = sample size for that group of participants. All values rounded 
to 2 decimal places. 
 
Experiment 2 
Categorical Remember-Know-Guess Judgment 
I wanted to investigate the processes responsible for the increase in incorrect 
identifications of the innocent suspect seen after a participant is presented with at least one 
intervening lineup. To do this, various intervening task predictors were included as potential 
predictors of participants’ categorical R-K-G judgments. Table 10 contains a summary of the 
proportions relevant to these analyses. 
Intervening task condition. When all six combinations of intervening task were entered 
as predictors in the model along with whether the participant misidentified the innocent suspect 
from the final lineup, the main effect model was a better fit to the data than the null model (D = 
19.13, p = 0.085), but adding interactions did not improve the model (D = 8.82, p = 0.55). The 
main effects results demonstrated that the addition of any intervening lineup increased the 
chance that participants would make a “know” judgments rather than report they were 
“guessing” (Brange = 0.49 – 1.33, ! = 1.63 – 3.78). In particular, biased intervening lineups 
(biased then fair lineup: B = 0.98, ! = 2.66; biased then no lineup: B = 1.33, ! = 3.78) and two 
intervening lineups (B = 1.28, ! = 3.60) seemed to have the largest effect on R-K-G judgments. 
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Familiarity judgments were also more common than guess judgments when the participant 
selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup, rather than a filler (B = 0.51, ! = 1.67). 
A similar effect was found for “remember” judgments—whenever an intervening lineup 
was presented (rather than no lineup) there was an increase in “remember” judgments relative to 
“guess” judgments (Brange = 0.25 – 0.88, ! = 1.28 – 2.41). The effect of intervening lineups on 
“remember” judgments appeared to be weaker overall though. The strongest effect was found 
when two fair intervening lineups were presented though (B = 0.88, ! = 2.41), followed by when 
a biased then a fair intervening lineup was given (B = 0.59, ! = 1.80). “Remember” judgments 
were also much more common than “guess” judgment for participants who selected the innocent 
suspect from the final lineup (B = 0.83, ! = 2.29). 
Number of intervening lineups. When the number of lineups (zero, one, or two) was 
used as a predictor of participants R-K-G judgments, the main effect model was a better fit to the 
data than the null model (D = 12.82, p = 0.012), but adding the interaction did not help to predict 
R-K-G judgments (D = 0.26, p = 0.878). The multinomial results showed that with each 
additional intervening lineup, there was a 48% increase in “know” judgments and “remember” 
judgments relative to “guess” judgments (Bknow = 0.39, ! = 1.48; Bremember = 0.39, ! = 1.48). In 
addition, “know” judgments were 65% more likely than “guess” judgments when participants 
selected the innocent suspect from the final lineup rather than a filler (B = 0.50, ! = 1.65). An 
innocent suspect identification rather than a filler identification was associated with 
approximately two times more “remember” judgments than “guess” judgments, a much larger 
effect (B = 0.77, ! = 2.16). So, more intervening lineups and identifying a repeated innocent 
suspect from a final lineup were both associated with reports of stronger memory experiences 
and less guessing. 
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Table 10. A summary of the proportion of individuals within each condition in Experiment 2 who 
identified the innocent suspect or did not, separated by R-K-G judgment. 
 
 
Intervening Task 
Conditions 
 
 
 
N 
“Guess” / “Not 
Present” Judgments 
“Know” Judgments “Remember” 
Judgments 
Innocent 
Suspect 
ID 
Another 
Decision 
Innocent 
Suspect 
ID 
Another 
Decision 
Innocent 
Suspect 
ID 
Another 
Decision 
No Lineups 45 0.13 0.58 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.09 
One Lineup 142 0.08 0.42 0.12 0.23 0.06 0.09 
Two Lineups 116 0.16 0.30 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.07 
No LUP No LUP 45 0.13 0.58 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.09 
Biased LUP Fair LUP 62 0.24 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.08 
Biased LUP No LUP 63 0.10 0.37 0.19 0.22 0.06 0.06 
Fair LUP  Fair LUP 54 0.06 0.39 0.11 0.24 0.15 0.06 
Fair LUP No LUP 44 0.07 0.48 0.07 0.23 0.02 0.14 
No LUP  Fair LUP 35 0.09 0.46 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.09 
Notes. LUP = Lineup. ID = identification. Rows show the proportion of N for each identification 
type, within each category of R-K-G, so each row totals to 1. Proportions rounded to 2dp. 
 
Number of innocent suspect identifications in the intervening lineups. Finally, a 
model was run to address whether choosing the innocent suspect from a previous lineup 
influenced participant’s R-K-G judgments. When examining the effect of choosing the innocent 
suspect at least once from an intervening lineup, the main effects model was significantly better 
than the null model (D = 28.50, p <.001), but adding an interaction did not improve the model 
any further (D = 3.20, p = 0.20). Choosing appeared to have a large effect on participant’s R-K-
G judgments—when a participant identified the innocent suspect from at least one intervening 
lineup, the chance of a “know” judgment or a “remember” judgment was approximately five 
times that of a guess judgment (Bknow = 1.76, ! = 5.81; Bremember = 1.76, ! = 5.81). A 
misidentification of the innocent suspect rather than a filler had no effect on the likelihood of a 
“know” judgment (B = 0.01, ! = 1.01), but increased the number of “remember” judgments by 
34% (B = 0.29, ! = 1.34). So, choosing the same person from a previous lineup seemed to 
greatly increase the strength of participant’s subjective memory experience—they were far less 
likely to judgment their decision as a guess—and choosing the innocent suspect from the final 
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lineup was associated with more subjective recollection processes. 
Multiple identifications of the innocent suspect and false recollection. Was there 
evidence that people who selected the innocent suspect multiple times across the procedure 
experienced more false recollection than people who only selected the innocent suspect in the 
final lineup? Again, only participants who misidentified the innocent suspect from the final 
lineup were used in these analyses. The multinomial model that included whether the participant 
selected the innocent suspect from an intervening lineup as a predictor was a significantly better 
fit to the data than the null model (D = 17.93, p<.001). Refer to Table 11 for a summary of the 
number of people within each R-K-G category, the proportion of those individuals who selected 
the innocent suspect from the final lineup only, and the proportion who selected the innocent 
suspect from more than one lineup during the experimental procedure.  
 
Table 11. A summary of the proportion of people in Experiment 2 within each R-K-G group who 
selected the innocent suspect multiple times or only from the final lineup. 
R-K-G 
Judgment 
Sample 
Size 
Proportion who selected the IS* 
only from the final lineup 
Proportion who selected the IS* 
from more than one lineup 
Remember 19 0.84 0.16 
Know 33 0.37 0.63 
Guess 30 0.37 0.63 
Total 82   
Notes. *IS = innocent suspect. R-K-G = Remember-Know-Guess. All values rounded to 2dp. 
 
The multinomial results suggested that people who selected the innocent suspect from at 
least one intervening lineup were significantly more likely to judge their memory experience as 
“know” (B = 2.17, ! = 8.76) or “remember” (B = 2.15, ! = 8.58) rather than “guess.” However, 
there was no significant differences in the likelihood of a “remember” or “know” judgment—
these judgments were equally likely and much more likely than a guess when participants chose 
the innocent suspect multiple times. Thus, a misidentification of the innocent suspect from an 
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intervening lineup increases both misattributions of familiarity and false recollection for 
individuals that selected the innocent suspect from a previous lineup and the final lineup, but not 
for people who only chose the innocent suspect from the final lineup. 
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